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This thesis is a study of special interest group use of the coalition 
technique to accomplish a public affairs agenda. The study provides a brief 
overview of the history of special interest group activity in the United States; 
discusses the legal restrictions placed on special interest groups by the laws 
of the State of Iowa and the United States of America. Further, this study 
considers the ethical implications of these actions in the context of the 
professional codes of the Public Relations Society of America and the 
International Association of Business Communicators. 
The study is based on in-depth interviews regarding the operation of 
four coalitions which were formed to accomplish public affairs agendas at 
local ancl national levels. At the local level, the coalitions were formed by a 
for-profit cc)ry>oration seeking to influence a ballot initiative. At the national 
level, o n e  c-o:ilition \\';LS forn~ed by 3 trade association and the other nras 
formecl I > \ .  :L foreign pxfcrnrnent. Each sought to influence a national public 
policy clcl,:itc, -I- hi. rnctli:~ coirerage of these coalitions by $'elite" media was 
analyzecl to :~.sc.c.rtain if the meclia performed in a watchdog capacity, 
informing tllc. pi11,lic if:'\\.hen illegal or unethical actions occurred. Coalition 
ativities \\.c*rcB ;~n:ll\.zc.cl in the contest of professional codes since coalitions 
are of tea r l  f'or~i~c.cl ;ind olxr;lteci blr public relations professionals. 
'I'llcl cluc.s~ ion c.onsiclerecl in this thesis was whether, by the analysis of 
cases 1lis1( )ric~s. 111ecli;i C-o\'er:ige ;1nc1 ethical codes, guidelines for the ethical 
fornxitic )n ;inti c )lWr;ltic )n o f  co;llitions l,y speci:ll interest groups could be 
estal~!isllc.el. 
'J'llel 1-intli ngs 01' t.llis sti~clj~ :Ire t11:1t co:llitions jxrforni ;In important role 
when 111c.j. rc.prclsc:nt ;i I>ro:ld p~~l,lic interest. the "gr:tss roots;" hon.ever 
c.():lliri(,ns ;Ire. fc,r~i~cci nvithour consider:ltion for true representation of a 
]->ro:ld c.ilizc~~l I , ; l s c b .  [I~cby ri1:ly l,e dc.cc.pti\.e. ilnet11ic:ll :~nci .Astroturf-t1.p front 
org:iniz:~lions. Ix)tc~n~i:ill~~ cl:~mnging to the pi~I>lic interest. The media c:ln 
I :  I i l ~ l l x ) r I ; ~ ~ ~  I-OIC in protecting  he i>i~l>lic nterest 1,). performing :n 
~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ c ~ l l ~ l ~ ) , ~ ~ ~  llo\\x.~.c~r [ I I C > ?  c l o  not ; I~\ \~:I )~S rise 10 this res1x)nsihiiit\.. 
Tllc pI l l , l i ( .  I.CII:lti( )[IS ~>rofC~ssion I>C';II..S I ~ C '  hnlnt of rnccli:~ :lncl pi~hlic. conct'r-n 
L t r l l ( y c .  ~ l l l c ~ ~ ] ~ i c ~ ; l l  ~-0:1li[io1i ;~c.ti\~it?~ (n\i*i~rs, 131lii-;11 gi1ic~~~1irlc.s for 1 1 s ~  
p L l l ~ l i ~ -  f . c a ] : l t  i t  )II.S I , ~ ; I ( . I  i t  i (  ) ~ i c ~ r s .  11ic) 111c.cIi;~ :111cl t he>  p~~l>lic, ;IIY offe~-c~cI, 
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Chapter 1 -- Introduction 
"Where the voice of the lone dissenter may be heard in the New 
England town meeting (our romantic image of democratic 
society), the strident voice of the 'movement' is heard across the 
land. This is the force which turns media attention in new 
directions and which may turn societies in new directions." 
(Westley, 1987, p47). 
Special Interest Groups (SIGS) organized to advance a specific cause 
have been part of the American political scene since Colonial days. Today, 
SIGS exist to advance almost any cause, from saving the environment or a 
specific animal (snail darters or Spotted owls), to encouraging a particular 
style of living (vegetarianism, family-based values, alcohol- or drug-free), to 
promoting a particular product, service or project (gambling, health care 
services or having a stop light installed at a busy intersection). SIGS are 
formed in a community to address a local issue or at the regional, national or 
international level to advance causes of much broader interest. SIGS may be 
long-lived to address an issue of ongoing concern to the group's members, 
or they may dissolve after dealing with the issue or goal that brought the 
group together. 
SIGS usually work to advance some political agenda, to accomplish 
solnc ch:lnge in the law or public policy The United States' representative 
system of pcwernmen[ is structured to be responsive to the R-ishes of the 
c.itizenI\m, :I result, the more 'voices' a special interest group represents. 
the 1nOl.c likely it is that a governing bod?. nrill respond to the group's 
wishes. To represent the greatest number of voices, special interest groups 
often find it helpful to join with others who have similar interests. 
Coalitions are one of the tools special interest groups use to acquire 
greater power and advance their causes more effectively in the public affairs 
arena. Coalitions derive their power from the numbers of individuals and 
organizations they represent and the credibility attached to those numbers by 
the public and by policy makers. 
To further the perception of coalitions as representative of a broad 
base of people, coalitions are frequently given names crafted to indicate the 
inclusive, grassroots nature of their membership. Common coalition names 
include: Concerned Maine Families (a group promoting an anti-gay rights 
agenda), the Coalition for a Competitive Food and Agriculture System (a 
group lobbying for change in government farm programs), and Citizens 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes (an organization of some 6,000 groups 
interested in hazardous waste disposal). 
The effectiveness of coalitions in helping SIGS achieve public policy 
goals has encouraged even more individuals, groups and organizations to 
l o k  to coalition-building as a weapon in their public affairs arsenal. It is not 
the premise of this study that organizations begin coalitions with the intent 
to deceive. nor that all coalitions do deceive. Unfortunately. however, some 
Icx,k for a quick fix and take shortcuts that amount to buying the results and 
nnlnipLllating the public rather than building relationship and involL7ing the 
pul,lic :I legitinlate level. This quick fix approach to coalition work has 
e\,en gener:ltcd a new name, Instead of "grassroots lobbying" -- utilizing 
l e p i ~ i m : l ~ r  coalitions nrhicll truly do speak for the broad base of indi\viduals. 
gn,ul,s they represent. -- then Tresun. Secretan, Lloyd 
Bentsen dubbed the new phenomenon in which "front" groups imitate 
coalitions, "Astroturf Lobbying." 
Coalitions carry with them the perceived credibility of involvement by 
a wide range of interested parties. They imply a voice that speaks for many. 
When they deceive or mislead the public or policy-making bodies, they can 
undermine the professionalism of public relations and damage the public 
trust. It is arguable that a front group falsely purporting to be a broad-based 
grassroots organization abuses the First Amendment rights of assembly and 
petition. As a result, such front organizations should be a cause for ethical 
concern. 
When a legitimate, strategic communications tool of the public affairs 
industry is misused in such a manner, it must be of great concern to all. The 
public, legislative bodies and the communications industry are all abused 
when unethical shortcuts are taken to form and operate coalitions. 
Yet, what constitutes a legitimate coalition effort? How can the public, 
the media and governing bodies distinguish between a coalition that 
legitimately represents a broad grassroots section of the public and one with 
its I~zsis in ~stroturf? Further, what role do the media play in uncovering 
~ s t ~ o t u  rf coalitions? \Vhat guidelines should individuals. public relations 
professionals and organizations, which wish to form or participate in a 
co:tlition. follon- to ensure that their efforts are credible and ethical? 
Obiective Of The Studv 
pllrpost. of this study is to analyze four coalition efforts: the 
cI:lrhc c o l l n r ~  Developnlent Corp.. the Citizens for Riverboat Ganddinp. the 
(:i,izclls for :I Fret. E;~\\~ait, :~nd the Co:llition for Health Insumnce Choices. 
- ~ . l ~ ~  :ln;llvsis \ \ r i l l  1,:fit.d o n  intt.nvie~vs n7ith 0rgnniz:aion principds: 3 
comparison of whether the coalitions operated in compliance with standards 
of conduct of professional communication societies; and a review of media 
coverage of these four coalitions in the Washington Post, the New York 
Times, and the Des Moines Register. 
These four coalitions were chosen for study because they are 
representative of how individual companies, national trade associations and 
governments use the coalition technique to advance their public affairs 
agendas at local, national and international levels. 
Two coalitions were formed by, or involved, Argosy Gaming Co. to 
influence county ballot issues. 
The Clarke County Development Corp. was established in 1994 by a local 
economic development group and involved Argosy Gaming with the 
objective of convincing Clarke County, Iowa, voters to pass a local 
referendum on riverboat gambling. 
Citizens For Riverboat Gambling was established by Argosy Gaming in 
1993 to encourage Polk County, Iowa, voters to pass a referendum on 
riverboat gambling. 
Two coalitions operated at the national level: one a foreign country 
seeking to influence the opinions of the American public; the other a trade 
;~sstx.iation seeking to influence opinion on a national social issue. 
Citizens For A Free Kuwait was formed in 1989 to provide information to 
convince the United States population and government to support Kunrair 
during the Persian Gulf X'Z. 
?'he Co:llition for Health Insurance Choices nlas formed in 1972, by the 
1 Ie;lltll Insur;lnce Associ:ition of America to p i n  grxssrwts involvement 
(,f ,lIc. Anleric:ln pLlt,lic in the n:ltion's health care debate. 
The media selected for this evaluation represent the "elite" media in 
terms of coverage of these subjects. "Elite" media have been defined as 
those media which frequently lead other media in subject coverage. The 
New York Times and the Washington Post are elite from a national 
perspective. The Des Moines Register frequently leads other media in its 
market. In addition, the media serve in a watchdog capacity for the public. 
If an organization is operating in a deceptive or misleading manner, how 
quickly do the media realize it and alert the public? 
Evaluations of the four programs will be made in the context of ethical 
guidelines established by the Public Relations Society of America in its Code 
of Professional Standards for the Practice of Public Relations and the 
International Association of Business Communicators in its Code of Ethics. 
Finally, the author will propose guidelines for use by public relations 
professionals, the media, governing bodies and the public for developing and 
evaluating coalition-building efforts. 
Content Of The Study 
This study contains four parts. Part I comprises the introduction and 
literature review, Chapters One and Two. 
In I'art 11, Chapter Three offers a brief history of special interest 
groups in the Unitecl States, including SIG use of coalitions. and outlines 
ethical isslles related to SIG operation. Chapter Four re\.iews elements of the 
CO&S of the Public Relations Society of America and The International 
Ass()c.i:ltion of Husiness Conmmunicators n,hich appll7 to SIG coalitions. 
~1m:llxe~ Five clincusses legal restrictions on special interest groups 
1):lrt 111 offers tq'o c1m:lpters. covering c:use :~n:llysis and nmedia re\.ie\\.. 
~t,:,,,",. Six p-csults [he four callition c:lst.s. including who n.:us in\-ol\-ed. 
what happened and what resulted from each campaign. Chapter Seven is a 
discussion of media coverage on the four cases. 
In Part IV, Chapter Eight presents conclusions, suggested guidelines 
for use by any individual or group interested in developing or evaluating a 
coalition effort, as well as recommendations for additional research. 
References 
Westley, B. H.  (Spring 1987). Setting the political agenda: What makes it 
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Chapter 2 -- Literature Review 
Two communication theories -- agenda setting and agenda building -- 
hold particular relevance for a study of special interest group use of 
coalitions. 
The agenda setting theory explores the role of the media in 
determining not so much what the public thinks, but rather what the public 
thinks about. Agenda setting research also addresses the broader subject of 
who sets the agenda for the media and the interaction of individuals, special 
interest groups and the media in having an impact on policy making 
agendas. 
Agenda building is the process of moving a subject from being an 
issue of interest to a few, to establishing it as a part of the public agenda 
(subjects of interest to individuals or groups within the general public), and 
subsequently having it adopted on the formal agenda (subjects addressed by 
legislative bodies) (Cobb, Ross & Ross. 1976). 
Agenda-setting and agenda-building research overlap in many cases. 
However. while agenda-setting research focuses on the role the media plav. 
agenda-building research looks at the broader context of policy making in 
which the media nuy  or may not play a role. 
Numerous studies of agenda setting have shown a correlation between 
ix~hLit the cover with regard to political and social issues and n-hat the 
pLll,lic Is likely to say are the salient political/socid issues (Protess & 
McComl,s. 1971, 1~47-60, $1-67, p71-74, p75-88. p87-77, p119-125. p127- 
129). 
Tile role of the medi;~ in shaping the public plic). zigend:~ is germme 
,(, r l l i s  slL,ciJl  slxcl:ll interest groups incre:~singl!. use the medi:~ to nise 
awareness of their agendas with the public and policy makers (Rose, 1991; 
Adams Ck Jennings, 1793). 
In addition, the Washington, D.C. media have been described as a 
"shadow government" (Rivers, 1982) with the United States government and 
the media increasingly operating as a symbiotic unit. The government 
presents a desired image to the media; the media re-interprets that image and 
feeds it back though media coverage; the government thoughtfully reacts to 
this re-interpretation. 
At the local level, research has explored whether the media set 
agendas or pass on priorities set by other individuals/organizations in society 
(Weaver & Elliott, 1985). One conclusion was that to a great extent the 
media reflect the city council agenda but do so in a "filtered" manner, 
reflecting but also making news judgments. 
The public relies upon the integrity of the media to report the news 
accurately and completely. One expectation the public has of the media, and 
probably that the media have of themselves, is to perform in a watchdog 
role. I t  is relevant, then, to consider who sets the agenda for the meda. 
Agenda setting research has considered a number of points of 
~nfluence. Turk looked at the role of public information officers in 
esral>lishing what is covered in the media (1986). Gilberg and his colleagues 
Icx~ked :it the President of the United States as a media agenda setter (Gilberg 
el :,I . ,  1980). The agenda settins effects of media on other media have also 
I>een est:ll>lis\led (Gans, 1979; Reese & Danielian. 1989). 
~ l [ \ ~ ~ , ~ ~ h  nxlny inst:mces can be cited in which the media have been 
uecl to  ylin uisi\>ilit\. for :I special interest group issue. little resexch W% 
~ o u l , c l  (n 1 1 , ~  sul,jrc.l of ho\\. medi:~ :ire m:lnipul:ltt.d s ~ c i f i c : d l ~  to achieve 
special interest group goals. 1 Only one study was found addressing this 
issue. Manheim and Albritton (1984) analyzed the efforts of six foreign 
countries who had retained public relations firms to improve their images in 
United States media. Since almost all publics rely on media coverage to gain 
information regarding the activities of foreign countries, as Manheim and 
Albritton point out, the "product of (public relations) activity becomes a 
primary source of both public opinion and policy action. ... (R)esearch 
suggests that actors external to this process are not necessarily passive or 
benign, that to the extent of their dependence on such actors as sources of 
information, the media are vulnerable to manipulation of projected images of 
reality" (p656). 
With the exception of foreign entities, the media, public and 
government officials have access to a variety of information sources from 
which to form opinions. In this respect, the agenda-building process is a 
much more symbiotic endeavor that has possible built-in checks and 
Sti~dies to establish the agenda-setting impact of investigative reporting 
by the media on policy making have been inconclusive. Researchers studied 
several audiences who could have been influenced by media coverage of 
fraud and abuse in home care and found that watching 'the media did 
................................ 
1 CI3S .GO h4nute.s' nras the prime vehicle of the Natural Resources Defense 
Col~ncil to raise the Alar crisis in 1983. The People For the Ethical 
'Tre:ttment of Aninds (PETA) routinely contact the meda to cover their 
cle~nc~nscrations. Special interest groups appear to be well versed in 
: c i r ~ ~ i n g   med din invol\Iement, however. with the exception of the study 
n(xec\ :ll,o\~c., illccii;l nnnipulntion has not heen :l well-identified. 
sese:trcl~rcl str:ltegy. 
influence the general public's opinion of the importance of an issue. Media 
coverage also influenced government policy maker opinion but not the 
opinions of interest groups whose views were already firmly formed (Cook et 
al., 1983). A similar study on the subject of media coverage of rape showed 
the greatest impact on the media itself with more limited impact on other 
publics (Protess et al., 1985). The researchers reasoned this was because the 
rape issue already holds a high awareness level with all publics. 
The studies found, however, that the policy elites were more likely to 
change policy based on working with media directly rather than because of 
public pressure. Journalists would work policy solutions into their stories. 
Policy makers who had been interviewed in the process of story 
development were more likely to implement those changes. 
Widespread involvement by the public in the policy making process 
occurs through agenda building, both from the standpoint of developing 
new issues and in the context of redefining old issues (Cobb 81 Elder, 1971). 
In considering how agenda building occurs, special interest groups are an 
important point for consideration. 
Special interest groups, which may include non-profit public interest 
groups, ;rclvocacy groups, pressure groups, corporations or individuals with a 
panicul:~ interest. have been politically active throughout United States 
history in fonvarding their private agendas to gain legislative consideration. 
In the non-profit area alone, the Foundation for Public ~ffai rs  provides 
cioc~~mentntion on 276 public interest groups, ranging from cornmunit)' and 
gr:lssnxxs orp:lniz:ltions such as Mothers Against Drunli Driving. to groups 
collcernc.cl :Iccur:lcy in the media such as the h8ledi:i Research Center, to 
\\,ell lino\\.n en\.ir-onment;rl groupsincludinp the 1za:k W'alton League 
( Illll,lic. Intcrcst I'roFiles, 1902-C)). 
SIGS are most likely to participate in the policy process via agenda 
building, a process involving more influencers and points of influence. 
R~~ea rche r s  Gladys Lang and Kun Lang, who studied the relationship 
bemeen the media and public opinion during the Watergate crisis, outlined 
six steps of "agenda building" (Lang & Lang, 1983). 
The media highlight events or activities; 
Different issues require different amounts of coverage to gain 
attention; 
Activities are "framed" or given a field of meaning; 
Language used by the media affects perception; 
Media link the activities to secondary symbols; and 
Agenda building accelerates when well-known individuals 
speak out. 
Special interest groups have been instrumental over time in advancing 
causes to the nation's "formal" agenda (Lipset, 1986). Civil rights, 
environmentalism, product safety, feminism, gambling, tax reform. These and 
countless other issues have been brought to legislative attention through the 
efforts of interest groups. The importance of special interest group efforts in 
advancing the legislative agenda has increased and refined in recent years. 
According to Douglas J .  Bergner, former executive director of the 
Found:~tion For Public Affairs, "It is clear that the public interest movement is 
:In estat31ished, ongoing, and very significant factor in the formation of public 
wlic) tcxl:ly. In vrr); different fashions and with often contrasting messages. 
pul,lic intrrcst and public policy groups make government, business and the 
p'lillcians :let -- b y  raising issues and helping set the political agenda" 
( 13cA~.gner., 1986, 1316). 
Special interest groups have been studied as a starting point and as a 
sustaining factor in moving issues to the policy making stage. Special 
interest groups distribute information, hold events, create "news" to which 
the media must attend (Nelson, 1984; Westley, 1987). Even when gaining 
media attention is not the original objective, programs developed and actions 
taken by an organization can attract media attention. By attaining coverage 
in the media, special interest groups create broader awareness and an 
increased perception of the importance of issues among the general public. 
That perception of importance may be the impetus for policy makers to 
attend to the issue. 
One frequently used tool of special interest groups is the coalition -- 
"a temporary alliance of distinct parties, persons, or states for joint action" 
(Webster, 1989, ~253) .  Because they represent many voices, coalitions are 
frequently seen as credible representatives of public interest. They are also 
powerful in their ability to place pressure on policy makers, changing or 
accelerating the direction issues may take (Bergner, 1786; Novotny, 1990; 
Tucker & McNerney, 1972). 
Perceived credibility of coalitions is their major strength (Hunt, 1993; 
T ~ ~ c k e r  & McNerney, 1793; Winkelman, 1787). As Hunt points out, the 
public and legislators frequently see a coalition message as "an unbiased 
vie\\* *of the people'" (~74) .  
Special interest groups have become more cognizant of the value of 
using pu\>lic relations to advance their causes and more sophisticated in their 
use of pul>lic relations techniques, particularly strategic use of the media 
(C;I-clver 1989; Rose, 1931). Michael Perrschuk. former FTC chair m d  head 
of the Acl\*tx.ac)r Institute, coined the term "media :id\locac!." to describe ,*the 
strategic use of mass media for advancing a social or public policy initiative 
(Rose, 1991, p29). 
Coalitions have become a popular tool for advancing public affairs 
causes. A 1794 survey of Fortune 100 firms revealed that the average 
Fortune 100 company belongs to 5.7 coalitions (The Pires Group). 
The effectiveness of coalitions in helping special interest groups 
achieve public affairs goals has encouraged even more individuals, groups 
and organizations to look to coalition-building as a tool in their public affairs 
efforts (Rubinstein, 1987; Winkelman, 1989). 
Unfortunately, some organizations have taken short cuts to coalition 
building that amount to trying to buy the results and manipulate the public 
rather than build relationships and involve the public and other groups in an 
above board fashion. 
This quick-fix approach to coalition building was dubbed "Astroturf 
Lob by ing" by then Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen (Pires, 1994). Astroturf 
organizations are the "front" groups that imitate the legitimate grassroots 
coalitions that truly do speak for the broad base of individuals, groups or 
organiz:~tions they represent. 
I t  is in the credibility ascribed to front groups that imitate coalitions 
t h : ~  the potential danger to the policy making process lies. The public, media 
:~ncl rx ' l ic . \ l  mkers accord coalitions high credibility ratings because they 
perceive in\~olvement by a wide m p e  of interested parties in the coalition. 
Implicit in co:ilitions is the notion of one voice that speaks for man)-. The 
plll,lic :lncl pul~lic pllicy d i n g  organizations nuke decisions based on this 
;\scrii,t.cl c-reciit>ility. If the public, the media and polic?. ntzkers accept on its 
f;lc.cb irlform;l[ion :lnd ;irgilments of Astroturf caditions :tq represent:~ti\-e 
,f , I re  c,l,ilij(,n ancl 1,elief of :I 1,ro:al seg~nent of the p ~ l  t~lic, policy decisions 
may be n~ade that in effect represent the opinions and beliefs of a small 
segment. 
Hence, these front organizations are a cause for ethical concern 
kcause  a legitimate strategic communications tool of the public affairs 
industry (the coalition) is being misused. The public, legislative bodies, the 
~ommunications industry, are all abused when unethical shortcuts are taken 
to form and operate coalitions. 
Since public relations practitioners are increasingly involved in 
establishing coalitions and presenting them to the public, the media and to 
policy makers, ethical issues related to the practice of public relations, special 
interest groups and the use of coalitions also deserve consideration. 
There are two major areas of concern with regard to the unethical use 
of the coalition technique. One relates to credibility of the public relations 
industry and to individual practitioners, and the other derives from the effect 
the deceptions perpetrated by front organizations may have on society as a 
whole. 
Tlie public relations industry has focused considerable attention on 
gaining professional stature. Ethical conduct represents a key baseline 
criterion for gaining professional stature (McKee. Nayrnan & Lattimore, 1975; 
Cutlip N Center, 1978; Newsom S; Scott, 1793). 
Mcliee. Naynlan & Lattimore (1975) identify eight criteria for a 
pn,fession. one of which is establishing a code of ethics. The Public 
I<el:ail,ns S(xiety of America. which represents more than 16.000 p~lblic 
rel:lti(,ns ,,r:~titioner.;, adopted its first code of ethics in 1950 The 
I l l t c . rn ; l~ ion ; l l  ,4sstx_'i;ltion of Business Cornmi~nic:ltors, representing 12.500 
c.( l l~lm~lll ic. :~~~,~s :Iciopted its first code of ethics in 1985. 
The argument has been made for a universal code of ethics, one 
which would apply to all practitioners and which would be promoted as a 
m r m  of operation, as a way to counter public perception that the industry is 
divided within itself on the subject of ethics (Hunt & Tirpok, 1773). Those 
opposed to a universal code argue that adherence to a code of conduct is for 
the r~~os t  Part voluntary, relying on practitioners to be ethical because they 
believe in themselves and desire the respect of the public (Wright, 1773). 
The discussion of ethical conduct by public relations practitioners is ongoing 
and frequently focuses on the need for reputation management to reside 
with individual practitioners rather than be mandated by a society code. 
Considering that the 1994 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics records 
nearly 160,000 public relations professionals in America today, and the 
professional societies represent only a fraction of those, it would seem clear 
that professional organizations and formal codes aside, it is important for 
individual practitioners to be aware of ethical considerations and choose to 
conduct themselves, and counsel their employers, in ethical approaches to 
miintztin the public trust. 
"The real keepers of the reputation are those who practice public 
re1:ition.s. If they do it well and honorably, there will some day come a time 
when the reputation issue will go anray," commented Davis Young. Fellow. 
I>RSA. ;1 former chair of the PRSA ethics committee (Bovet, 1973). 
I'ul,lic opinion polls have shown serious erosion in public esteem for 
I,usinrsses :Ind gc)\rernment (I\'ewyx)n 8 Saad, 1994). Pratt lists three 
reasons \\,IlJ, this trend will  have a significant impact on public relations: 
. IIut,ljc relations f~ces  more ethical dilernnus. and practitioners are :dso 
seer1 ;IS *.tnlsted counselors;" 
Public relations confronts gray areas of conduct where different 
approaches and responses to communications situations may arise, and 
while environment and social responsibility have greater emphasis as 
focal points for public relations actions, public relations still faces 
public demand for "morality, decency, accuracy, and professionalism 
in actions" (Pratt, 1994, p218). 
Much of the ethical conflict lies in the advocacy role of public 
relations. Barney and Black (1994) liken our adversarial society to a court 
room. They defend the advocacy role of public relations as arguing a client's 
case in the court of public opinion just as a lawyer does in a court of law. 
Public relations is not required to present all sides of an issue, they say, 
because the adversarial society assumes (but does not guarantee) that 
someone will rise up to argue the other side. 
Englehardt and Evans (1994, p251) acknowledge that "the practice of 
public relations is prone to situations of deception and concealment" but 
emphasize the consideration of mitigating social, personal and political 
circunstances which may intervene. They stress focusing on avoiding harm 
to relationships as a guide to truth telling. 
I-Ionf the public relations industry addresses ethical issues will be the 
clefining k~ctor for the profession in the future (Pratt, 1994). Maintaining 
pr0fession:d stature requires daily diligence. With public trust in 
i . o r ~ x x ~ i ~ ~ , n s  and the government eroding, those in the public relations 
pu~fessi(,n (:I profession n-hich by definition acts in a mediator role bern-een 
t]lc (,rg:lniz;ltion the p~~b l i c  relations pnctitioner represents :lnd that 
ol.q,lniz:l~l(,n*s pu131ifi)  [nust stand firm on erliics to preLVent filnher erosion 
:,ncl I ( ,  tlel13 rel,uild lc,.;t trust. In this light. tcmls such :IS coalitions. n-hich 
involve bringing together many constituencies, are a particularly important 
ground on which to take an ethical stand. 
The lack of a singularly directed focus within the public relations 
industry with regard to ethics takes on special meaning when applied to 
special interest group operation and to the formation and utilization of 
coalitions to attain public affairs goals. 
Listing ethical issues in public relations, Bovet included misinformation 
or dissemination of misleading information as a key problem (1793). Clearly, 
a "front" coalition disseminates misleading information and perhaps outright 
lies as well. 
Tucker and McNerney advise that coalition participants must replace 
the win-lose mentality of members with one that's win-win. They say that 
mutual benefit is the ethical barometer of a good coalition. "True mutuality 
balances the interests of stakeholders and the public good" (1992, p28). 
The PRSA Code of Professional Standards for the Practice of Public 
1iel:itions includes articles that specifically say members shall '.conduct 
ourselves professionally, with truth, accuracy, fairness, and responsibility to 
the pi~l>lic;" that members "shall not knowingly disseminate false or 
1nisle3ding inforrmtion;" and that members "shall not use anv indi~~idual or
org:~nization professing ro serve or represent an announced cause. or 
pn)lrssinp t o  be independent or unbiased, but actually senring another or 
~~nclisclosecl interest" (PRSA Code of Professional St:1ndards. 1988). The 
li\13C ~ ( ~ l e .  of Ethics takes a bro:lder based 3ppr0:1ch nrhich pro\-ides 
. S u i c l c l i r l c  of i,rofrssionnl 1,eh:lvior . . :lnd focuses on helping incii\.iduals 
L l t ~ \ - c l ~ , l ~  e~tlic:ll c[eci.sion-nrlking skills inclependent of IABC polic!-'' (IABC 
C:c,de of' I.rllics, IYC)-* ) .  A 11101.e conlpsehen~iw discussion of these t\\.o ccx1t.s 
:Is ],c.\r :lpl,l\. 10 c~,:ll ili(,n :rcii\.il\. is in Ch:lpter Fou S, 
Perhaps the larger ethical concern is the damage unethical coalition 
behavior does to individuals and to society. Bok contends that deception 
damages the human community as a whole (1787). She points out that lies 
misinform, obscuring the real objective of a communication or action; lies 
eliminate or obscure relevant alternatives; lies obscure accurate estimates of 
costs and benefits; they provide a degree of uncertainty in how we look at 
choices. All of these concerns can be applied to the unethical use of 
coalitions by special interest groups. 
Yet, what constitutes a legitimate coalition effort? How can the public, 
the media and the governing bodies recognize a coalition that represents a 
broad grassroots section and one which has its base in '~stroturf?' What 
guidelines should individuals, public relations professionals and 
organizations which wish to form or participate in a coalition follow to 
ensure that their efforts are effective and ethical? 
Methodology 
This study is designed to analyze the coalition efforts of a variety of 
o r ~ n i t i n  In addition, media coverage of each of these coalitions will be 
an;~lvzed. As an outcome of this analysis. the author will propose guidelines 
for  (1st. IJJ ,  pi~blic relations professionals. the media, governing bodies and 
l\lc pul,lic for clevelopiny and evaluating ethical codit ion-bu ilding efforts. 
Fo~lr co:llitio~l efforts nrill he anal\.zecl: the Co:llirion For Health 
I~ls~lr:lnct> Choices, Citizens For A Free Kunrait. the C1:lrke County 
c.l(,lx,lcnr R,r,>,, :lntl Citizens For Ki\-ertxxlt Gu~nl~linp The md!.sis \\.ill 
I n c . l r l c l c b  in,cr\,ie~\s n . i t h  orp:lniz:lrion princip:lls; :I cornpilrison of the 
operation of these coalitions to ethical standards proposed by professional 
communications organizations; and a review of media coverage of the four 
coalitions. 
The interviews will address several areas of interest: the coalition's 
stated objective; who was approached to participate in the coalition and 
when; how the coalition was funded; how coalition members were involved 
in the coalition communication process; how the coalition communicated 
about membership to the public, policy makers and the media; and how the 
coalition perceived media coverage of coalition efforts. 
The media selected for this evaluation represent the "elite" media in 
terms of coverage of these subjects. As Gans (1979) suggests, if the elite 
media cover a particular topic, it is likely that other media will cover the 
subject as well. 1 In addition, the media serve in a watchdog capacity for the 
public. If an organization is operating in a deceptive or misleading manner! 
it is relevant how quickly the media realize it and alert the public. 
Articles will be evaluated to determine: how much coverage of each 
coalition there was; whether or not the media delved into the membership 
................................. 
1 'The definition of "elite" media has been expanded in this study to include 
rhe nwst prominent medium to cover each coalition. In the case of the 
Citizens For Riverboat Gambling and the Clarke County Development 
Corl3. conlitions. this is the Des Moines Register. It is arguable that the 
li~~g,<.;rer leads coverage of issues by other Des Moines media. Hon-e\-er; 
somct1me.s the other media in Des Moines nvill refuse to cover a subject 
fll-s~ ;lclclressed by the Kegisrer. Only the Register co\'erape nil1 be 
:Ist=+& on the g:uilbling coalitions. Only coverage in the  yen- I-ork 
'l.il,le..; ;lncl \yl;l,shjnpron Pmr will be usecl t o  e~~aluate the other mro 
c x  ):~lit~o~~>q. 
2 1 
and operation of the coalitions; how much influence the media reported each 
coalition having on policy making related to its stated purpose. 
The four programs will be evaluated in the context of ethical 
guidelines established by the Public Relations Society of America Code of 
Professional Standards and the International Association of Business 
Communicators Code of Ethics. 
Based on these evaluations, suggested guidelines for developing 
and/or evaluating coalition formation and operation will be presented. 
Limitations 
Two limitations to this study must be recognized. First, the coalitions 
are being evaluated based on interviews with public relations practitioners 
involved with each coalition. The information they provide is being 
analyzed on its face. The only check on the accuracy of this information 
was provided by the media coverage of these issues. In some cases 
(particuljrly the Citizens for a Free Kuwait) information provided by the 
interviewee conflicts with the generally understood objectives and actions of 
the group. Since the events are described by public relations representatives 
f o r  each coalition, it is reasonable to expect that the best light (the "corporate 
line") will be placed on each group's actions. Also, the study is restricted by 
the ;Irnount of time which could be spent on each interview. In the case of 
Citizens for ;I Free Kuwait, significantly less time was available for 
intcn.'it.nling the agency principal. 
,4 second 1inGt;ltion relates to the media analysis. The ;uticles 
:In:llvzed firere those listed in the indices for rhe pub1ic:ltions. Since all 
:,,-liclrs tiling e:lc]l co:llition n.ere not listed in the respective indexes. 
undoubtedly the media analysis is incomplete. While the media analysis is, 
as a result, not complete, the articles reviewed were seminal to the actions of 
the coalitions studied, according to the public relations principals. 
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Chapter 3 -- Special Interest Groups: 
A Brief History of Grass Roots Impact 
The United States of America was founded as a democracy, a form of 
government in which the power to govern rests with the people. The actual 
ability to n~ake and change laws is vested in governing bodies which, 
theoretically at least, are representative of the people as a whole. 
While the governments at local, state and national levels are 
responsible for law making, the people never give up their right to be 
involved in the legislative process through political organization and political 
expression (Emerson & Haber, 1952). 
By law and by history, the rights of the individual in the United Sates 
carry great weight and are protected by the First Amendment rights of 
assembly and petition. 
The idea of individuals of like mind banding together into special 
interest groups to advance their opinions before legislative bodies has a long 
history in the United States. Social activism, which seemed to rise up in the 
1960s nrhen events and social changes caused a ground swell of public 
interest group activity on such topics as the Vietnam War, civil rights, and 
:lbortion, really had its roots in America's founding (Lipset, 1986). 
From colonial times on, activities that were handled in Europe by the 
st;lte or strlte-finance~i organizations were taken over in the United States b?. 
organizations. Business leaders who had become financiall?~ 
souncl I,egan to support symphonies, universities and medical facilities. 
~ ~ , l ~ ~ ~ t e e r  groups took responsibility for social services. Earl!. 
,,Lll ,I iuslxci:ll interest groups addressed anti-sla\.enr. fenunism. 
c~n\~lrc,nment;llis~n :ind inclividu;~l rights. 
At one extreme, the Boston Tea Party might be viewed as a colonial 
special interest group activity. On December 16, 1773, a group of Boston 
citizens, led by American patriot Samuel Adam, boarded ships and dumped 
the cargo of tea into Boston harbor to protest the British tax on tea. 
The Revolutionary War-era Sons of Liberty represent a more 
formalized early special interest group. Organized by Samuel Adams and 
Paul Revere, the Sons of Liberty were highly active in promoting the policy 
agenda. They opposed the Stamp Act until it was repealed; formed the 
Committees of Correspondence to resist British economic and political actions 
and took part in convoking the Continental Congress (Funk 8; Wagnalls, 
1979). 
Issues of public interest to America's early citizens eventually 
generated special interest groups which remain influential today: the National 
Rifle Association was formed in 1871; the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People was established in 1909, and the American 
Civil Liberties Union became active in 1920. 
The United States' unique political context with two houses and a 
presiciency in which none of those involved is formally subject to party rule 
Itla\!es the system particularly open to special interest group lobbying 
(Lipset ).  
Speci;il interest groups have increased in popularity in recent decades. 
A content :in:rlysis of the 1986 edition of Public Interest Profiles found that 
spt.ci:\l interest groups were growing in numbers. increasing their spheres of 
intluencc.. cloing niore grassroots work and working nrith large budgets 
( 13~1-gncr-. 1986). 
'~'hc. ;~n;il\~sis founcl that SO percent of the groups profiled operated :it 
I\\.(, ,hrec> It.\.&: I ~ K . ; I ~ ,  s.;t:lte. federal or intern:ttional. Fort). percent of the 
groups had been formed in the 1970s and 20 percent had come into 
existence since 1980. 
G ~ ~ s r o o t s  organizations (the foundation for coalitions) had become 
highly sophisticated. Half of the organizations were doing grassroots work, 
up 20 percent from the previous edition of Public Interest Profiles. 
T'he aggregate budget total of the non-profit, public interest 
organizations profiled was $1.5 billion. Some 60 percent of the organizations 
had budgets in excess of $1 million. 
Non-profit public interest groups may be the first special interest 
groups to come to mind, but the for-profit sector is also active in the policy 
making arena. Frequently commercial interests operate through industry 
trade associations which, by their non-profit nature, are seen as more 
credible and public interest oriented. 
A survey of Fortune 100 firms conducted by The Pires Group (1994) 
underscored the dollars for-profit corporations invest in advancing a public 
affairs agenda. The survey reported that ninety percent of these large 
comp:inies spend at least $1 million a year on public affairs, and that one- 
thircl have budgets of more than $5 million. 
Consumer-protection advocate Ralph Nader described three waves of 
pul,lic interest group activism in the 20th Century (Public Interest profiles 
]c)c)'-19C)3). The first reflected a rise in the populist-progressive movements 
\ - \ r I l i c . h  c~c.urrecI in response to labor problems, urban squalor and 
expl(,ir;l,i(,n 1,). r:lilrilnds and b:mks Wornen's and b1:sk rights n-ere issues 
nper-c, c i \ p i l  liberties in general. As noted earlier, the ACLU and NAACP 
\\.ere) esr:ll,lished during this first wave. 
The second wave arose out of the Great Depression and World War 
11. The Consumers Union and many social service organizations became 
active during this period, particularly in the cities. 
The third wave occurred in the 1960's when civil rights, 
environmentalism, women's rights and consumer justice became issues. 
These movements resulted in the establishment of many government 
agencies expressly to handle these issues. One government organization 
established in response to the activism of the 1960s was the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA was founded in 1970 to set standards for 
air quality, radiation levels, pesticides in food and waste disposal. 
Nader suggests that these waves of special interest group activism 
seem to occur in 30 year cycles and that another wave may be  ready to 
occur, aided by the increase in technology. 
The level of special interest group activism changes in response to the 
current political scene (Rose, 1991). During the Carter adrmnistration, 
activists were in key government positions and the government involved 
itself in many areas, including product development, safety, advertising and 
pricing. I t  was preceding and during the Carter administration that Nader 
organizecl his Nader's Raiders, teams of lawyers, consumer special is^ and 
stuclents to conduct surveys of companies, federal agencies and the U.S. 
Congress analyzing how responsive they were to consumer interests. 
I'resident Reagan, on the other hand, adopted more of a "Let business 
be 17Llsiness,'' stance m d  opposed a federal government that overshadowed 
s1:lte.s' rights. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l i ~ ~  to D ~ ~ ~ I : I S  1, Bergner. then editor and executive director of 
,hC, ,:oL,ncl:ition fc)r ~)ublic Affi~irs. "The public interest movement. nrhich n7as 
once :, fr inge element in the  ~~I icy-nxking  process. has nutured :lnd 
developed a new professionalism. It is clear that the public interest 
movement is an established, ongoing, and very significant factor in the 
formation of public policy today. In very different fashion, and with often 
contrasting messages, public interest and public policy groups make 
government, business and the politicians act -- by raising issues and helping 
set the political agenda," ( ~ 1 6 )  
While activism was at a high point in the 1970s, it didn't disappear 
after that. Rather, organizers changed tactics and became more sophisticated 
in their methods and s a y  about how business operates (Grover, 1989; 
Rose). 
As special interest groups have become more adept at building 
extensive grassroots organizations and learning public relations techniques, 
they have increased their ability to effectively set the public affairs agenda. 
An organized grassroots effort by California-based voters led to a 
revolt on insurance rates. Environmental groups have used guerrilla tactics 
to hinder logging operations. Animal rights groups' actions have made 
we;lring fur coats less socially acceptable. 
To increase their power, special interest groups frequently organize 
coalitions. By doing this, they increase the number of individuals for whom 
the\. speak and increase the perceived "public interest'' credibility of their 
Inessage. 
Cor~litions bring together credible opinion leaders representing various 
interests 1 0  find conunon ground and ~ldvrnce a mutually beneficial agenda. 
Their g(,:l] is to c11:lngt. or accelerate the direction an issue is taking in the 
1x)lic-y :Irm:i (Tucker & McNerney, 19721. 
'1'11~ increase during the 1970s in legislation designed to address 
c.n\rin,nnlcnl:~lis~~~ :~nd \vorkpl:~ce s:lfet!. concerns c:lused the first nxljor 
coalition unification of the business community itself. In 1972, a business 
coalition was formed to defeat legislation aimed at forming the Consumer 
Product Safely ~~r-r-mission (Rubinstein, 1987). The use of coalitions a5 a 
public affairs tool has become increasingly common. 
The most effective coalitions are built over time by establishing 
relationships with like-minded constituents; they arise out of a strategic plan; 
ancl members agree on messages and a course of action (Tucker & 
McNerney; Newman, 1990). 
In addition to coalitions, special interest groups have become adept at 
using other public relations techniques, particularly use of mass media. 
Earth Islands used media advocacy in the form of a video news release 
distributed nationwide to raise the dolphin safe tuna issue. Even individual 
citizens have used the technique. Phil Sokolov, a man who suffered a heart 
attack, has made it  a personal crusade to educate the public about the 
dangers of a high cholesterol diet. He placed full page ads in media 
including the New York Times and the Washington Post to urge food 
manufacturers to stop using saturated tropical oils. 
The objective of media advocacy is to re-frame the problem from a 
concern of individuals to one of public policy. 
The sophistication of special interest groups in framing an issue, and 
the w:iy the media elect (or are guided?) to cover the issue is significant. 
AS Turk p i n t s  out, ''The world the public sees through the mass 
medi:l's eves is not a mirror i m ~ g e  of reality ... The media's nen7s windon- on 
nrorici is, insreaci, a reflection of the media's onrn construction of re:llitv" 
19SO). 
Turk adds that the sources of the informational raw material the media 
rely u p n  may be as influential in establishing the media agenda -- and by 
association the agenda of the public and policy makers -- as any other factor. 
Special interest groups gain their credibility from the perception that 
they represent a broad base of individuals. Also, they are perceived to have 
no agenda other than the "public interest." However, implementation of the 
agenda of a particular SIG may or may not be in the best interest of the 
public as a whole. 
As special interest groups have become more adept at their lobbying 
efforts, concern has arisen about whether they have too much influence on 
the policy making process. The 1995 Congress considered legislation called 
the Istook Nonprofit Gag Bill, which would have curbed lobbying by non- 
profit groups. Sponsored by the Republican party, critics say the legislation 
is designed to silence more Liberal opposition (Georges, 1995). Ultimately, 
the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was passed. This law substantially 
changed who must register to lobby and what information must be 
disclosed. 
In response, non-profit organizations counter that they play a key role 
in society through senlice delivery, research, and public education. A 
position statement distributed by OMB Watch (OMB is the United State's 
go\.ernrncnt's Office of hknagement & Budget) and endorsed by public 
interest gro~1p.s nationwide, stated that non-profit organizations provide 
"t~mendous insight on public policy issues." that  the)^ comply with all 
resrncllons on their lobbying efforts, and that the restrictions proposed b!. 
,he ~ s r ~ ~ ) k  IJ1ll  would "have a chilling imp:lct on the den~ocratic process rt., 
:Is (Ile  of indi\~iduals nntl organizations to participate in public 
ln)Iic~, cicix~te.~'' (Lester, 19951. 
TO protect the public and policy making process, various restrictions 
have heen placed on special interest group operations. Restrictions that 
currently restrict special interest group lobbying efforts are discussed in 
Chapter Five of this study. 
Special interest groups have played a major role in policy making in 
the United States since the country's founding. They have increased their 
ability to influence the policy process in recent years by incorporating more 
public relations techniques, including coalitions and use of the mass media, 
in their methods of operation. As SIGS become more sophisticated in the 
use of these public relations techniques, the public, the media and policy 
makers should consider some areas of potential ethical concern. 
One area of SIG operation to question is who provides the funding for 
a SIG/coalition effort? If a coalition is a truly broad based, grassroots 
initiative, then it  is arguable that funding for the effort should be somewhat 
broad b a e d  as well. As Hunt points out: If one group or individual 
undernrrites the cost, "... it's a safe bet that when the chips are down that 
entity or'group will shape the action, position or agenda of the coalition" 
(Hunt, 1993, p108). But, how broad based does financial support have to 
be:' All participants equally? Half? Is time spent on the project of equal 
value to dollars? 
Another area for consideration is the extent to which the media are 
m:lnipul:ltt.d. Westley suggested that public interest is sustained and moved 
t o  higher levels by groups that organize around an issue and who, by their 
:~c-tions, 'ntch ;lnd hold media attention. These groups "... d e n ~ m d  center 
stage, Tllc *nedi:l c:lnnot ignore 'wh:~t':. happening.' e\.en n k n  it's being 
111:1cl~~ 10 11:iplxn" (\T'cstley. 1987, $7). 
The guidelines suggested a s  a result of this study will take these 
ethical aspects into consideration. These areas may also be worthy of 
additional research. 
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Chapter Four -- What Ethical Codes Say About 
Coalition Formation And Operation 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the articles of 
the Public Relations Society of America Professional Standards for the 
Practice of public Relations and the principles of the International Association 
of Business Communicators Code of Ethics as they relate to special interest 
group formation and operation of coalitions. Copies of both the PRSA 
Standards and the IABC Code are in Appendix A. 
A special interest group (SIG) is defined as any group, regardless of 
size, whose goal is to advance a specific topic on the policy making agenda. 
A coalition is a temporary alliance of various groups or individuals to achieve 
a mutually agreed upon goal. 
There are more differences than similarities between the two codes, 
but one  area of commonalty is that the codes address the conduct of 
individuals rather than the conduct of the public relations industry as a 
whole, public relations firms, or the organizations they represent. This is an 
important distinction because this approach places upon individuals the 
responsil>ility to ensure that SIGs or the coalitions operate in an ethical 
mmner.  
O n e  of the more significant differences is chat the PRSA Standards 
ofkr sprcific perforn~ulce guidelines while the lABC Code offers general 
c\iscllssi~,n points in four broad areas. In addition. because IABC is an 
(,ry:iniz:lrion for 1,usiness communicators, the Code is less easily applied (and 
I't.rh:,i,S i f  S(l(xlld not be) to SIG codition efforts nrhich fomr:uded by 
n<)n-13r("ii tI'lll,lic irlterest $r()Llps. ~01nnlllnit). grOllpS Or c o ~ l n t r i e ~  Xld Stlltes. 
The PRSA Standards include several articles that may be specifically 
applied to SIG coalition formation and operation. 
Overall, the PRSA Standards ask members to pledge to "conduct 
ourselves professionally, with truth, accuracy, fairness, and responsibility to 
the public." This overriding pledge to responsibility to the public is 
underscored in several articles of the Standards, most specifically Article 1, 
which states that members should conduct their professional lives in accord 
with the public interest. Conducting one's life in accord with the public 
interest is pertinent to public relations activities conducted by SIGs. 
However, defining just what an individual, organization or coalition must do 
to be "responsible to the public" is open to interpretation. The single- 
focused objective of most SIGs quite often means that their agenda may be at 
odds with the agenda of other individuals, organizations or coalitions. 
Coalitions promoting vegetarian diets will conflict with coalitions promoting 
meat consumption, for example. Yet the SIG's belief in the "rightness" of 
their cause may blur their perspective of right courses of action. The 
individu:~l interpretation of ethical action in these cases becomes critical. 
Article 2 acknowledges that PRSA members hold a dual obligation to 
their clients/employers and to the democratic process. The article advises 
exernplif,iing high standarb of honesty and integrity in-honoring that dual 
oblig:ltion. This article presents challenge enough for the public relations 
pr:lclitic)ner sen.ing one clientiemployer It becomes increasingly difficult 
\\,hen ()~g:lnization becomes p:irt of :I codition. As pan of a coalition, the 
SIG required to compronise its onJn goals to achieve the goals of the 
gr()llP, T ~ C  pul>lic relations pnctitioner will be required to understand and 
aril,mln(xl:lre the po:rls of not only h i s k r  employer and the den~ocrntic 
lx,()c.e\s ~ , ~ ~ t  :Ilsc, the go:~ls the ccxllition. Cornpro~~list. 11x1~ I>r pnrtic~ilarl!. 
difficult for single-focused SIGs, but former FTC Chairman Michael 
Penschuk, who now heads the Advocacy Institute, believes that public 
interest groups can play a significant role in setting the public agenda if 
they're willing to seize the middle ground with timely compromise 
(Pertschuk, 1987). 
PRSA articles 4 and 5 both address dedication to truth and 
dissemination of truthful information. Article 4 says members shall adhere to 
accuracy and truth. To  reinforce this point, Article 5 says that members 
won't knowingly disseminate false or misleading information. Both of these 
articles pertain to SIG coalition activity. By their nature, coalitions present an 
image and information different from what would be  presented individually 
by any coalition member. Coalition communicators must ensure that 
information disseminated is not false or misleading. 
O n e  segment of Article 6 advises that PRSA members shall not d o  
anything that corrupts the processes of government. An ~ s t r o t u r f  coalition, 
because of its inherent deceptiveness, may corrupt the processes of 
government by convincing policy making bodies to take action based o n  
inaccurate or incomplete information. 
Article 7, which addresses public disclosure of the client/employer on  
whose behalf a public communication is made, holds particular relevance for 
SIG conlitions. Coalitions are given names which are indicative of 
invol\lt.n~ent by  ;1 larger group of individuals and organizations, names which 
inc.l~lcle .*citizens." "fmulies." or "codition." Many coalition communication 
rn;~[erials clo not identify the individual pxticipating orgmizations or 
mellll>ers, Article 7 advises that a coalition should make the names of its 
nlcrnl,crs kno\\~n i f  ;~sked. The larger issue, honrever, is hon. the public. 
lllrcli:l :1nCl p,licy m:krrs :ire ni:~de :ii\.:lre of the cadition membership n-hen 
only the coalition name is included in communications such as mass media 
advertising. This has become more important as interest groups have 
become more adept at the use of mass media to advance social and public 
policy initiatives (Rose, 1791; Adams 8; Jennings, 1993). 
In ~rticle 8, members are advised not to use any individual or 
organization that professes to represent an announced cause but which, in 
fact, serves another, undisclosed, interest. To the extent that a front coalition 
is directed by a single individual or organization but purports to represent a 
larger pool of interests, the public relations people promoting the coalition 
are in violation of the PRSA Standards. One example to consider in the 
context of this Article is the National Heart Savers Association. Formed by 
Phil Sokolov to provide a vehicle to increase cholesterol consciousness, the 
National Heart Savers Association is 99 percent funded by Sokolov. The 
NHSA is the organization named as sponsoring advertisements. Yet the 
agenda is Sokolov's (Adarns & Jennings, 1973). 
Finally, Article 10 applies to public relations practitioners in the 
process of establishing a coalition. It advises that members shall not 
represent conflicting or competing interests without consent of all concerned 
lx~sised on a full disclosure of the facts. Since coalitions frequently require 
t h : ~ ~  members subjugate some of their own individual goals to accomplish the 
gc,:lls of the coalition, it's critical that all participants be aware of the interests 
of e;lcll menil-,er as the coalition is formed. 
where the PRSA Standards provide fairly specific guidelines for 
rsr:ll,lishing :tnd canmunicating by SIGs about coalition efforts, the 1.4BC 
cCKlc of Ethics states that it exists to ~nforni and educate members to "help 
i n c l l \ i C l r l ; \ l s  cle\relop ethic:il decision-m:king skills independent of the IABC 
pol,c.~,~ss .!.llC' IAUC Qx]e :aldres.;rs conduct in four :irr:ls: Conununicauon 
and information dissemination; Standards of conduct; 
Confidentiality/Disclosure; and Professionalism. 
In a general way, Article 1 provides a good guideline for all SIG 
efforts by encouraging communication professionals to uphold the dignity of 
the profession through honest, candid and timely communication. 
Article 2 is also relevant to coalitions. I t  suggests that "Communicators 
should attempt to identify the source of information to be used." This may 
be interpreted to mean that communicators should identify the sources of 
information (members of the coalition) disseminating information. 
Article 3 advises communications professionals to obey the spirit and 
letter of laws and regulations governing their professional activities. This 
would be relevant to SIG's lobbying efforts where regulations may vary at 
the state and federal levels of policy influencing. By association, Article 4 
says that professionals will not condone illegal or unethical acts as related to 
their organization, its business or the public environment. This ~r t ic le  
wou Id apply to coalition development, operation and communication. 
These guidelines from PRSA and IABC will provide the ethical context 
for evaluating specific SIG coalition efforts in this study. 
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Chapter Five - Legal Restrictions On Special Interest Groups 
A variety of state and federal regulations are in place to govern special 
interest group involvement in the policy making process. The Lobbying 
Discbsure Act of 1995 passed by the 104th U.S. Congress greatly expanded 
the definition of lobbyist and the scope of disclosure requirements at the 
federal level. On the state level, the rules vary somewhat from state to state, 
although there are consistencies since the state laws are derived from the 
federal precedent. This chapter examines the codes of the State of Iowa and 
the United States in comparison to the articles of the PRSA and IABC codes 
of ethics. 
Interviews with Lynette A.F. Donner, legal counsel for the Iowa Ethics 
and Campaign Disclosure Board, and Wright Andrews, Esq., a Washington, 
D.C. attorney and lobbyist and president of the American League of 
Lobbyists, were conducted to identify trends in rule making and changes in 
the rules which may have resulted from actions taken by the coalitions 
studieci in this thesis. Transcripts of these interviews are included in 
Appendiv B. 
The relevant articles of the PRSA and IABC codes are discussed in 
Ch:~pter 4 Following is an abbreviated list of those articles: 
Concluct nrith truth. accuracy, fairness and responsibility to the public; 
High standards of honesty/integrity because members have a dual role of 
responsibility to clients and the democratic process: 
I)etlic:ttion to tnlth and dissemination of tmthf~il information: 
[)o  nor corrupt the processes of pmrernment: 
. I)lsi.l(,he Icirntir)7 of client/employer. hl&e members of groups 1inon-n: 
1 )(, represent :In undisclosecl interest: 
Do not represent conflicting interests without full disclosure to all parties; 
Obey the spirit and letter of the law. 
Code of the State of Iowa 
The actions of special interest groups in Iowa are guided by two 
sections of the Iowa Code: the Iowa Campaign Disclosure - Income Tax 
Ckckoff Act (mainly covering contributions to campaigns or ballot issues) 
and the Iowa Public Officials Act (mainly concerned with the actions of the 
state's executive branch). The Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board 
(IECDB) is responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the code. 
Disclosure is one of the main subjects covered by the Iowa Code and 
by the public relations codes. The Iowa Code requires, for instance, that the 
name and address for each contributor of $2 5 or more for any ballot issue be 
reported [56.53b(11)1 once the contributions total $500 or more. The same 
information must be reported for in-kind contributors. 
Disclosure also applies to political materials, solicitations and yard 
signs. These must include the name and address of those responsible for the 
materials. 
If  a committee or organized group, i.e. a coalition. is distributing the 
n~aterlals, only the name of the cornrnittee/coalition is required to be 
incluclecl on the nlaterials. This is important since, while the contributors to 
a co:llitio~l nrould have been disclosed through the state's financial disclosure 
1-el~)rling pnress, llnless someone checked with the Iowa Ethics and 
C l^lnl3:ilpn Disclosure Hoard, the only name they nrould be exposed to is the 
co:llition name. 
I()\Y:I E[llics :lnd C:mmpaign Disclosure Uo:~rd Lepl Co~lnsel LJ-nette 
I)ollncr ~ o l n m ~ n ~ s  th;tt the pri~n;~n renson for rhe Bo;l~-c! to exist is to tr:lck 
how an individual or organization gets financing and how those dollars are 
used. She says that organized candidates and other political groups are well 
aware of the reporting requirements. I t  is mainly neighborhood groups that 
become involved for local economic development or personal reasons which 
do not comply with the code, failing to do so out of ignorance rather than 
intent. 
A second area of focus in the Iowa Code and the public relations 
codes is actions with the potential to corrupt the channels of government. 
The restrictions are directed mainly toward public officials rather than at 
those who might try to influence them. Section 6 8 B . 5 ~  places bans on 
certain lobbying activities. Bans are placed on public officials being involved 
in lobbying activities. Further, officials are banned from lobbying for two 
years after they leave office (68B.7). Other activities such as accepting or 
receiving gifts, honoraria and loans are also banned (68B.22). 
Donner points out that these areas of the code were put in place in 
1993 in response to concerns within the state about ethical conduct of the 
executive branch of government. The specific concerns were for members of 
the executive branch who left government office and immediately began 
lobl3ying the officials with whom they had worked and/or those who had 
conflicts of interest between their work for the state and their prilrate 
I~usinesses. I t  was in 1993 that the purvienr of the IECDB was expanded 
hevoncl c:lmpaign clisclosure to include administrative ethics. 
r)onner points out that the laws continudl?. become more detailed 
tile legisl:lrllre reacts to specific situations. She suggests that ethics can be 
lcg,il:,,ecl l \~llen issue is concrete :lnd endmciirs :In issue on which most 
Ix.Ol,lc I ~ ~ , I ~ I  :, conmlon I,elirf, since, in 3 sense all laws :Ire n codificarion of 
the morals of society. For instance, people generally believe killing is bad, 
so it's illegal. 
A third aspect of the public relations codes addresses revealing who 
employs the public relations professional (a variation on the disclosure 
theme). Section 68B.36 of the Iowa Code requires lobbyists to register. They 
must disclose clients, contributions to candidates, receipt of campaign 
contributions and expenditures by the lobbyist. Beginning in 1994, the 
Iowa Code required lobbyists to report twice a year on those who paid them. 
As noted earlier, the objective is as Donner said, "to pierce the veil" of who 
funds a particular effort. Although the IECDB is responsible for enforcing 
the code, Donner reports that the Board doesn't actively seek information on 
the various groups. The Board most often finds out about unethical activity 
because some opposing group reports the activity to them. As noted in 
Chapter Six, opposition groups are also a means by which the media become 
aware of and begin reporting on coalitions. It is obviously important that the 
citizenry be alert, regardless of their support for or opposition to, special 
interest group activity. 
A section of the Iowa Code particularly relevant to coalitions is 56.12, 
which stipulates that contributions given to political officials in the name of 
another are prohibited. Such contributions may not be given nor can such 
contrit,utions be knowingly accepted. Again, the point of the Code is full 
ciisc.losul.e :~nd establishing a clear understanding of who is doing what and 
where the funcis come from. 
The Iowa Adninistrative Code (351) details a Lobbyist Code of Ethics. 
TIlree ;lrticles of that code are conlparable to M ~ C ~ S  of the public relations 
c.txles ' T L L ~ ~  of these :trt~cles 1nvol1.e disclosure in one form or :mother. 
i n r l u c l i n g :  nor ]ol>hyi~ig l~nt i l  re~is~t'rt'd :ind not conununicarinp in the nane 
of any fictitious person. The third article requires that lobbyists not deceive 
or attempt to deceive any public official. This last article is comparable to 
the PRSA and IABC code sections on being truthful and disseminating 
truthful information. 
No laws were passed as a result of actions of the Citizens for Riverboat 
Gambling or the Clarke County Development Corporation. From Donner's 
perspective, disclosure was the primary issue in both of these cases. She 
said that there has been discussion of whether the state should limit how 
much a corporation can contribute to ballot issues. The question to be 
answered in arguing for or against legislation to cap corporate contributions 
would be whether or not these contributions corrupt the integrity of the 
electoral process. Donner said she's not sure a case could be made that 
corporate money has been able to change the underlying community opinion 
on an issue. In Polk County, Argosy gave all the money and lost, 
theoretically, because community opinion was opposed to the project. In 
Clarke County, Argosy gave all the money and the ballot issue passed, again 
theoretically because community opinion supported the project. In addition, 
\\~hile laws prevent corporate contributions to political candidate campaigns 
bec:tuse ostensibly a candidate can be "bought" to gain ongoing influence, 
;tn issue is not something you can buy and achieve a position with lasting 
influence on the policy process. 
Donner conmmented that the states' codes are derived from the federal 
laL\ls. 1-1onrever, "ntil 1995, the code of the State of Ionra nras far more 
stringent in its clisclo.;ure requirements than was the 1;ln7 covering lobbying 
eft'c)rt.s ;I[ t he  federal level. 
United States Lobbying Disclosure ~ c t  of 1995 
The Lobbying Disclosure ~ c t  of 1995 was adopted based on the 
findings that: "responsible representative Government requires public 
awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists;" that "existing lobbying disclosure 
statutes had been ineffective;" and that "effective public disclosure of the 
identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists . .  will increase public 
confidence" (Public Law 104-65). 
The new Act was designed to disclose who was lobbying on what 
issues, on behalf of whom, and how much they were paid. Surprisingly, 
prior to the passage of this Act, lobbyists at the federal level did not have to 
disclose who was paying them, or how much, or which issues they were 
attempting to influence. 
According to Wright Andrews of the American League of Lobbyists, 
the old law was unclear and unenforceable. The old law had been 
interpreted very narrowly by the Supreme Court so it did not have the depth 
it appeared to on its face. While the old law was meaningless as it was 
interpreted, Andrews reports that it took years of hearings and testimony to 
accomplish any change. Bills that would pass one house would not get past 
the other. He  says the "trumped up" charges brought to defeat lobbying 
reforrn over the years were "one of the most scandalous things I've ever 
seen 
LY'hile Andrews comments that the final legislation nras cut back in 
manv n93\1.s ancl some *.gaping loopholes" renuin. the Act speaks broddly to 
the issue5 and is fairly clear regarding who has to register and in requiring 
lol~l>yists to report what they were hired to work on: by whom, and hon. 
1nilt.11 thcy,'re getting paid. 
These new requirements are highly relevant to coalitions. Under the 
old law, organizations could and often did ask their lobbyists not to reveal 
the organization's involvement. According to Andrews, de facto coalitions 
were formed in which a particular organization would provide significant 
funding through a trade association or coalition and be the primary player 
without policy maker or public awareness. 
Coalition activity in Washington, D.C., has increased over the years, 
Andrews reports. While most coalitions are legitimate in the broad sense, he 
says some have been established as a cover for organizations that prefer not 
to be as visible on certain issues. 
Two specific areas of the Act address coalition activity. Sec. 
[4(b)(3)(A)I stipulates that lobbyist registration must reveal the names of 
organizations other than the client who contribute more than $10,000 toward 
lobbying activities and [4(b)(3)(b)l who in a major way plan, supervise or 
control lobbying activities. For instance, under the old law, the Coalition for 
Health Insurance Choices would have been the "client" of the lobbyists 
working for the Health Insurance Association of America. The Principal 
Fin;~ncial Group, one of the primary funders of this coalition's activity and 
one involved in manv policy decisions, would not have been listed in the 
lobbyist's disclosure statement. Under the new law, Principal's involvement 
and Funcling level would be revealed. Further, the lobbyist's registration 
must l is~ (and the lobbyist must be willing to reveal if asked) the client's 
name. ;rdclrrss and principal place of business and a general description of 
the client's business or activities [4(b)(2)1. 
The old I:lw bras in conflict with dn~ost every article of the public 
l.el;ltions c-txies. And while lobbyists ;ue Frequently 13nyers and not public 
~-el;llions ~>r:lctiti~,~~rrs, the org:lniz:rtions represented often l ~ \ r e  public 
relations people involved in strategy development. Funher, enough lobbyists 
are public relations professionals to make these conflicts troublesome. The 
ethical d~kmmas are almost too numerous to detail. Under the old law, it 
would be simple for coalitions to corrupt the processes of government since 
the identity of members was easily obscured. Lobbyists could easily 
represent conflicting interests without disclosing it to either party since if one 
wasn't obligated to reveal clients to policy makers, there would be no 
particular need to reveal that information to other clients either. It is only 
through full and open discussion of issues that the public and 
representatives of the public are served. The old law did anything but 
guarantee a full and open discussion. 
The new Act, on the other hand, moves toward disclosure. Although 
loopholes remain, Andrews says the new Act goes a long way toward letting 
policy makers and the public be aware of who is trying to affect issues and 
how much they're paying to make it happen. This disclosure should help 
prevent corruption of the processes of government. Given the history of 
exceeclingly narrow interpretation of the lobbying law, it will be interesting 
to see hornv the new Act is adhered to in actual practice. The public relations 
ccxle advisory to obey both the spirit and the intent of the law is one which, 
at 1e:~st at the federal level, is often ignored in response to political pressure. 
One of the loopholes is allowing an exemption from registration to 
religious :lnd prJssroots groups. The argument in allowing this exemption is 
that tlles~ groups represent a broad membership; however Andrew 
co~nments that this is purely a political action and not necessxil~ grounded 
in I c l g i c  I<eligious group my also find an exemption on the grounds of 
I:il-st Amendment protection. 
According to Andrew, no specific coalition activity was responsible 
for the willingness of Congress to pass the new Act The old law was 
widely recognized as inadequate and Congress finally took the necessary 
steps to change it. 
Disclosure is the primary concern of the state and federal codes, and 
this is one of the most important elements for coalition formation, operation 
and interaction with the public. The PRSA and IABC codes of conduct also 
place heavy emphasis on operating in the sunshine. 
While the code of the State of Iowa seems to be applied evenly to all 
individuals and organizations, the federal law allows exceptions for religious 
and grassroots organizations. This exception deserves continued scrutiny by 
Congress. To ensure that issues and ideas are exposed to full and open 
discussion, religious and grassroots organizations should also be subject to 
full disclosure. 
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Chapter Six -- Four Coalitions: Case Analyses 
The activities of four coalitions are discussed in this chapter. This 
study's goal is to identify common elements which may be constructed as 
ethical guidelines for other coalitions by analyzing who was involved; how 
the coalitions were structured; how participants in the coalitions perceived 
their own effectiveness; and ethical issues from each organization's own 
perspective. 
The coalitions chosen for this study represent the broad range of 
circumstances in which the coalition technique is used. Two involve a 
corporation seeking to advance a local ballot issue; two are entities working 
at the national level: one is a trade association seeking to influence a national 
social issue; and the fourth is a foreign government interested in changing 
United States public opinion. The four coalitions studied are: 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling; 
The Clarke County Development Corp.; 
Coalition for Health Insurance Choices, and 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait. 
These case analyses are based on interviews with principal players 
with each coalition. In all cases, those interviewed were either employees of 
p~~l>lic relations firms retained by the coalition-sponsoring organizations or 
were public relations people on the staff of the coalition-sponsoring 
(1rg:lniz:ltlon. AS discussed in Chapters Two and Three. public relations 
pr(lfrssi(,n:lls frequently are seen as ethically responsible for an 
(rlg;lniz:oi(,ks actions, Because of this. the actions of ench co~llition are nlso 
ex:lminccl in light relev:mt :irticles of the professional codes of the Public 
Relations Society of America and the International Association of Business 
Communicators as identified in Chapter Four. 
Methodology 
In-depth interviews were conducted with principals involved in each 
coalition effort. Graham Gillette of Gordon James & Associates, the public 
relations agency retained by Argosy Gaming, was interviewed on January 25, 
1976, on the activities of both the Citizens For Riverboat Gambling and the 
Clarke County Development Corp. Susan Neely, Senior Vice President, 
Director of Communications for the Health Insurance Association of America 
during the nation's health care debate, was interviewed on February 24, 
1996, on the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices. Frank Mankiewicz, 
Vice Chairman of Hill & Knowlton, one of the public relations firms retained 
by the Government of Kuwait, was interviewed on March 6, 1976, on 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait activity. 
An extensive list of questions was prepared. Both Gillette and Neely 
were interviewed using all of the questions. Each interview took from one 
ancl a half to two hours. Mankiewicz had more limited time available so the 
question list wa5 shortened; the interview was completed in approximately 
20 nlinutes. 
The qllestions and answers from each interview are included in 
Appendis C. The interviews were not taped, but the answers are transcribed 
from det;liled notes taken during the interviews. Intervienree comments 
seeITletl panicularly germane to the study were recorded a5 exact 
quo[rs ilncl :Ire indicated with qllotation ~narks. 
Citizens For Riverboat GamblinpJ 
Clarke County Development cornration - 
Iowa was the first state to pass legislation allowing riverboat gambling 
on navigable waterways. The legislation stipulates that before a gaming 
license can be issued by the Iowa Racing and Garning Commission, the 
voters in the county(ies) where the riverboat would dock must pass a county 
referendum agreeing to allow this form of gambling in their county. Until 
1993, all licenses had been granted to gaming companies who operated boats 
on the state's major border rivers, the Mississippi and the Missouri. The 
debate had continued about whether gambling boats could/should be 
allowed on lakes. In 1993, Argosy Gaming decided to try to make this 
happen. 
Argosy Gaming and the company's public relations firm, Gordon 
James LG Associates, were involved in two efforts to bring riverboat gambling 
projects to two central Iowa counties. In both cases, the stated objective was 
the same: to bring a new economic opportunity, including jobs and 
associatec! businesses, to the area. Both efforts used the coalition technique. 
A comparison of these two efforts reveals much about what can make a 
coalition effort succeed or fail. 
~n 1993, Arpmy Gaming retained Gillette Graham of public relations 
Gr)rci(,n lanles & Associates to help them in their bid to bring a riverboat 
casino pn~iect o Polk County, Iowa. Ganung companies frequently identi@ a 
I:lrgei c0mlnunily; develop a project concept; present ii for community leader 
; ,pIx.ov~,~~ use [he fleshed-our project which hru: been pil'en conmunity 
leiidel. I,lessing 10 q3in voter support in the public referendum. 
Argosy approached the Des Moines City Council with a proposal to 
site a gaming boat in Des Moines. According to Gillette, Argosy was 
encouraged to consider Greys Lake as a potential site. Argosy went so far as 
to purchase the land near Greys Lake and have an architect's rendering of 
the proposed project completed to help visualize their goal. 
Whether Argosy was encouraged by the City Council to pursue the 
project or not is unclear. At least they were not discouraged from 
proceeding. Because the time between Argosy's initial contacts in the city 
and the referendum date was short (Argosy petitioned for a referendum vote 
in late August; the vote was held in early November), Argosy and Gillette 
elected to proceed with several actions at once. They contacted individual 
business leaders to explain the economic benefits of the project and to elicit 
their support; they developed a plan to pay off Polk County's debt on the 
Prairie Meadows race track (an $89 million debt); and they developed an 
advertising campaign to take their message to the public. The ads were 
tagged: Sponsored by Citizens for Riverboat Gambling. 
The production of the TV ad5 drew immediate media attention to the 
coalition effort. Questions were asked about who the "Citizens" were. It 
was revealed that there were only two citizens: Gillette and the owner of the 
p~lblic relations firm, Gordon James. Media attention also focused on the 
anlount of money Argosy was putting into the effort - over S200,OOO. 
~ ~ c o r c l i n g  to Gillette, the intent of the coalition was good; the 
rxrculion was p o r .  In Polk County. coalition members were to be business 
c(,mmunity leaders. The coalition wanted these leaders to say that from 
a i,usiness :lnci a smndpoint, the riverbont gamhlinp project would 
1 ,  1 , 1 ,  1 .  The ol,jec[iirr n7:1:: to h:live these influencers buy in 
and then sell the concept to the voters. However, Gillette says: "It ended u p  
as a coalition of one." 
The failure of the coalition to develop to an effective level may have 
been instrumental in the failure of the project. Key Polk County business 
leaders actively spoke out against the project. This appears to have dissuaded 
other business leaders, who had indicated support for the project in private, 
to decline to voice their support publicly. City Council members w h o  may at 
one point have been privately supportive of the concept also withdrew 
public support. The referendum failed by a 60 percent to 40 percent vote. 
A coalition was a key strategy in Argosy's Polk County effort, but 
Gillette believes it became a major negative. He says they wanted to use 
"citizens" in the name of the coalition because they were convinced they 
would have citizen involvement. But when they used the name without 
actually having citizen membership, "It turned out to be  a huge negative." 
"We clearly misused it (the coalition technique) in Polk County," said 
Gillette. They moved ahead with the coalition even though they didn't have 
members signed up because: "We felt we had to get a jump on the 
competition. We may have been successful if we'd had more time and had 
the co:ilition formed before it was announced. Maybe w e  could have been 
successful." 
In other words, if there had really been a coalition, the Argosy effort 
 my h:lve been successful because, by definition, the effort would have 
repsesmtecl a broacl interest of the community. In fact, there was not a 
l>n):~cI colnrnunity interest and so  calling the effort a coalition didn't make it 
The issue of membership in the coalition became the ethical focus of 
discussion, with media coverage including commentary by Argosy's 
competition, state regulatory officials and reporters (Carlson, 1994). 
The Argosy experience in Clarke County was substantially different 
and in many ways represented the learning that took place from the Polk 
County experience. An established group of business leaders -- the Clarke 
County Development Corporation (CCDC) -- contacted Argosy to work with 
them to bring a riverboat project to the county. Rather than Argosy taking 
the lead, the local business leaders led in all cases. Argosy provided 
technical information and financial support when it was appropriate. 
Every effort was made to ensure that the Clarke County initiative was 
seen as locally led and locally controlled. There was no special coalition 
developed -- the existing organization was broad based, including a bi- 
partisan group of business leaders (heads of banks, local media), city officials 
and individuals. This group reached out to others, including legislators and 
county supervisors from surrounding counties to enlist their support. The 
group held informational/educational meetings for local citizens to present 
the plan. A logo and name, "Vote 4 the Boat," were designed by a local 
high school student. 
The nujor ethical issue in Clarke County related to funding. ~ l l  
fin:lnci:ll supprt  for the Clarke County project was provided by Argosy 
Gaming, ~ h ~ s  decision nras nude consciously after much discussion. 
CJillette s;iici Clarke County leaders had decided that people knen- the 
co~lnly ll:al pone :lfter Argosv and that the county n7anted to work closely 
\ \ r i l l l  Argosy to  VJss the l~dlot issue. "It nras Argosy or nothing. so the\- 
clicin ' l  m i n t l  l:lking [money from Argos). for the c3nlp:lign." In ~lddition. 
(;,I l c l l c  ,a,intetl i]l:lt tilt. c;~mp:iign in C1:lrke  count^^ cost less th:m the 
Polk County campaign. Money was used to produce two direct mail pieces 
to send to everyone in the County and to produce a couple of radio spots 
and billboards. Television advertising was not used. 
"It was obvious it was a community effort," said Gillette The direct 
mail pieces quoted people in the community, looked local, and didn't come 
across as big money. 
Nonetheless, how the funding was handled was a point of concern for 
the coalition in Clarke County. Gillette reports that great care was always 
taken to run dollars through the coalition, with a committee formed to file 
the required reports with county auditors. The CCDC made every effort to be 
above reproach. 
Media Impact On Coalition Effectiveness. 
The Citizens for Riverboat Gambling group intended to sign up 
members after the coalition went public. Gillette reports that conversations 
were continuing with potential members, and privately he had been told by 
some business leaders that they supported the project. However, after the 
coalition became a topic of public discussion via media coverage, these 
potential members refused to formalize the relationship. In addition, 
business le;~ders spoke out publicly against the project and their comments 
were reported in the media. This further discouraged potential members 
from signing up. The media, operating in its watchdog role, had a serious 
inlp:lct o n  the potential effectiveness of the coalition. 
Ethical Issues: Conclusions. 
The Argosy coalition experiences reveal several possible pints  
for- ctllical considerntion. The first centers on h o ~ .  fully formed a coalition 
needs to be before it becomes public. In the Citizens for Riverboat 
Gambling case, the public relations firm and Argosy determined that a 
coalition strategy was a good approach but didn't have any business or civic 
leaders or private citizens signed up before they began operating as though 
the coalition was a Full-going entity. When the media reported that to only 
the two public relations practitioners comprised the coalition, the credibility 
of the effort was called immediately into question by opposition groups, 
policy makers and the media. Whether the coalition intended to be 
deceptive or not was irrelevant. It was perceived as having tried to deceive 
the public and immediately lost credibility. 
By comparison, the Clarke County group included a broad bi-partisan 
base of business leaders and individuals. While the group's membership was 
discussed, it was always in the context of how the effort obviously had 
community support. 
The second ethical discussion point is how the efforts were financed. 
Both were totally financed by Argosy. In both cases, Argosy and the public 
relations .firm were careful to file all forms required under state laws, so the 
efforts were legally in compliance. However, being legally in compliance 
isn't enough in the eyes of many publics; being ethically "right" is also 
critical. Concern about the funding was focused in taro areas: the amount of 
money spent and more significantly that it came from one corporation. The 
amount of money is probably indicative of what it costs to affect a ballot 
issue in tcxlay's medi:l environment. The single source of Funding. howei-er. 
cre:~tecl the concern that Argosy was trying to buy the ballot. A broader 
1,:~s~ of filnding would have carried the message that a wide range of people 
:~ncl orq:lnizations believed enough in the issue to put their money behind i t .  
While the Clarke County project was also funded solely by Argosy, 
the broad membership base overcame the concern. The conclusion that 
could be drawn from this discussion is that to be effective and maintain 
credibility, a coalition needs to have either broad membership which is seen 
as  representative of the public interest or to have a broad base of funding. 
Having both would be preferable. 
Finally, an ethical concern centers on the deceptiveness in naming the 
group. The name Citizens for Riverboat Gambling implies that there were 
citizens involved. Even when it became public knowledge that the coalition 
was made up only of members of the public relations firm, the group 
continued to operate under the coalition name; to tag their ads as sponsored 
by the coalition. The voters watching those ads, if they had not read the 
newspaper articles, could be led to believe the ads were funded by a group 
with broad citizen participation. This deceptiveness is damaging to the public 
trust and a dangerous path for the public relations profession. 
Coalition for Health Insurance Choices 
Elected in 1992, President Bill Clinton promised one of his 
administration's first actions would be major, national health care reform. 
First Ladv Hiliar). Rodham Clinton led the charge to foster a national debate, 
t o  clevelop a reform plan, and to move this effort to fruition. Reform of the 
United St:ites' health care system, as championed b ~ .  the Clinton's. would 
ll:l\re cll:lngccl r:ldicnl]y the way health care sen~ices, including health 
insurr;mcc, is nrlnaged in this country The health insurance industnr was 
prr:ltlv cc,ncerned al,out what this reform would menn to them. Further. the 
insurance industry believed the Clinton plan would not be effective in its 
proposed form. 
In 1992, the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), a 
national trade association whose membership included medium sized health 
insurance providers, launched a major effort to pass comprehensive health 
care reform at the federal level. They claimed that reform as they presented 
it would achieve health care that served everyone (and would be less 
damaging to H I M  members than the Clinton plan). One element of this 
health care plan would have been universal insurance coverage which 
would have been supported by an employer mandate. A major strategy in 
the HIAA effort was establishment of the Coalition for Health Insurance 
Choices (CHIC). 
According to Susan Neely who was then Senior Vice President, 
Director of Communications for HIAA, the name for the coalition stemmed 
from the HIAA Vision, a document outlining the insurance industry's goal for 
health care reform. H I M  was opposed to the Clinton plan for regional 
purchasing plans. Research showed that people were concerned about lack 
of choice. Opinion research was used to test names and messages. "Choice" 
was a loaded word and became the key consideration in the name. 
The intent in establishing the coalition was to involve a broad base of 
HIAA member companies, businesses and other groups and individuals who 
were interested in health care reform. Initially. H I M  staff were assigned to 
:ipproach potential nlembers, explain the goals of the effort and sign them up 
for support. Major coalition partners were listed on CHIC letterhead. The 
initi;ll outre:lch was to groups which nrould be publicly supportive, "the 
Letterlle:lrl Comlllittee." The credibility of these members W:LS used to enlist 
~ U I ' I H ~ ~  ~f 0tI1el.s. After businesses :md groups nvere enlisted. H I M  added 
individual members to the coalition, mostly through responses to the 1-800# 
included in campaign advertising. Ultimately some 100 organizations and 
43,000 individuals became CHIC members. 
Each organization contacted was given a packet of information 
including the HIAA Vision in total and individual white papers on the key 
issues. They were asked to sign a card saying they agreed to be members. 
Each organization provided name, phone, FAX, and signature. The more 
than 430,000 individuals who responded to the advertising were sent a 
packet of information including letter writing points, bumper stickers, etc. 
The 43,000 who returned a card from the packet asking to be CHIC 
members were asked for similar identifying information. All were entered 
into a database. H I M  was scrupulous about getting and recording this 
information in case anyone asked, an action which served the organization 
well when the coalition came under media scrutiny. 
There was no set target number of members for the coalition. For 
letterhead purposes, HIAA wanted to have 10 to 20 organizations who 
brought credibility. "To some degree it (membership size) is the quality," 
N e e l ~  said, rather than a specific number of organizations 
Neely pointed out that there was difficulty from the outset in 
est:iblishing a truly broad based coalition. HIAA was cut off from some 
natural ;~llies because to gain support for universal coverage, businesses 
woiild have needed to support an employer mandate. and many didn't. 
The CHIC plan of action called for ongoing acti~~ation of members to 
nl;lke contacts with Congress in Washington as well as with key members of 
Cc~ngress in their home districts. Neely said: "We built an arsenal of people. 
Then \\lllen we had :In issue, we could activate them." 
There were many examples of how members were activated. For 
instance, when issues such as mandatory alliances, spending limits or the 
specific  linto on Health Reform Plan were being discussed, Call-to-Action 
Alerts were sent to CHIC members. Between February and June 1993, these 
Alerts generated 46,081 letters and mailgrams to Congress and to key 
members of congress in their home districts. Calls-to-Action were sent for 
each relevant issue. Calls-to-Action were specific to CHIC member interests, 
i.e. mailings to small business members encouraged them to contact their 
Senators and express opposition to flat community ratings. 
All funds for CHIC operation came from the parent organization, 
HIAA. The reason was that HIAA felt there were no other obvious sources of 
cash. They couldn't get the business groups with large financial bases to 
support the effort because these groups didn't agree with CHIC objectives. In 
addition, HIAA felt that because it was their members whose future was at 
stake, they should provide the funding. 
H I M  determined that it was sufficient to have the other organizations 
and individuals involved as carriers of CHIC-supportive messages. An added 
advmtage to being the sole source of funding, according to Neely, is that 
H I M  didn't have to involve other coalition members in the decision making 
process. However, Neely commented that single-source funding is not ideal 
l~ec;~use it  affects the credibility of the coalition. In California, where HIAA 
mountecl a state coalition effort, businesses and others did contribute. ~.\Yie 
were :lcl:knxmt about (everyone contributing financially)." Neely said. even 
s]le acknowledged that this nude it harder to make decisions. 
i\ hey t:stic in [he HIAA campaign n7as a nationd television 
: ~ ~ l ~ c ~ t i . ; i n ~  c:l,llp:lign which took HIAA messages nntionxvide. The ads used 
t i l r c ,  ;lcrc,rs n:lmec] 13:rrr) ;lncl Louise nvho portrayed middle-cl:~ss Americms 
talking about health care reform. In each ad they talked about one of the 
proposals the Clinton's were bringing forward and expressed the concern 
that "There has to be a better way." 
At the outset, the decision was made to tag the "Harry & Louise" ads: 
"Sponsored by the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices. Primary funding 
by the Health Insurance Association of America." This helped 
organizational/coalition credibility when they came under media scrutiny 
since there was no deception about who was funding the effort. Focus 
group research conducted by HIAA showed that viewers of the ads were 
aware the insurance industry was paying for the ads. 
While the coalition was used extensively in the HIAA campaign, Neely 
contends that as it evolved, it was not the driver it should have been. CHIC 
was not an optimum coalition in terms of media and policy maker credibility 
because it didn't have the big names on the letterhead. Inside the Beltway, 
CHIC was seen as being totally an HIAA initiative, not a broad based 
coalition. I t  was not the key part of the strategy it could have been from a 
\Vashington perspective. 
HIAA focus group testing showed that CHIC was much more credible 
outside the Beltway and in the ads. In spite of this, HIAA decided to 
continue to use the coalition even inside the Beltway because with the 
citizens as members they felt they had enough of a base to b e  credible. 
Nerly renuins an advocate of coalitions. "I n~ould  always use a 
coillition. I r  t,&es the initiative anray from being that of an indi~~idual group 
o r  c,~.g:ll'ization i t  increases clout and credibility." Neely argues that the 
In<,rch ~c ) l> le  involved in 3 coalition, the greater the opportunity for the 
co;llilion t o  he effective in convincing policy n~*ers. 
Media Impact On Coalition Effectiveness. 
Media attention played a significant role, positively and negatively, on 
the effectiveness of the HIAA coalition. 
In O c t ~ t ~ e r  1993, both the New York Times and the Washington Post 
ran articles reporting on an opposition group's accusation that CHIC was a 
front group for insurers. Neely commented that the Washineton Post article 
created serious problems for HIAA and the coalition. 
"At that point, any hope of making CHIC a more broad based coalition 
was lost," Neely said, because businesses were concerned about becoming 
allied with HIAA. "Based on (the adverse publicity), we considered 
dropping the coalition." However, because focus group research showed 
the coalition continued to be credible outside Washington, CHIC was 
retained. 
The impact of the Post article on HLAA is underscored in Neely's 
comment: "We passed through the ring of fire and were never any better or 
worse than we said we were. But we were never what we could have 
been," because of the article. 
On the positive side, the "Harry & Louise" television ads were a major 
striitegy for HIAA to get its message out. In addition they were considered a 
p~ll,lic rel:ltions triumph by HIAA because of the massive amount of news 
co\rerage the ads generated. A news conference was held to introduce each 
nen. \v;lve of advertising. HIAA and the ads gained even more visibility and 
creclit>ilit\:  \%~hen the Clinton's did a parody of Harry and Louise during a 
\Kr:tshington Grid~ron event. 
considered the bulk of this coverage to be highly positii-e. The 
:,(lS scnrr:llccl fi lr  Inore nmrs co\rerLige of  H I M  messages than the!, elver h:td 
,n,;,pinrcl lu,ssil,le. donlnside of the :ids \17:Ls that enrert:llnmt.nt medi:l 
such as &l& magazine began to focus on Harry and Louis as real people 
rather than as actors. Managing these false activities kept H I M  from 
devoting full time and attention to the health care debate. 
In spite of the impact media coverage had on HIM'S efforts, Neely 
commented that the media should play an even more aggressive role, 
particularly with advertising. While many media do "Ad Watch" columns 
which focus on truth in advertising, she suggested that the media don't do  
enough analysis of the coalitions sponsoring the ads and who's involved 
with the coalitions "'Which citizens?' and 'Whose coalition?' are problems 
media should/could do a lot more with," she commented. 
Ethical Issues: Conclusions. 
Full disclosure was a major issue with HIM'S efforts. The 
organization's decisions to operate in the sunshine served it well. In forming 
the coalition, H I M  provided mission statements for the coalition and white 
papers on the issues. Potential members were required to sign papers 
indicating their support and desire to be a member. These steps protected 
HIAA and CHIC when the media scrutiny began. The television ads, which 
have great potential to obscure the real backers from viewers. were tagged 
not only with the coalition name but also with who provided the fundng. 
The full disclosure practiced by HIAA helped ensure the coalition 
remained strong internally and made it less open to attack from outside 
soLll.ces, including the media, policy makers and the public. Granted, some 
CHIC, mem\,ers did n~ithdraw saying they cfid not understand what CHIC nlas 
rc:llllr :lt~ollt. This underscores the need for ongoing fill1 disclosure with 
menlfyrs to ensllre there is clear understanding about cadition pods and the 
1;lc.tlc.s nrhic.h \vi]l be used to achieve the111. 
As with the riverboat gambling coalitions, financing was also an 
ethical issue with CHIC. HIAA made a conscious decision to be  the source 
of funding based on the association's member interest as well as to  expedite 
decision making capability and ability to operate with speed. However, this 
decision left CHIC open to criticism from opposition groups. 
Interestingly but not surprisingly, it was not the funding that 
concerned Washington, D.C., policy makers. Their concern was related to 
which other large organizations also supported CHIC'S position. The  coalition 
was not as effective as it could have been had other large organizations been 
involved, but it was deemed effective enough because of the extensive 
grassroots involvement. T o  a great extent, this goes to the definition of 
"coalition" as it exists inside the Beltway. Lobbyist Wright Andrews reports 
that policy makers in Washington perceive a trade association as a d e  facto 
coalition effort because the association represents many separate businesses 
and individual members. 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait 
The Persian Gulf War began in 1939 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The  
attention of the worlcl focused on the Middle East. The question debated 
worlclwide \vas mrhether or not world powers should intervene. The  United 
Stares, nrith oil interests in Kuwait and political interests in neighboring 
Israel, nr:1s embroiled in the debate domestically. 
In 1989, :I group of Kuwaiti students and ministers of the Kun-aiti 
g ~ \ r ~ r n ~ ~ m r  rn:lined the Hill B Knowlton (H&K) public relations finn to 
Ilell> [ I l c m  Influmcr Americ;ln public opinion of Kun?ait Frmk bkmkirn.icz. 
\Ticv  CI1;lirln:ln of Idill R I<nonrlton. u7:ts in\~ol\red in working n-ith the 
coalition Citizens for a Free Kuwait (CFK) in their efforts to position Kuwait 
in the minds of the American public. 
According to Mankiewicz, the group of Kuwaiti students and 
government officials was already formed when they approached Hill & 
~ n o w l t o n  for assistance. The group was composed of Kuwaiti students 
studying in the United States as well as Kuwaiti government officials, some 
of whom had been exiled before the Persian Gulf War, some of whom were 
in exile in. the United States because of the war. 
The Kuwaiti students had approached the Kuwaiti government 
officials for help because they felt they were suffering from the image of 
Kuwait as it was being portrayed in the media at that time. The government 
officials came up with the idea of developing a national organization and 
effort. The stated objective of the group, accordng to ~ankiewicz,  was to 
improve the image of Kuwait among the American public so that the Kuwaiti 
students living in the United States could feel better about themselves. 
Since the group was already formed when it came to Hill & Knowlton, 
there wxs no discussion of numbers of members involved. Hill & Knowlton 
helped structure the group with a council made up of a few of the group's 
meml->ers who were ministers in the Kuwaiti government, the dean of a law 
sch(x>l and former members of the Kuwaiti parliament. These individuals 
mide the clecisions and were the spokespeople. 
M:lnkiewicz reported that his firm was retained to get media coverage 
of Citizens for :1 Free Kuwait members and activities. To do that, the f i m ~  
(1rc.llestr:lted actiirities such as rallies on campuses and arranged interviews of 
CFI< mem!~ers, 1r-l addition, H&K and CFK were deeply involved in a lrarietv 
of :lc.ri\rities, including testimony ro human rights com~issions, which took 
pl:lcc in \xr:nllington. D.C. and were directed to federal policy makers. 
In spite of these activities to influence public opinion, Mankiewicz said 
that one of the ethical considerations for the coalition was that members 
wanted to be sure they were not seen as a group trying to affect U.S. policy. 
According to Mankiewicz, Citizens for a Free Kuwait was against U.S. force 
being used in their country. It was a matter of pride. They thought the 
economic sanctions against Iraq should be allowed to work. 
Mankiewicz's comments about the stated objective of the group are 
often contradictory to the actions CFK undertook as well as to the generally 
understood reasons for the group's existence. 
A widely publicized event that raised ethical concerns was the 
testimony by an eyewitness, "Nayirah," to a Senate Human Rights 
conference. According to Mankiewicz, the Senate asked the Citizens for a 
Free Kuwait for names of people who could testify at this conference.   he 
Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter had been smuggled out of Kuwait and was 
prepared to testify about atrocities she had seen. The Ambassador asked 
Congressman Lantos not to give the girl's last name because the girl's family 
was afraid of reprisals against family members still in Kuwait. Lantos agreed. 
Mankiewicz said: "We thought this was a mistake but we were not in 
control. Then the girl testified that she had seen several instances in which 
Iraqi soldiers had taken babies out of incubators, left them on the floor, and 
taken the incubators. It turned out she'd only seen one such instance." 
Media Impact - On Coalition Effectiveness. 
Mecli:~ coverage was a factor for this coalition. The Hill & Knonrlton 
clirccti\fe \\.:IS to anin widespread, positive coverage of Kun-nit. hlankien.icz 
s:litl tjly cc):lli[ion felt th:lt mediit coverage \\,as prett). g o d  o\*er:lll, hon,e\.er 
he ix)inlccl 10 3" t.t]il(,ri:ll nrrittm 17). H:lrpeis M;lp:izine publisher. John R.  
MacArthur, and published in The New York Times (1992) which he says 
reported inaccurately on many coalition activities. This article was the 
genesis of much of the adverse attention on the coalition and on Hill & 
~ n o w l t o n  which was later picked up by other media. 
The media also focused on the amount of money spent by the 
Kuwaitis on public relations firms. Mankiewicz said that he did not know if 
all members of the coalition contributed to coalition activity. Newspaper 
reports indicated funding was provided by wealthy Kuwaitis living in Europe 
(Lee, 1990). 
In terms of effectiveness of the coalition, Mankiewicz also rated that as 
"Pretty good." He pointed to a long article in Time written by ~ i c h a e l  
Kramer that described Kuwait as a good country in a bad neighborhood 
(Kramer, 1990). Achieving that perspective of Kuwait by the media achieved 
H&KYs goal. 
Ethical Issues: Conclusions. 
Tliere are many ethical issues surrounding CFK and Hill & Knowlton. 
They ranged from disclosure issues (who were members of the coalition; 
what was their true goal; why weren't the names of those giving testimony 
revealed) to the amount of money spent on the c a m p g n  by the Kuwaitis. 
One significant ethical issue may lie in the coalition concept itself. All 
coalitions are special interest groups. Not all special interest groups are 
cc,:ilitions, i t  is questionable whether Citizens for a Free Kuwait %?as in fact a 
co;llific)n o r  i f  i t  was really a special interest group which had taken a 
co:llitic)n name 2nd had sought to gain a coalition's credibility. While 
M:lnkiewjcz cl:linu; the CFK goal was to create a pa~it i \~e impression of 
KllLj.:li[ \\.i[ll [ I l r  Anleric:ln public, a significant share of the group's actiLvities 
were directed toward Washington policy makers. Deception of any public is 
a problem, but deception of policy makers who are deciding whether or not 
to send a nation into a war is even more serious. And, since federal policy 
makers are to be responsive to the interests of their constituencies, if the 
broader public has been deceived into being excessively concerned about 
the situation in Kuwait, that concern will be translated to the Washington 
scene. It creates a problematic domino effect. 
Discussion 
The coalition technique was used in these cases with varying degrees 
of success at accomplishing local, national and international public affairs 
agendas. Common points for discussion about the coalitions include: media 
coverage, operating guidelines, coalition naming, number of members and 
financial backing. 
In all cases, the media played a role, although not always the same 
role. Wlien the media reported on the membership make up of both the 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling and the Coalition for Health Insurance 
Choices, both organizations were hindered in their efforts to attract additional 
members. The conclusion which may be drawn from this is that coalitions 
wc)l~icl I>e well advised to have a solid base of members on board before the 
coalition becomes a public entity since potential members may be swaved by 
the comn~ents of critics and adverse to any media attention in which they 
1n:l). t>e singled out. 
meclla, because of its positive coverage of the Coalition for Health 
Insul-:lncc, Cllc,lces b G ~ ~ : l m r y  & Louise" :~ds, the Citizens for a Free Kun-rut. :lnd 
the Clarke County Development Corp., helped the coalitions accomplish their 
objectives of getting messages about their efforts to the broadest audiences. 
While the media did focus on membership of the coalitions in all 
cases, it was for the most part a one article topic. Particularly when the 
coalition is using advertising, increased media scrutiny of the sponsoring 
coalition may be advisable. 
None of the coalitions was established with any specific set of 
guidelines in mind. Some of the efforts were more sophisticated than others. 
The Health Insurance Association of America implemented a detailed plan for 
reaching possible coalition partners, including both businesses and 
individuals. The HIAA plan included sharing a great deal of information 
about the goals of the coalition. The intent to involve members widely was 
carried out. 
Some efforts were very much a "learn as you go" process. The 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling coalition intended to have business and 
community leaders as members and was holding meetings to enlist support, 
but allowed time pressures to take precedence in how decisions were made. 
There was not a good appreciation for what might happen if they went 
public with a "front" organization. There was rapid learning between 
Gillette's experience with Citizens for Riverboat Gambling in Polk County 
;~nd  the follo\ving opportunity with the Clarke County Development 
Corp~r:ltion. In Clarke County, there was still no set of guidelines, but there 
were some principles of operation. These included letting the local group 
t;tke the  leacl in making contacts, speaking to the media. and enlisting 
nleml~ers. 
The Citizens for :I Free Kun-;lit co:ilition c:lme to Hill & Knon-lton 
more less f u l l y  formed. Hill & Knonrlton :lppe:ln not to h:i\re concerned 
itself much with the membership, funding or other aspects of the coalition. 
It is impossible to know whether more active participation on H&K's part in 
the structure of this coalition could have helped avoid some of the pitfalls 
the coalition encountered. 
The names of the coalitions were conscious choices based on the 
desired message to be communicated. Focus group research led to including 
the world "choices" in the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices. The 
riverboat gambling coalition intended to imply that there were many citizens 
involved with their effort The Clarke County Development Corporation 
name was left in place to reinforce that this was a locally driven effort. The 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait name could not be analyzed from the interview, 
but the implications of the name are clear. 
Ensuring that the coalition delivers on the promise of the name would 
seem to be the prime directive. The media focused on membership of all of 
the coalitions but continued to report the story on the two coalitions -- 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling and Citizens for a Free Kuwait -- where they 
seemed to feel the coalition was less than it was purported to be. 
None of the coalitions was established with a specific number of 
members as the god. The primary goal for three coalitions was having the 
first members be the major leaders/influencers. The Citizens for Riverboat 
Garnl->ling nrns not successful in gaining support of business and comrnunitv 
lenders and they failed. The Clarke County Development Corp. started out 
with a },ro:rcl based, non-partisan group of business and cormnunit). leaders. 
They were :ihle to convince others to be supporti~~e of their cause. They 
were successful. 
'I'jle Coalition fc,r Me;ilth Insi~rance Choices took sonle polic~. stands 
\\lhic]l excluclecl some business groups n-hich n-odd h:n.e been helpful to 
their cause, but they had a position which resonated with many individuals 
throughout the United States. Because they were not able to get business 
groups involved, they were not seen as an effective coalition among 
Washington policy makers. But because they had such a broad individual 
member base, the coalition was effective outside Washington and even 
carried some weight with members of Congress. 
I t  could be argued that the Citizens for a Free Kuwait was not an 
actual coalition but rather a small special interest group action. Because they 
named their group like a coalition, however, they carried some of the 
credibility of a coalition and were invited into the policy process in 
Washington. Numbers do not appear to be important. who  the members 
are, is. 
Financial backing for the coalitions was a subject of media coverage 
and coalition organizer concern. The greatest concerns among the media 
were the amount of money being spent (did it seem like an inordinate 
amount?) and where the money was coming from (one special interest 
group?). The second concern seems the most legitimate. The first concern 
related to amount of money spent is more nebulous because of its relative 
nature. 
Financial backing was also of concern to most of. the coalition 
0rg:lnizers. While it  seems to be recognized that a broad base of financial 
backing would be desirable, there were trade offs including: ability to make 
decisions, time to find other backers, and who benefits from the coalition 
efforts, wtlicll seemed to mitigate the need to go beyond a single funding 
source. In the c:lses studied, the co:dition organizers opted to go nrith a 
single source of funding. 
Com~liance With Professional Ethical Codes 
How well did these coalitions adhere to the articles from the codes of 
ethics of the Public Relations Society of America and International 
Association of Business Communicators which are applicable to coalition 
operation? Overall fairly well, with a few fine points to consider. 
Article 2 of the PRSA code discusses the dual obligation PRSA 
members hold to their clients/employers and to the democratic process. This 
dual obligation becomes even more problematic in a coalition involving 
disparate members. By opting to have single funding sources, the coalition 
organizers eliminated some of the possible conflict because of the inherent 
understanding that the one who pays the bills makes the decisions. 
Nonetheless, there were still difficulties. In spite of the fact that HIAA 
provided extensive packages of information about the coalition's positions 
and objectives, some organizations, such as the Arthritis Foundation, pulled 
out after a while because they felt the coalition was not consistent with their 
interests. 
PRSA Articles 4 and 5 address dedication to truth and dissemination of 
truthful information. Article 4 says members shall adhere to accuracy and 
truth. Article 5 says members won't knowingly disseminate false or 
~~isle:aiing information. By "going public" with the Citizens for Riverboat 
G:lrnl,ling coalition when there nras not a broad base of citizen involvement, 
the co:llition did knowingly disseminate false and misleading information. 
\\rl~en askecl bv the media who constituted the men~bership, the 
sp)keslx~)ple told the truth, but if the media had not asked. it is 
qurs~ion:lI,le whether the spokespeople would have mde an open statement 
of' meml,el-sllip, This point again reinforces the need for the coalition to 
h:l\re effecti\le nlend,ership hefore becoming plblic. 
l%SA Article 8 may also have come into play with the Citizens for a 
Free Kuwait. This article advises members not to use any organization that 
professes to represent an announced cause which, in fact, serves another, 
undisclosed interest. The stated objective of the Kuwaiti group is at odds 
with the objective of the group as understood by many individuals and 
groups who have analyzed this case (Rowse, 1992; Roschwalb, 1994). To 
some extent it does defy logic that the Kuwaitis would pay up to $11 million 
to public relations firms so that Kuwaiti students living in the United States 
could feel good about themselves. 
PRSA Article 10 advising that members not represent conflicting or 
competing interests without consent of all concerned based on full 
disclosure of the facts also is relevant to HIAA's coalition.   he HIAA 
organizers meticulously detailed the issues and objectives of the coalition. 
The nature of the issues prevented many business groups from joining the 
coalition. A fuller understanding of the issues as the coalition went into 
operation caused some organizations to withdraw. Clearly this subject is one 
nrhich requires careful attention throughout a coalition's existence. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the IABC code is more general, seeking 
only to provide guidelines to allow members to develop ethical decision 
nlriking skills apart from the code. 
Article 1 of the IABC code encourages professionals to uphold the 
clig11it). of the profession through honest, candid and timely communication. 
In the c;lse..; of the Citizens for Riverboat Gambling and Citizens for a Free 
E;i~\\-:lir, ..timely1' is the critical issue. CRG'S Gillette was candid and honest. 
1,111 onlJ. :lfrer the deception had been discovered by the media. Timely 
c(allmllnic;lri~)n woulcl have indicated disclosure of menlbership before the 
gr',lll, I,ec:lmc pl1blic, or perh:lps the group wo~lld neiVer h:lve been brought 
to public view if it were not a legitimate coalition. CFK openly discussed the 
identity of the Ambassador's daughter only after the testimony had its desired 
effect. This delay created criticism and loss of credibility. It was also in 
conflict with Article 2 of the IABC code which suggests communicators 
identify sources of information. Intent to communicate in a timely manner 
could also guide which actions a coalition decides to take. It could prevent a 
front organization from coming into existence. 
Article 3 advises obeying both the spirit and the letter of the law. All 
of the coalitions obeyed the letter of the law. The spirit of the law, 
particularly as it relates to disclosure, was problematic. Both CFK and CRG 
experienced disclosure shortcomings. 
Both the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices and the Clarke County 
Development Corp. operated in compliance with the anicles of the IABC 
code. 
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Chapter Seven -- Coalition Media Coverage Analysis 
This chapter analyzes media coverage of the coalitions by three "elite" 
media sources: The Des Moines Register, The New York Times and '& 
Washinpton Post. It is a premise of this study that the media, serving in their 
watchdog role, have a responsibility to be aware of deceptive or misleading 
activity by coalitions and report on such activity to the public. Since 
coalitions are formed to impact a policy agenda, it is also worthwhile to 
know if the media report on the influence coalitions have on accomplishing 
the policy change. 
Methodolw 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to study me&a 
coverage of the four coalitions. 
Quantitative measures included counting the number of articles 
published about the coalitions in media identified for the study. The total 
number of articles mentioning the organization which created the coalition 
was con~p:irecl to the number of articles covering just the respective 
coalitions. Qu:llitative evaluation included reading each of the articles which 
mentioned the coalitions to identify message themes. 
'I'l~csc media were chosen for study for three reasons. First, because 
at the respective state and national levels they are the meda most likely to 
cover neurs :~l,out issues of public interest which may lead to public policy 
ch:lnges. Seconcl, :IS shrlite" media in their own venues. they are likely to 
1e:lcl (x11c.r mecli:~ in co\rer:igt. of topics of public interest. Findly, nrhilr 
in<lusln~ ,r:rlc Il,ecli:l s l lc ]~  3s Columhi:1 ~ournalism Review or Public Relations 
I(c\,ic\r. \\fc)ulcl (10 pre:lter :~n:lIysi:: of the irnp:~ct of the coditions on the 
policy debate or on the journalism and public relations professions, it is more 
important to understand what the general news media are covering since this 
coverage could lead to broader public understanding and discussion of 
important issues. 
To assess the level of media interest in the Argosy Gaming coalitions 
in ~ o l k  and Clarke Counties in Iowa, a count was made of articles published 
in the Des Moines Register between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1995 
which mentioned Argosy Gaming and either Citizens For Bverboat Gambling 
or Clarke County Development Corporation. The articles analyzed were 
those included in the on-line database of The Des Moines Register held by 
the Drake University Cowles Library. 
The Des Moines Register was selected because it is the largest 
newspaper in the state of Iowa, and as such, represents one of the state's 
"elite" media, the medium other media watch and frequently emulate. 
A content analysis was done by reading each of the articles which 
mentioned either of these coalitions. 
To assess the level of media interest in the Citizens for a Free Kuwait 
coalition, a count was made of the number of articles indexed in The New 
York Times Index and The Washinpton Post Index in 1990 and 1991, the 
time sp:in covering the months preceding, during and following the Persian 
Gulf \Var. The search of The New York Times Index included the headings 
"I(u\\.:lit," *'Middle East," and 'Citizens for a Free Kuwait." The search of The 
W;~.shington post Inciex included the headings 'Citizens for a Free Kunrait," 
"E;~i\v:~it," :mcl ''Persi~in Gulf Crisis." 
I\ limitecl content analysis was conducted by scanning the entries in 
[hesc c:ltegories in both indices. Articles n~hich appeared from the limited 
cc)nrc.n[ :~n:llj~sis to \,r relevant to the study nrerr read in total. 
T o  assess the level of media interest in the Coalition for Health 
Insurance Choices, a count was made of the number of articles indexed in 
The New York Times Index and The Washington Post Index in 1992, 1993 
and 1994, the years following President Clinton's election during which the 
health care debate was the most heated at the national level. The search 
included articles under the headings "Health care," "Health Insurance 
Association of America," and "Coalition for Health Insurance Choices." 
A similar, limited content analysis was conducted for these listings as 
was done for the Kuwait coalition. 
The New York Times and The Washington Post were selected 
because they constitute the nation's elite media. It has been shown that if 
The New York Times covers an issue, other media are llkely to cover the 
subject as well (Gans, 1980). The Washington Post is the newspaper most 
likely to cover issues under discussion by the United States Congress. 
Findings  -- Argosv: Citizens For Riverboat Gambling 
From J;~nuary 1. 1994 to December 31, 1994, 60 articles published in 
the Des Moines Register mentioned Argosy Gaming. Because Argosy 
Gaming Co is n puldicly traded company, the Register routinely reports on a 
\viclc. r:lngc o f  Argosy activities. Only those articles relating to the Polk 
Count!. initi:~tive were of interest to this study. A total of 14 articles reported 
on tlic c.o:~lition issue. Six of those articles mentioned Citizens for Riverboat 
G:~tnl>ling O n r  o f  these six nr:Ls eliminated from analysis because it referred 
t o  :I s i~ni l :~r l~ .  n:lmecl. I,ut unrel:lted, ccnlition group operating in Scott 
Coi~nt)~.  Io\\-.;I (see. I:igure 1 ). 
i\l-go,s\. c;:l[llins's interesl in ~'olk County :LS n cfiino site begsn to 
t nicrli:~ intcl-c.1 in 1:lte ~ugl l s l  1994. On August 26. Ar~os>. is r e ~ * e d  
to have called for a referendum vote on riverboat gambling in the November 
8 election ( ~ o w e r s ,  1994). Various business leaders are quoted as  opposing 
the idea of a casino boat in the City of Des Moines. On August 30, city 
officials acknowledged that they had discussed riverboat gambling projects 
with Argosy Gaming Co. and another group (Bowers, 1994). 
Three articles in September present Argosy's proposal made public at a 
news conference; detail greater opposition by Des Moines business leaders; 
and report on Argosy officials continued plans to meet with city leaders to 
gain support for the project. 
The first mentions of Citizens for Riverboat Gambling occur in two 
articles published in October. The first article, on October 8, focuses on the 
production of TV advertisements which use actors to portray "just plain 
folks" who  are supportive of riverboat gambling (~arlson, 1994). 
Figure 1. Argosy Gaming - 1994 Media 
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Fir~ure I .  Comp;irison of media coverage of Argasy Gaming in the !& 
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The article Says: "The commercials actually are being sponsored by 
'Citizens for Riverboat Gambling,' a political action committee organized by 
Argosy. Gillette (spokesperson for Argosy's public relations company) said 
members of the citizens group will be announced next week." 
The second article, on October 20, focused specifically on the 
membership of the Citizens For Riverboat Gambling coalition. Spokespeople 
for the coalition acknowledge that there are just two of members of the 
coalition and that the entire campaign is being paid for by Argosy Gaming 
(Carlson, 1994). 
The article says: "Actually, it seems to mark a fundamental change in 
the way public policy issues are promoted in the state of Iowa." While the 
article acknowledges that citizen groups are common, it goes on to say that 
members of the Argosy group "have not named a single supporter willing to 
be  publicly identified with the issue." 
Coalition spokesperson Gillette said: "I know that normally a group of 
people decide they are for or against something and they organize and form 
a committee and things move. That's not what happened in this case. We're 
not trying to deceive anybody. A citizens group didn't spring up." 
The October 20 article quotes a representative of the Iowa Racing and 
Gaming Commission as being concerned with this coalition precedent. "It 
bothers me. not as a regulator but as  a private citizen, when I see an 
org~nization arith m o  members and a lot of money calling itself citizens for 
sonicthing or other. The perception is bad." 
The Argosy coalition is also criticized by gambling opponent Rev. 
Clrl()s J:lvne I\-llo s:lvs: ..what these people are doing is nrrong. This isn't 
g o c ~ i  ~ ] l e  ~Omnnlnity. There ought to be a nrny to c~ntrol this." 
4 not her article on October 24 does not mention the coalition by name 
but reports on The Des Moines Register Metro Poll results. According to that 
article, "The public relations firm hired to promote a yes vote in the 
referendum has a deep hole to dig itself out of" as opposition to the 
referendum continues to increase, according to the poll (Fogarty, 1994). 
Two articles in November mention Citizens For Riverboat Gambling. 
The first article, on November 3, reports that the coalition will spend more 
than $200,000 in support of the referendum's passage (Bowers, 1994). On 
November 9, an article reports that the Polk County riverboat gambling 
referendum was voted down. The article reiterated the messages Argosy had 
used to position its offer but stated that Argosy had secured only one 
political endorsement and that the Citizens for Riverboat Gambling committee 
had consisted of only two people (Petroski, 1994). 
Two other articles on November 1 and November 11 do not mention 
the coalition group but quote Argosy executives on their continued interest 
in Des Moines/Polk County as a project site and their surprise at the negative 
reception t o  the Argosy proposal (Petroski, 1994; Petroski, 1994). 
A final article on December 20 reported that Citizens for Riverboat 
Gambling had spent 5235,000 to support the ballot initiative which failed by 
a 60 percent to 40 percent margin (Bowers, 1994). 
Findinrs -- Argosy: Clarke Countv Development Corp. (CCDC) 
I:n)m J:lnuary 1, 1995 to December 31. 1995, 50 articles published in 
The Iles Moines Repister mentioned Argosy Gaming. Only those related to 
the CI:~rke County initiative were of interest to this study. A total of 13 
:~rticles relx)rtecl on rhis issue. Five of those articles mentioned Clarke 
C i ) l ~  nt I kvcloj>nient Corp  (CCDC) (see Figure 1). 
Argosy's presence in Clarke County was covered in two articles in 
January. The article on January 12 mentioned the CCDC as soliciting an 
Argosy proposal (Petroski, 1995). This article reported significant local 
support for the project, including a vote by the Osceola City Council to 
support the project. On January 17, a news item reported a three to nothing 
vote by the Clarke County Board of Supervisors to support the Argosy 
project (Dateline Iowa, 1995). 
Five articles in February reported on the Argosy project; one of those 
mentioned the CCDC. On February 1, the report reiterates the local support 
for the project and states that local opposition is organizing (Petroski, 1995). 
O n  February 10, the article provided additional discussion of opposition to 
the riverboat and states that Argosy officials attended a series of town 
meetings to respond to questions (Petroski, 1995). The February 15 article 
reports on  a "job fair" held to recruit job applicants for the riverboat 
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(Petroski, 1995). An article on February 24 reports that Argosy is providing 
all fi~~ancial support to the Clarke County initiative. (Petroski, 199 j) A local 
leader is quoted as saying that because of the short duration of the 
campaign, the local group had not had time to raise money, but, "This has 
definitely been grassroots from day one. We are running it locally. They are 
not calling the shots." The article also covers opposition concerns that the 
Argosy offer is too good to be true. The February 27 article leads with 
comments by a long time member of the CCDC who believes inviting Argosy 
to Clarke County was a good move. The article reports heated debate within 
the community (Petroski, 1995). 
One article in March reports that the Clarke County referendum won 
by a wide, 69 percent to 31 percent margin, but notes that Argosy must still 
receive a gambling license from the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission 
(IRGC) (Petroski, 1995). Opposition forces had begun a letter writing 
campaign. IRGC members are interviewed on their intentions. Argosy's 
president is quoted: "We've had a tremendous ground swell of support from 
the city and the county and from cities all around Osceola." 
One article in June reports on concerns that the Osceola casino would 
I3e financially damaging to a Des Moines gambling operation (Petroski, 
1 .  A spokesperson for the CCDC reinforces the excitement Clarke 
Coil n t ~ .  h ;~s  for the Argosy project. 
Four ;~rticles address the Clarke County/Argos)r project in July. The 
firs1 o n  ~ u l y  19 expresses concerns of riverboat gambling supporters that the 
p-ojc.ct I l r I L r  nor receive an IRGC license (Petroshi. 1775). A CCDC 
sp)keslxls(,n reinforces n'hat the project would mean to Clarke County in 
lemls 01. i(,l,s :lncl economic development :md stresses that there are plent!. of 
g:lml,lci.s I ( ,  emure succr;s of hoth gambling operr~tions. An article on [uli- 
21 repons that the Argosy license is turned down by the IRGC. On July 22, 
an IRGC n ~ m b e r  is quoted supporting the decision and the need for the 
state to be tougher on license approvals (Petroski, 1995). Argosy 
spokesperson says the company is considering a court appeal. The final 
article on July 31 is a letter to the editor saying the IRGC decision was a slap 
in the face to rural citizens of the state and the CCDC (Judge, 1995). The 
letter reinforced that the gambling initiative was initiated by the citizens of 
the county and not Argosy. 
Findings -- Kuwait: Citizens For A Free Kuwait 
There were no references to Citizens for a Free Kuwait in The New 
York Times Index in 1990 or 1791. There was extensive coverage -- 159 
mentions in 1970 and 178 in 1991 -- of Kuwaiti government officials and 
their actions in the analyzed period. 
There were no references to Citizens for a Free Kuwait in The 
Washington Post Index in 1990 or 1991 under the heading 'Citizens for a 
Free Kunrait' or 'Persian Gulf Crisis.' However, there were two articles in 
1990 :ind tnro articles in 1991 which discussed the government of Kuwait's 
use of public relations firms. Both of these articles mentioned the Citizens 
group. 
On November 29, the ran an article titled: "Kuwait's Carnpgn 
On the PR Front" (Lee, 1970) This article revealed that Kuwait had hired 
seven fir~ns to work on its behalf, including Hill S; Knowlton Inc. The 
:~rtic.le conimented on the cost of the campaign and a spkesperson for the 
Citizens for- a Free Kuwait said that '*most of its funds come from nrealth>. 
K L I \ \ . ; I ~ L ~ ~  \rho ;we in exile in Wrestern Europe." 
A second article published on December 19 was titled "Kuwaitis Pay 
$5.6 ~ l l i o n  to Publicity Firm" (Lee, 1990) This article detailed how the 
money was being spent and reiterated that the source of the fun& was 
"wealthy Kuwaitis in Europe." 
In this article Rep. James A. Hayes (D-La.) was quoted as saying: "It's 
a ridiculous sum of money no matter what you think of the cause. I resent 
that on an issue that should be decided by information from experts so much 
is being spent to influence me and the American public. This serious cause 
is being advertised like T-shirts or basketball shoes. That's immoral." 
One of the articles published in 1991 mentioned the efforts of 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait. 
Published on March 17, the article was titled: "The Selling of Kuwait 
Moves Into New Phase" (Lee, 1991). This article discussed the strategies 
used to focus public opinion away from unfavorable aspects of the Kuwait 
government and on those aspects of the Persian Gulf conflict which would 
garner public support. The amounts of money spent on various tactics of 
the campaign were detailed. The article pointed out: "Kuwait's efforts were a 
case study in the way that foreign regimes with ample stocks of money and 
ingenuity can influence public opinion." 
The last article, published on June 5, was titled "Kuwaitis Paid for 
Mosh:icher Trip" (Auerbach, 1991). This article detailed how the 
go\:ernmt.nt o f  Kun7ait had spent almost $67,000 to fly then-Commerce 
Secretary h~losh:rher ;md several aids to Kuwait "as part of a major public 
re1:ltions &on to show Americans how the country wa5 devastated by the 
I)ersi;~n Gulf \Var." 
Mosbacher's trip was reported by the Commerce Department in a filing 
with the Office of Government Ethics under regulations on the use of 
nonfederal h n d s  for travel. 
Findings -- Health Insurance Association of America: Coalition fm 
Health Insurance Choices 
There were no references to the Coalition for Health Insurance 
Choices (CHIC) under the headings 'Coalition for Health Insurance Choices,' 
'Health Insurance Association of America,' or 'Medlcine & Health' in '& 
New York Times Index in any of the three years scanned. There were eight 
mentions of the Health Insurance Association of America (HIM) in 1992; 
four mentions of H I M  in 1993, and eight mentions of H I M  in 1994. 
While CHIC was not mentioned in the index headings, the article 
published on October 20, 1993, did reference the coalition in the copy. This 
article was titled: "Coalition Opposing Health Plan Is Called Front Group for 
Insurers" (Hilts, 1993). The article detailed the accusations by a consumer 
grotlp, the Families USA Foundation, against the HIAA coalition. They said: 
"the health insurance industry is masquerading in favor of some kind of 
health cxe reform when, in fact, its objective is to tear the guts out of the 
Aciminist r:~t ions' reform proposal. " The article discussed various aspects of 
the H I M  plans to influence members of Congress. 
H I M  spt~kesprson Charles N. Kahn responded: "I don't think this is 
1 I e 1 1  Everyone has plans like this. Families USA is trying to make it 
I t x k  like nr@rc doing something un-American. I think that is outrageous. 
It's Mc~ClirtI1visrn." 
I:l~rthcr. Farnilies USA c1;limed the H I M  coalition purports to be ;I 
I ,ro;lcl-\~~tst .cl  co:llition hut in L~ct is ;I snull number of indi\~idclnls. 3 quarter 
of whom were employees or dependents of one insurance company. The 
article noted that three groups had resigned from CHIC because "they had 
joined the coalition without being aware it might be run by the insurance 
lobby. " 
Kahn defended the coalition saying that CHIC membership had grown 
substantially. He said: "The members of this coalition are citizens, many of 
them are people who work in the insurance industry, but they have a right 
to advocate their position even if they don't agree with Families USA." 
There was one reference to CHIC in The Washington Post Index in 
the three years scanned. This article was published on October 20, 1993, 
and reported on the Families USA attack on the HIAA coalition (Weisskopf, 
1993). 
Ronald F. Pollack, executive director of Families USA, was quoted as 
saying, "Once you use deceptive and dummy coalitions, falsely advertise and 
spend megabucks to defeat health reform, that is deceitful and unethical." 
The Post article reported that " H M  has been careful to name itself as 
the coalition's financial backer in the fine print of brochures and ads, and 
most o f  the tactics laid out in its 'vision plan' are staples of industry groups 
ge:lring up for big legislative bouts." 
I IIAA nras mentioned in one article in 1992; three articles in 1973, and 
five :lr1iclcs in the first three quarters of 1994. All but one of these articles 
:alclressc~cl 1-IIM's highly visible and controversial "Harry and Louise" 
aclvertising c l ~ n p ~ i g n  opposing the Administration's health care reform plan. 
Discussion 
The content analysis showed that the media performed to some extent 
in line with the premises of the study. There was a greater tendency for the 
media to serve as watchdogs, informing the public of the coalitions ac 
entities. The media were less llkely to draw a direct connection between the 
actions of the coalitions and a change in policy. The content analysis raised 
several other points that will be discussed here. 
First, did the media cover the coalitions as entities, thereby perforning 
in a watchdog roll for the public? All four coalitions received varying 
degrees of media attention. Media coverage focused predominately on three 
areas: Funding for the coalitions, membership composition, and the public 
relations tactics used to influence opinion. 
Discussion: mosv GamindRiverboat Gambling Coalitions. 
The Deq Moines Register covered both of the coalitions with which 
Argosy G:tming was involved. Comparatively speaking, the Register gave 
more coverage to the Argosy coalitions than the Times and the did to 
the Kuwait ancl HIAA-led efforts. I t  is likely this is because gambling has 
been ;i sul,ject of great local interest and the Register's purview is local. 
In the Recister coverage, particular emphasis was placed on the fact 
that Argosv Gaming was providing all of the funding for both coalitions. In 
:idclition, nlith respect to the Polk County initiative, emphasis was given to 
there only t>eing two members of the Citizens group. It was the perception 
of I>r(xrclcr involvement created by the "Citizens" name conflicting with the 
rc:ility ()I.  on]?. ~\\~o hirecl rnenllxrs n~hich rnised the ethicd concerns of 
repul:~rors :~ncl illr oppc~sition nncl prompted the Register to conunent t h : ~  this 
m:1rkccl :1 lilncl:lment:ll :I ch:mgr in the \\.:w :~ctii.ities like this are h~~nndled. 
No particular point was made of membership in the Clarke County 
Development Corp. a1 though spokespeople for the CCDC repeatedly 
emphasized the broad, grassroots, cornmu nity suppon for the project. 
Perhaps CCDC stressed this message because of the negative reaction to 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling having only two members. Perhaps the 
Polk County experience prompted the media to dig more for who was 
behind the CCDC group. This study cannot determine the causal 
relationship, but whatever the cause, the result was media coverage that gave 
the public a better view of who was behind the CCDC effort from the outset. 
Discussion: Kuwait/Citizens fm a Free Kuwait. 
Since The New York Times did not cover Citizens for a Free Kun7ait 
activity, per se, it did not perform the media's watchdog function with regard 
to this coalition. Since there was heavy activity directed by the coalition to 
the  media, it is difficult to understand why the Times didn't d o  some 
coverage of the coalition as an entity. It is possible that the Times Index d ~ d  
not have the anicles indexed so they could be identified by this analysis. It 
is also possible, although less likely in this researcher's opinion, that the 
Times ciid not react to the emphasis that was being placed on gaining the 
paper's covergge of positive Kunrairi messages. A third possibility is that the 
Times r e m n m  son. these activities (as the mentioned in their micle on 
r he I-IIAA co;llition effort) as what one would expect in the lobbying effort of 
:I*\. Fx'\vuful, \veil S~lnded organization. This stud!. does nor al lon for 
scjecllng one concl~islon over another. But nil could be ~ o n h y  of funher 
stucl).. 
The \Srasl~in~ton Post covered the Citizens for a Free Kuwait kxiri!- 
c . u t c b n s i \ r c l \ r  in [lle t \ \ *o :~rticlt..; ;~n: l lvz~I .  The reporter twilined the c~bjrcri\-t. 
of hiring a public relations firm; detailed some of the tactics and messages 
used; discussed both the amount of money spent by Kuwait in hiring public 
relations firms to support their agenda, and re-iterated that the coalition 
membership was comprised predominantly of a few wealthy Kuwaiti leaders. 
One possible conclusion is that the Post focused attention on these 
activities because Kuwait was working to influence the U.S. government to 
support armed intervention, and the covers Washington, D.C. as a 'local' 
market much as The Des Moines Register covers Des Moines as a local 
market. Or, of course, it is possible that the simply did a better job as a 
watchdog. 
Discussion: HTAA/Coalition for Health Insurance Choices. 
The Post and the Times gave limited coverage to the HIAA Coalition 
for Health Insurance Choices, The coverage of this coalition was generated 
by an attack by another coalition group with opposing views. The coverage 
included discussion of how broad-based CHIC membership was. In 
addition, the techniques used to influence public opinion were discussed 
because this information had become available through an HlAA planning 
clocument which Families USA had obtained. 
The bulk of the media coverage of HIAA focused on the "Harry and 
Louise" :lcls. The "Harry and Louise" advertising concept involved having two 
actors portray :I niddle-class couple talking about health reform. In each ad 
they expressed concern that health reform be done properly. This 
:~clvertising c:lnipnipn hecame a cornerstone of the HIAA effon, with each 
new ser ie  o f  :~ds :lnnounced at a news conference and publicized nridely. 
The 1-11AA :~cls carried the t;~g line: '*Sponsored by the Coalition for ~ e n l t h  
Insu~lncc Cl~oices." Idowever, there w\'as no pnniculnr connection nude 
between the public relations plan and the TV ads in either the or the 
Times articles. The Families USA group did lump the ads into their overall 
concern about CHIC. 
Both Hilts' and Weisskopf's articles reported on the HIAA plans to 
target 17 key members of Congress; attend town hall meetings; prepare 
spokespeople; and get news releases to newspapers. 
Ronald F. Pollack, executive director for Families USA, was quoted in 
Weiskopf s article as saying: "Once you use deceptive and dummy coalitions, 
falsely advertise and spend megabucks to defeat health reform, that is 
deceitful and unethical." 
HIAA's Charles N. Kahn, 111, responded: "We have been perfectly up 
front with the coalition, and we are simply taking our message to the people. 
Ron Pollack has decided to attack us because he's unwilling or unable to 
discuss the issues." 
Weiskopf said the H M  plan "offers a glimpse into the lobbying 
strategy of a powerful industry group." This comment did not ascribe any 
indictment of ethical problems or illegality to the HIAA plan. Again, the 
media m y  not have covered this coalition more extensively because in their 
view the actions were nothing other than would be expected by a large 
inclustw 1ot)bying group. In fact, Weiskopf noted that Families USA's 
pl~l~licizinp of the HIAA plan "illustrates another favorite tactic of lobbyists: 
coil ntel- in tclligence to discredit the enemy." 
In surnnI:lr)r, the media co\rered rhe "nenrs" about the coalitions. The 
.'newsH I~cing the "nrho," "what," "when," "where." and to some estent 
16why's of \vh:lr5s occurring in society. The medi:~ in this study did not 
eclitori:iliz~ on the rightness or wrongness of the co:llition actions. rather the!. 
rep ,necl only o n  \\rh:~t 11:lppelnecI. \Yrhen question:ible :~ctions such :LS a 
skewed membership or an imbalance in funding sources were discovered, 
these messages tended to be repeated in subsequent coverage of the 
coalition. When questionable ethical practices were uncovered, as in the 
cases of the Citizens for Riverboat Gambling and the Citizens for a Free 
Kuwait, the media pursued more extensive coverage of the organization's 
activities, however, again, they did not editorialize on or analyze these 
activities beyond reporting the news. 
The second premise analyzed was whether or not the media reported 
on each coalition's impact on the policy making process. 
With regard to three of the coalitions studied, the media did not draw 
a direct correlation between the coalition's activity and the change, or lack of 
change, in policy. The exception was Citizens for a Free Kuwait. For the 
other three coalitions, the media coverage did indicate that the policy making 
objective was achieved. For instance, the media reported on how many 
groups were supportive of the Clarke County gambling referendum passage. 
And the media reported that the referendum passed. They did not say one 
haprxtnecl because of the other. Documents provided by HIAA, as well as 
media coverage, indicated that the HIAA Harry and Louise TV ads 
(sponsored by CHIC) created enough controversy that the White House 
offered concessions in the health care debate to get H I M  to stop running 
the ;ids INe\v York Times, 1794; Vision cY: Advocacy Highlights, 1994). The 
rnecli:~ clicl not report that the policy direction n7as changed specifically 
I>ec:ii~se o f  CI1-IIC. 
L:~ck o f  media :ittention to the HIAA campaign by media Ad \Vatch 
columns \\l:i.s noted l ~ y  \Vest, Heith and Goodwin (1995) They r epned  thllt 
:11111ost no .Acl \X~:ltclles :~ssessed the :iccur:~cy of the he;ilth a r e  spots -- only 
foLI1. in l h ~ '  Ne\\. \I'o,-1.; Times from FA1 199.3 to Summer 1994 They report 
that this lack of attentiveness was acknowledged by Washington Post 
columnist David Broder who conceded "that the news media had failed 
seriously to challenge the accuracy of health care advertisements." 
With the Citizens for a Free Kuwait, however, The Washineton Post 
did draw relationships between actions taken by the coalition and changes in 
opinion. To combat Kuwait's image problem, press briefings with Kuwaiti 
leaders were organized. A survey of cities in eleven countries worldwide 
was conducted to show that the United States was not alone in supporting 
Kuwait. Testimony was organized for a congressional hearing. A Kuwaiti 
spokesperson said, "After that, we started getting a lot of good press and 
calls from volunteers" (Lee, 1990). 
In addition to the questions of the media as watchdog and reporting 
on policy making impact, there were several other observations to be made 
based on the content analysis. 
One point particularly relevant to this study is that, for the most part, 
the media coverage seemed to focus on the public relations firms that were 
involved' rather than the companies/associations/countries that sponsored the 
activity. The public relations tactics were called into question. 
As noted earlier, The Des Moines Register commented that the public 
re1:ition.s firm that had been hired had a deep hole to dig out of, not that 
Argosy 11;lct :I deep hole to dig out from. The media questioned the public 
re1:ltion.s firm's actions, not Argosy's. 
In Lee's ztrticle of March 17, 1771, about the dollars spent by Kuwait 
on p~11,lir r1:ltions :~ctivities, i t  is noted that Hill & Knonrlton nvns *.one of the 
p~~l,lic rel:~tions companies that marshaled Kuwnit's campaign in the 
1,eginning 1,ut \v:ls removed from the nccount after a nrave of nepnti\.e nen-a 
:11,oc1r Kl~n.:lit 1,ep;rn to set in." Kun7:lit did not cexse their efforts to change 
public opinion; they simply changed public relations firms. In fact, a 
for Hill & Knowlton said: "NOW every American knows where 
Kuwait is. 1 guess that means that we did our job well." 
The conclusion that may be drawn from this is that the credibility of 
specific public relations firms and the public relations profession as a whole 
suffers from deceptive and unethical behavior. Can it be that because the 
public relations firms are "'hired guns," the funding sources escape direct 
scrutiny? 1f that is so, then public relations firms need to hold even more 
diligently to their dual position -- operating in their client's interest and 
operating in the public interest -- serving as the ethical conscience. 
Another point for consideration is which publics coalition efforts 
target. Ultimately, the coalitions wish to change policy in some way. They 
undertake agenda building tactics that involve media coverage but are not 
wholly dependent on the media. With the gambling coalitions, the public 
had to be convinced and they were swayed by influencer opinions, 
including the opinions of key business leaders. Some of the public were 
prob;tbly swayed by the media coverage in the Register. Even more it was 
prol->ahly snrayecl by neighborhood and workplace discussions and personal 
opinions ~nc l  attitudes toward gambling. To get the United States involved 
in the 1)ersi:ln Gulf, Congress had to be convinced the American and world 
6Lpul,llc" \\.:la supportive so opinion studies were conducted and publicized. 
Well kno\vn indi\ricluals were involved in the process, i.e. the Kunraiti 
~lnll,:lss:al~)rss cl:alghter who testified to Congress. Agenda building acti\'ities 
invc l lvc  \J: lrio~ls pLlt,lics on n u n y  levels. The media me one element. 
~ ~ ) ~ i l ~ n g  hill circle, :IS the desipn:~ted natchdogs for the public (the 
,,L,l,l,c inrluCling p)licy In:lhinfi I,(xllt..;). the nledi:~ l> l : l~  :I critical role in 
,ll~,n,lol-ln /l-e,.c':lliw the ;sti\.ities of co:llitions SO the public is mlslecl. I[ 
might be argued that the media should check out membership and backing 
of any powerful coalitions as an ongoing responsibility. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusions, Guidelines For Coalition Operation, 
Recommendations For Further Study 
Research completed; findings analyzed. What conclusions can be 
drawn? What guidelines can be put forward for establishing, operating and 
evaluating coalitions? What loose ends can be identified for possible 
additional research? 
Conclusions 
Several conclusions have arisen from analysis of the composite 
findings of this research. 
The coalition technique is increasingly seen as an effective way for 
special interest groups to gain credibility and "voice" with the public and 
policy makers. Forming coalitions has become more common as 
organizations have come to understand the dollars required to effectively 
lobl>y at the state and federal levels or to effectively influence ballot issues. 
Adclitionnllv, coalitions bring together enough organizations and individuals 
that policy m;ikers will pay attention. 
Co:llitions can be an effective tool to advance the public policy 
ngencl:l. I f  they involve a broad bace of organizations and represent the 
grass roots, they can effectively operate in the public interest at both the 
srxe :incl fedcr:tl levels. At least they can represent the interests of a sizable 
por t ion  o f  the pul~lic since it is unlikely that any special interest group (b~r  
clefinition) 01- co;llition could represent the interest of all of the public. 
Tllcrcf0re i t  is critic:ll when fxed  with :I coalition effort that the public. 
mcyli:l :lncl p)licy m:lkers :lsk. "Whose p~iblic interest?" 
For the most part, coalitions do not set out to deceive. They perform 
a legitimate function in the public agenda building process. However, when 
coalitions are formed which do not operate with full disclosure, when they 
d o  not have a clear governance system established, when they have a single 
source of funding, the potential increases for the coalition to be seen by all 
audiences as deceptive. Wright Andrews of the American League of 
Lobbyists cautions that coalitions are sometimes used by an organization to 
hide behind. When an organization has "gone to the well" too often with a 
particular member of Congress or Congressional committee, a coalition allows 
the organization to advance an issue with a larger group carrying the 
message as opposed to having to do it themselves. The new federal 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 should help ensure that these coalition 
members do not go totally unnoticed. 
The general public appears to be at greater risk of being deceived 
than LVachington, D.C. policy makers. First, this is because those involved 
in the federal process are more familiar with special interest group and 
coalition 'tactics and operation since they experience these entities on a day- 
ttrday br~sis. They Interface with the organizers and members of coalitions, 
frequently in person. While this is no guarantee that they will not be 
deceived, the Frequent and personal interaction with the players makes it less 
likely. Second, t,y comparison, the general public is less familiar with 
co:llition oper:ltion and more likely to be exposed to coalitions in name only, 
via mxss rnerli:~ :~dvertising or through campaign literature. Unless the public 
is p:lrticular]y :~trentive or talies i t  upon themselves to probe further, n-hen 
tlley :ln :alvrrtisement or recei1.e :I c l l l  for support from :In organization 
wit11 :I n:ime suc.11 :IS "Co;llition for :I Competitive Long Distance Senrice," 
they :Ire lilicly to :~prec with or support the effort on its bce. After all. n7ho 
disagree with an organization which espouses something so obviously 
in the public interest7 Because of the effectiveness of mass media advertising 
to rouse public interest in issues, it may be necessary for this type of 
advertising to be regulated further to ensure truth in advertising. The Health 
Insurance Association of America tagged the Harv & Louise ads as 
sponsored by the coalition but also added that primary funding was provided 
by the insurance industry. HIAA research confirmed that viewers of the ads 
picked u p  on this message. Most coalitions do not take this cautionary step, 
Perhaps they should. 
Full and timely disclosure of financing and membership are the two 
areas or coalition operation which are most likely to cause concern among 
the public, policy makers and the media. Coalitions that are the most careful 
first in fully communicating with members and second in communicating 
with audiences outside the coalition are the most likely to maintain 
credibility. 
Financial backing is one of the greatest common areas of concern for 
all publics. Broad based funding is preferable since it creates a vested 
interest ancl participatory decision making for many players. Single source 
funding clr:l\\rs attention and concern about who is calling the shots and honr 
the  decisions are being made. All four coalitions studied in this research 
\\,ere fLlnclecl hy  single entities. Three of them experienced the critical 
scrutiny of yx~licy m&ers, media and the public because of the impression 
this fLlntling arr:lngenlent caused. Only the Clarke County Development 
C<,rl>, csc:llxtl criticism hecause of the nridespre:ld conmunity support for 
tile cslxx~w'cl ~ ~ ~ j c " t .  
I.~,Q,,~ re.;lrictic,ns special interest groups and co:llitions :Ire 
c.onlinu:llly refinccl in response to the ethic:ll concerns of the pul~lic :lnc{ 
policy makers. However, the interpretation of the laws is affected by how 
narrowly or broadly the couns interpret the laws and by how effective 
various political and special interests were in influencing the crafting of the 
laws at the outset. The new federal Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 is a 
classic example. In the month since the research for Chapter Five of this 
thesis was completed, Wright Andrews reports that the Act has gone through 
two interpretations by Senate and House committees which have given new 
guidance to those who must operate under this law. In general, the laws can 
only provide guidelines for conduct. They cannot replace an ethical 
approach to coalition formation and operation by public relations 
practitioners. Both legal and ethical operation are important. 
The media have a watchdog role to play with regard to alerting the 
public to unethical coalition activity. In three of the cases researched, the 
media performed in a watchdog capacity and had a significant impact on the 
coalitions. According to coalition organizers, media coverage of both the 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling and the Coalition for Health Insurance 
Choices prevented them from attracting the broad base of influential 
members they had originally intended. Media coverage caused the focus to 
turn from the go:lls of the Citizens for a Free Kuwait toward the unethical 
practices of the coalition's public relations firm. In the fourth case, the media 
reported on the membership and funding of the Clarke County Development 
Corp., I x ~ r  i t  ciicl not adversely affect the coalition. again because the 
rneml>ersliip nr:1s so 1,road based mcl was accepted by a broad segment of 
the 1;irger p ~ ~ l ~ l i c  from the outset. 
I'~ll,lic rcl;ltions people and the techniques they use to influence 
c,pinj(,n :Ire 11ic ~ ( K - I I S  of 1~1:111ie if 3 c~:llition is seen 3s ineffrcth-r or 
Llnct]lic:ll, 11 is tht. rcpi1t:ition of the public relations pn3fession:d or fimi 
which suffers if a coalition is seen to be unethical or ineffective. Media 
coverage of Citizens for Riverboat Gambling centered on the two members of 
the public relations firm who formed a front coalition, not on Argosy 
Gaming. Media coverage of Citizens for a Free Kuwait delved into the many 
perceived unethical actions of public relations firm Hill & Knowlton. Just 
one of those actions was providing a Congressional witness whose identity 
was hidden and who may have presented false testimony. In an analysis of 
controversial clients accepted by Hill & Knowlton, ~oschwalb concludes that 
it is the actions of the public relations firms which are the ethical issue rather 
than whether or not a client deserves public relations representation 
(Roschwalb, 1994). Further, it must concluded that since it is the reputation 
of the public relations person/firm which is damaged if a coalition goes 
astray, then the public relations practitioner must stand firm as the ethical 
guard on conduct of the coalition. 
Guidelines or principles for the formation and operation of coalitions 
woulcl be useful for all involved publics. The Public Relations Society of 
Americii ctxle, in general, offers good guidelines for public relations people 
t o  follonr. I'ractitioners who conduct their individual and corporate activities 
in accordance with the articles of this code could feel that their actions 
wo~~lct \~~ithst:~ncl the test of publicity (Bok, 1989). The.Internationa1 
Ass(xi;ltion of I3usiness Communicators code, because it is more general in 
n:lhlre, is 01 less pr:lcrical use. Specifically, the PRSA articles which address 
clis..;cmin;ltion of tnltl~ful infornution, disclosure of clients represented, and 
itions. Honrever. this opcl.:i[ion in the pul~lic interest art. relevmt to co'll 
rcsc:lrch ix,intt.cl 10 some specific guidelines for callitions. 
Guidelines 
Numerous public affairs professionals have offered guidelines for the 
mechanics of forming coalitions which can operate effectively to accomplish 
public affairs goals. These guidelines include identifying potential allies, 
establishing governance, communicating with members (Haney, 1995; 
OIConnor, 1995; Pires, 1994). These guidelines are consistent with the 
suggestions made by the public relations professionals interviewed for this 
research. 
Neely offered the most thoughtful and comprehensive suggestions for 
guidelines. One could argue that if all public relations professionals 
followed her suggestions, they could be confident of the ethical foundation 
of their efforts. Her suggestions included: 
Involve as broad a base of membership as possible. The broader based 
the interests represented, the stronger the position when the group goes 
forward; 
Be prepared to compromise. Understand that if groups and individuals 
give their names, money and involvement, one organization can't call all 
the shots; 
Be sure to know what points you'll give on and what you won't; 
Establish clear rules of governance for the coalition. This usually 
inclucles :In Executive Committee which provides most of the dollars and 
mnlces IIIOS~ of the decisions; a Steering Committee includins 
relxesent;~ti\res of all participating organizations; legal council: public 
re1:ltion.s sLlpl->ort; reporting proceclures: meeting schedules, etc.; 
'I 'II~ 1,ortom line is full disclosure. People have to understand nrhnt the!.'re 
signinq 1117 for (wh:lt's the threi~t, n.h:lt do they st:lnd for, n7h:lt.s the cost). 
The suggestions offered by Gillette are consistent with Neely's 
thoughts but are less comprehensive and show the impact of the Polk and 
Clarke County experiences. He advises: 
Do the homework necessary to understand what you're trying to 
accomplish and who might be likely members of the coalition. 
Involve possible coalition members early. Listen to their interests. Learn 
from them. Build the coalition quietly. 
Have a strategic plan and a solid base before going public. 
Keep focused on what the coalition is trying to accomplish. 
Spreading out funding sources prevents "they're buying the vote" 
concerns. But how funding is handled depends on the situation, so it 
can't be a no or yes guideline. 
Mankiewicz advised that good coalitions can be effective but that bad 
coalitions are clumsy, ineffective and transparent. Having everyone in an 
industry involved makes sense but the coalition has to represent the interests 
of everyone in the group and this can be difficult. If one person or group 
controls the entire effort, it can be clumsy. He offered one guideline for 
coalition consideration: 
Be out in the open and tell the truth. Then you never have to remember 
what yo~1 said. 
Guidelines: Ethical Suggestions 
The follonring guidelines focus on aspects of coalition formation and 
oper;~tion n-hich ensure the coalition can withstand ethical scrutiny. Articles 
of r l ~ e  I>IISA St;~ncl;ircls for the Practice of Public Relations hai~e sen-ed as :I 
t);~sis f-01. S O I I I ~  of these guidelines. A brief discussion addresses k~ctors 
c ~ l l , c l ~  In:nr I,e t:tken into considerat~on n-it11 reprd to e ; ~ h  guideline. 
1.  he coalition must represent a genuine commonalty of interests as 
opposed to a contorted group of interests. 
Discussion. Front organizations are often thrown together rapidly to 
respond to an immediate crisis. As a result, the member interests may not be 
truly singular but rather represent more of a marriage of convenience. 
Organizations with public affairs interests are advised to develop allies well 
before the crisis so that then the need arises an effective and legitimate 
coalition can be formed efficiently. 
The broader the involvement, in terms of individuals and groups who 
seek to achieve a common objective, the more likely the group is to actually 
operate, and to be seen by various publics as operating, in the public 
interest. 
Since a broad range of groups joining a coalition are not likely to 
share all goals in common, full disclosure and discussion of the specific goals 
for which the coalition stands, how the coalition will operate, and on which 
points the coalition may diverge is critical. 
2. A representative membership must belong to the coalition before 
the group formally presents itself to the public. 
Discussion. A coalition may gain momentum after it becomes public, 
attrricting more members after the issue is openly discussed. However. a 
co:~lition is not 3 coalition, and should not be publicly presented as one. 
\\~llc.n on]\. one or two organizations are involved. This guideline assumes ;t 
t>ro;ider definition of '.coalition" than sonmetimes operates in federal circles 
w1lcbre :I tl.;ide ;~ssoci;ltion, for instance, n u y  be seen as a coalition. 
Tllis guitleline offers :~dirantages both to the codition and to the 
pul,lic., I:Or co:llition, :I strong hnse of nlernhers (2 'sletterhead conumuttee" 
:iclgI~mt.ntctl 1,). gr:~ssr(mts memtxrs) helps ensure there tn~ly is :I conmmon 
interest among individuals and organizations to promote a cause and that a 
coalition is the right public affairs tool to enlist. Further, a base of members 
prevents the embarrassment and potential reputation damage of having a 
front organization exposed by the media or competing groups. For the 
public, the ability to trust and have confidence in coalitions is tantamount. 
Coalitions following this guideline do not relieve the public from a 
responsibility to ask questions, to determine if this coalition represents their 
specific interests. 
3. Coalitions should practice full and timely disclosure of their 
membership, their funding, and their goals. 
Discussion. It goes without saying that coalitions should be aware of 
and comply with all legal requirements for disclosure of funding, 
members hip and lobbying activities. Beyond the legal requirements, 
coalitions should proactively make policy makers, media, and (to the extent 
practical) the public aware of this same information. This disclosure will 
increase overall public confidence in coalitions and as a result increase 
effectiveness of coalitions. 
This guideline builds from Article 8 of the PRSA Standards: "A 
member shall not use any individual or organization professing to serve or 
represent ;In announced cause, or professing to be independent or unbiased. 
but act11;tlly senling another or undisclosed interest." 
M:iss mec1i;i advertising, literature, and other mass-distributed 
con~n~unic;ltions tools, are vehicles which carry the greatest potential for 
cleceprion. To the extent practical, membership and funding sources should 
t>c. clisclosed in these vehicles. 
l i .  Co:llition fllnding sho~ilci come from n bro:lci txse of members in 
rCyI-i'sent:lll\'t'c ;i111oi111ts. 
Discussion. Funding source is often a critical issue to a coalition. 
Coalitions need to recognize the perceptual and actual questions which arise 
related to funding. A broad base of hnding is advisable to ensure broad 
participation by members in goal setting and decision making, and to deflect 
public concern that the coalition is really only the interest of one 
organization. If the coalition decides that hnding from only one or two 
sources is the route which must be followed, the coalition needs to be aware 
of the attention which is likely to be focused on this issue by the media and 
public. If a single source of funding is chosen, it becomes even more 
important that the coalition include a broad and legitimate grassroots 
membership to deflect the concern that the coalition is a front group. 
5. Coalitions should not intentionally communicate false or misleading 
information and shall act promptly to correct erroneous communications for 
which it is responsible. 
Discussion. This guideline is similar to the PRSA Standards Article 5. 
I t  is clear. 
6. Coalitions shall not engage in any practice which has the purpose 
of corrupting the processes of government. 
Discussion. This guideline is an adaptation of Article 6 of the PRSA 
Stand:irds. Because of the inherent goal of special interest groups and 
co:ilitions to influence the public policy agenda, it is particularly important 
th:lt co:~litions operate in a nxnner that does not corrupt government 
prtxcsses. 
In sumntlry, public re1;ltions practitioners who follon. these guidelines 
when fonning o r  \\.orking nrith a codit ion could be re:fionabl!- confident of 
\vitllst:~ncling (he test of puhlicit!r. In :~ddition, n~emhers of the medi:~. polici. 
makers or individuals wishing to evaluate a coalition effort could be 
relatively confident the coalition represents a broad segment of the public 
interest and is operating ethically if the coalition was operating within these 
guidelines. Each segment would need to determine if the coalition 
represents their interest, but that is another discussion. 
Recommendat ions  For Further Research 
This thesis has revealed several questions which would benefit from 
additional study. Among them: 
Can the influence/effectiveness of coalitions in impacting the public 
policy agenda versus individual efforts in impacting the policy agenda be 
quantified? 
What has the trend in the use of coalitions been and have coalitions 
proven particularly effective against any particular types of issues? 
A comparison of the effectiveness of recognized front groups versus 
legi tirnate coalitions in achieving their desired goals. 
* How well do federal policy makers understand the make up of the 
coalitions lobbying them7 
What kind of impact does mass media advertising by coalitions have on 
public awareness/understanding of issues and on action taken relative to 
those issues? 
How are media manipulated by special interest groups to help these SIGs 
;tchieve their goals? 
Why n7asn't there more intense media coverage and analysis of the 
Coalition for Health Insurance Choices? 
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Appendix A 
% o d e  o f  P r o f e s s i o n a l  S t a n d a r d s  l o r  
t h e  P r a c t i c e  0 1  P u b l l c  R e l a t i o n s  
Publ ic  Relations Soc ie ty  of America  
T11is code was adopred by rlre PRSA Assen~bly it1 1988.11 replaces a Code of E~hics in force 
sirtce 1950 otld revised in 1954, 1959, 1963, 1977, artd 1983. For it~forniarion on [he Code attd 
enfor-centent proced~rr.es, please call !he Board of Erltics cltair.ntan rhrough PRSA Headqlrarrers. 
Dec la ra t ion  of Pr inciples  
Members  of the Public Relations 
Society o f  America base their 
professional principles on the 
fundamental value and dignity of 
the individual, holding that the free 
exercise of human rights, especially 
freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, and freedom of the press. 
is e s sen~ ia l  to the practice of public 
relations. 
In  serving (he  in teres~s  of clients 
and employers. we dedicate 
ourselves to the goals of better 
communica~ion.  understanding. and 
cooperarion among  he diverse 
individuals. groups. and institutions 
of society. and of equal opponunity 
of employmenl in the public 
rclations profession. 
T O  conduct ourselves profess- 
 ona ally, with truth, accuracy, 
f a~ rness .  and r e spons lb~ l i~y  to the 
public; 
TO improve our indiv~dual 
competence and advance the 
knowlcdge and proficiency of the 
proicssion through con~inuing 
rcscarch and education; 
And to adhcrc to thc a n ~ c l c s  of the 
Code of Profcss~onal Standards for 
the P r ~ c t i c c  of Publlc Rela t~ons  as  
adopted by the governing 
Assembly of the Society. 
C o d e  o l  Profess ional  S t anda rds  
f o r  t h e  P rac t i ce  of Public 
Re la t ions  
Thcsc  articlcs have hccn adopled 
by thc P u b l ~ c  Rc l~ t lons  Society o f  
r \mcr~c; l  tu pronrolc and m ~ i n t ; ~ i n  
t11gI1 \~; l r l t l~r l ls  of publlc service 
:111<1 c l l ~ l c ~ l l  c~llllluct ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 ~  s 
r~ rc~ l lbe r s  
2. A member shall exemplify high 
standards of honesty and integrity 
while canying out dual obligations 
10 a client or employer and to the 
democratic process. 
3. A member shall deal fairly with 
Ihe public, with past or present 
clients or employers. and wilh 
fellow practitioners. giving due 
respect to the ideal of free inquiry 
and to the opinions of others. 
4. A member shall adhere to the 
highest standards of accuracy and 
trulh. avoiding extravagant claims 
or unfair comparisons and giving 
credit for ideas and words borrowed 
from others. 
5. A member shall not knowingly 
disseminate false or misleading 
information and shall act promptly 
to correct erroneous 
communications for which he or 
she is responsible. 
6 .  A member shall not engage in 
any pncticc ~ h i c h  as the purpose 
of corrupting the integrity of 
channels of communicarions or the 
processes of eovernment. 
7. A member shall be prepared to 
identify publicly the name of  the 
c l i en~  or employer on whose behalf 
any public communication is made. 
8. A member shall not use any 
individual or organizalion 
professing lo serve or rcprcscnl an 
announced cause, or professing to 
be independent or unbiased, hut 
ac tu~l ly  serving another or 
undisclosed interest. 
9. A member shall not ruarsnlce 
the ach~cvemrnt of specified rcsults 
he!.ond tlre nrcmbcr's direct 
con~rol.  
10. A nicn~bcr shnll nor rcprcscnl 
conflicting or co~ i ipc t~nr  InlCreSlS 
rvllho111 the c\prcss ciwtenl of 
those concernc~l. given ~ i l c r  a full 
lllsclosurc of tlrc f . 1 ~ 1 ~ .  
11. A member shall not place 
himself o r  herself in a position 
where the member's personal 
interest is or may be in conflict 
with an oblig2tion to an employer 
or client. o r  others. withoul full 
disclosure of such interest to all 
involved. 
1 2 .  A member shall not accept 
fees. commissions, gifts. or any 
other consideration from anyone 
except clients o r  employers for 
whom services are performed 
without their express consent. 
_eiven after full disclosure of 
the facts. 
13. A member shall scrupulously 
safeguard h e  confidences and 
privacy rights of present, former, 
and prospective clients o r  
employen.  
I J .  A member shall not 
intentionally damage the 
professional reputation o r  practice 
of another practitioner. 
15. If a member has evidence that 
another member has been guilty of 
unethical. illegal, or unfair 
practices. including those in 
violation of this Code. thc member 
is obligated to present the 
information promptly to the proper 
authorities of the Society for a c t ~ o n  
in accordance with the procedure 
set fonh in Aniclc XI1 of 
the Bylaws. 
16. X member called 3s a witness 
in 3 proceeding for enforcement o i  
t h ~ s  Codc is obligalcd lo appear. 
unlcss excused for sufficicn~ rcason 
by the judicial panel. 
17  A mcrnbcr s h ~ l l .  as soon as 
possible. sever rclations u i th  3n) 
orcan~zat ion or ~ndividunl ~f such 
r c l ~ r l o n s h ~ p  rcqulres rond t~c t  
i\)nrrnr) lo  lhc a n ~ c l c s  o i  ~ l i i s  Cfitc. 
The I.AB(I Co~le of Erhics provider colnmunicarion profejsio~~als n-irh guiclelillrs of profe;lollai 
beha\ior arltl irarldards o l  rrhical ~~racrice.  Thr maill purpose of [he I.4RC: Code - i ~ ~ c l ~ ~ l i ~ ~ g  irs z!.;- 
reln of enacrmenr - i= educariollal. The Code exijrj ro i ~ ~ f o r n ~  and educate rnelllbers ill the area; of 
cornrnur~icacion and informarion dijjerninarion. j t a ~ ~ d a r c l ~  of co~~duct .  ~ ~ ~ ~ f i d e n t i a l i r ~ / & c l o ~ ~ r ~  
and professionalism. Ir focuses or1 helpin? individuals develop ethical decisiorl-making skills ill&- 
pendenr of I.ABC policy. 
' ? / I . b i ' J ' . i : ~ Z . ~ T I C i \ l  L - A N D  I N F 0 4 h l A T I O N  ClSSEiC1INATIO1\1 
1. C o n m ~ u n i c a r i o n  prof*+il)l~al,i will upholcl rlie credibiliry alltl dipir!. of rhrir profes- 
siorl by e~ico i l rag i~ i?  rile practice of honesr. canditl ancl till~ely c o ~ n ~ n u ~ ~ i c a r i o [ ~ .  
P ro t ' e s i o~ i a l  comrnu~~ ica ro r s  n-ill nor use a n y  i~iforninrio~i  rhar has bee11 ~eoernre t l  01. -. 
app~ .op r i~ l r e ly  a cq i~ i r ed  b!. a b11ji11esj for atiorliet. b ~ ~ s i ~ ~ e j s  n.irl~uur p e n n i s j i o ~ ~ .  Furr11c.r. 
c o ~ ~ u i i ~ ~ t ~ i c a r o r s  jl11)11ld ilrreliipr ro idet~rif!- rile joiu.ce of ~ I I ~ O I . I I I ; I ~ ~ O ~ I  to be used. 
C = , i  FIZE?iTI,ALITY/DISCLOSURE 
.5. ~ : ~ I I I I I I I I I I ~ ~ . ; I ~ ~ I ) I I  I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ s ~ i o ~ ~ ~ l ~  n.ill respecr rile c ~ fi(le ~ri;\lir!- a11t1 risl~r-rn-t)ri\n~:!- of  
all in t l i \~ ic lna l~ .  I I I ~ I ~ ~ P I , ~ .  clielirs a l ~ t l  cusro~lless. 
0 .  ( : c , ~ n ~ l ~ r ~ i ~ ~ ~ - n r i o ~ ~  p~.ofrssi r~nls  n-ill rlor use all!. c o ~ ~ f i c l e ~ ~ r i : ~ l  i ~ ~ f o l . ~ l ~ n t i o ~ ~  ?ailled 3- a 
rest111 of profr. . io~~al ncrivity for  perso~lal  bellefir or t l ~ i ~ r  of or1iel.s. 
Appendix B 
Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board 
Lynette A. F. Donner 
Legal Counsel 
Background: The IECDB monitors and enforces two areas: campaign 
disclosure and administrative branch ethics. IECDB defines public interest 
groups as those involved in an election or those opposing 
someone/something in an election. 
Q1. Which rules are the cause of most concern? 
A l .  The paramount thing - reason for being - is to answer "where they get 
their money and how do they spend it." 
Q2. Which rules are most frequently violated? 
A2. There is a $500 limit on raising funds before disclosure forms must be 
filed. Organized candidates and groups know this. The problems usually 
occur with neighborhood groups, i.e. a group opposing a school bond 
issue, which are focused on economic development or are personally 
opposed to the issue and don't realize they have become a political 
committee. "They're turned in to us. We don't have to go out and seek 
them." (This raises the question of who is really the watchdog - the media or 
opposition groups?) We don't oversee the groups. The county auditors have 
the forms which the groups need to file. IECDB enforces after a violation. 
The problem is usually on disclosure on ads or brochures which must 
have ;1 "paid for by .. . "  statement. Again these violations are usually be 
people don't know about the rule. However, the intentionally sneaky ones 
are most difficult to track down. 
Q3. Are there different rules or not-for-profit, corporations, government 
:~gencies? ErhyAVhy not? 
A3.  There :Ire differences for candidate elections. Interest groups funding 
milst be separate from corporate dollars. Corporate dollars can't be used 
fori:lg:~inst candidates. However individuals can contribute through a 
corpor:lte-organized political action conunittee (PAC). Corporations are an 
:im:lssment of capital. If that capital is used to buy candidates, it may corrupt 
the [x)litir:ll process and harm the integriv of the electoral process. One of 
the prol,lenn seen in Ioara is that corporations are not so much an 
; l c c~~n~~~l : l t i o r~  o f  we:tlth as :n tax shelter for 'mom & pop' businesses. 
II~\\~c\~et- .  :I coryx)r.ltion is a corporation regardless of size :md the rules 
:ippls. 
4 4 .  What has been the trend in these laws? More/less? 
~ 4 .  The laws are continually becoming more detailed. The law is fairly 
reactive to situations. Right now candidates have a list of what the can and 
can't do with contributions. PAC's have no limitations on what they can do 
with the dollars. A little more than a year ago, a scam PAC emerged. There 
was no legitimate purpose for it. They filed the forms, but none of the 
dollars went to candidates, ballot issues, etc. All money was used internally. 
While Donner didn't have all the details, she said it could be argued that it 
was used for personal benefit. There is a bill before the Iowa legislature that 
funds have to be used for the stated purpose for which the group was 
organized. Another aspect of the bill would allow control over such things 
as telemarketing by PAC's. It will probably get out of the Senate but maybe 
not out of the House because of time. 
Q5. What has driven these new rule considerations? 
A5. Can legislate ethics when it's of a concrete nature. It's a different story 
when it gets into interpersonal relationships. 
Industry could be legislated if not operating ethically. In a sense, all 
laws are a codification off the morals of society. Killing is bad, so it's illegal. 
Taking money for other than the stated purpose could be considered bad as 
well, so it could become illegal. Where there isn't so common a ground, it's 
tougher to legislate morality. 
Q6. Why was the IECDB established' 
A6. Before 1773, it was the Campaign Finance Disclosure Commission. The 
focus nras on legislature. Then there began to be the same concern with 
regard to the Executive branch. So the Board gained the added 
responsil3ility for ethics as they related to the administrative branch of 
government. In part this was in reaction to people leaving and taking up 
lol~l3ying and also to Joe Welch, a senator who was deemed to have a 
conflict of interest in that while he held an elected position with the state, he 
worked for a company selling securities to the state and did so using the 
resources of his public office. 
Q7. Hon. :Ire the laws enforced? 
A7. The I3o:lrcl is set up to respond to complaints brought to them forrnallv 
or inforrn:llly. blostly the Board is involved with people seeking advisor). 
opinion ~ l ; t l j *  11:n~r the power to fine or take court action but haven't had 
to on the csecuti~re ethics side. Fines are related to improper disclosure are 
routine. 
Q8. Is tllcrc consistency in the la\vs n~ith other states.? 
A X  St:ltcls :1ren9t gre;~tl\r dissin1il:lr although st:~tes do custo~nize to their onVn 
si tu:lt ion :I.S Ionr:~ h:~s The system of reporting is conmon although 
thl-csholcls I ~ : I ~ T ~  from state to sr:lte. All sr:ltes take their st:lrting pl;lce from 
t hc> f c ~ l c ~ : ~ l  sclx,rr in8 system. 
Q9. The Citizens for Riverboat Gambling (a front group) w a  described as a 
new/deceptive way of influencing public opinion. Were there any changes 
in rules that came up after that situation? 
A7. No. "The disclosure function is meant to pierce that veil" of who is 
behind the name of an organization. There has been discussion of whether 
w e  should limit how much a corporation can contribute to ballot issues. 
However there would be constitutional issues. The question would be if it 
corrupts the integrity of the electoral process. She's not sure a case could be 
made that corporate money has been able to change the underlying 
community opinion on an issue. In Polk County Argosy gave all the money 
and lost because co~rnunity opinion was opposed to the project; in Clarke 
County, Argosy gave all the money and the ballot issue passed because 
community opinion supported the project. If she were to argue a case for or 
against a corporate giving cap, shed have to argue that in some way the 
corporate dollars were able to substantially change community opinion. 
~ l s o ,  an issue is not something you can buy (unlike a candidate) and then 
pull the strings on it over time. 
Wright Andrews, Esq. 
Butera & Andrews 
President 
American League of Lobbyists 
Mr. Andrews is a lawyer and lobbyist who has worked in Washington, D.C. 
for the past 20 years. He is the president of the American League of 
Lobbyists, a national association founded in 1979 and dedicated to serving 
L government relations and public affairs professionals. He provided an 
overview off the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, why and how it was 
passed, and the Act's implications for coalitions, 
He said: The old lam!, which had been on the books since the late 
1940's was unclear and unenforceable. As it was written, it was a joke; it 
was meaningless. It had been recognized as totally inadequate for 20 years. 
Numerous hearings had been held about changing the law, but they could 
never get passed through both houses. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was brought up in close to its 
present form in 1994 but was defeated based on tnimped up charges 
regarding how grassroots groups would be affected. The 1995 Congress 
passed the bill although even this bill was cut back in many ways. 
While this new law is not perfectly clear, it does require greater 
disclosure. It is fairly clear on who has to register. In spite of some gaping 
loopholes, it requires most lobbyists to register. At least they have to 
indicated what they were hired to work on, by whom and how much they 
were paid. This l a b  is better. It will lead to disclosure. 
I f  someone nrere to read the old law, it would not seem to be as 
ineffective as it  was in practice. The federal law was gutted by court 
interpretation. In 1948 or 1952, the Supreme Court interpreted the bill very 
narro\171y so i t  wound up not having the depth it appears to on its face. 
Unrler the old  la^, coalitions gave corporations, organizations and 
lobtwists something to hide behind. Some corporations did not want it to be 
knonrn ti1:lt they nrantecl to affect public policy. So a coalition nrould be 
forn~ecl ;tncl since disclosure of who nras hinding/involved in the coalition 
\xr:l.s not req~~irecl, organizations could become involved in affecting policy 
n~irl~out lx~l,lic knontledge. Over the years there have been more coalitions. 
hkst :ire legitin~nte in the broad sense but some were put together to hide 
t~ehincl. 
T l ~ c  neu. Act is nlurkj: on n-hen disclosure has to happen on 
co:ll~t ions. lxit contributors of over S1O.OOO ha1.e to be disclosed. 
\ r : l s i~~~~s  gmups :Ire tre:ited differently b!. the new Act. Not for profit 
~ I ' , ( I P \  h:l\re register except for churches and state :md local organizations. 
C(,llpl-c.ss ~ , : l t l l ~ ~ l  /,;I& :,nCl forth on [his Not for profits use feder:ll fund5 to 
c:lrql O I J ~  their i~I~(1IOgi~:ll :~pend:~s \Jet they n,:lnted to he exempt from 
rcgislcl-ing :IS I(,l,l,vi.;ts Tile limitetl pnnrision which exists in the 1995 Act 
\\?:I cll-(Jplwcl in :Is.:ln :ifter th~ught. AS k ~ r  ns puhlic imlicy is concerned. 
~llc.l.c. i.; 1 1 0  i~ : l l i c l  1-c:lson to h:l\:c i,ro;~d pener:iI exm~ptions for these grOllpS. 
If the churches want to get involved in public policy discussions, they can, 
but they should have to disclose this involvement. 
The new law is not that burdensome. It is the position of the 
American League of Lobbyists that it is helpful to the lobbying profession to 
have a low that's clear, to have disclosure, to clear up the misconceptions 
that have occurred because of the way the old law was interpreted. 
Appendix C 
Graham Gillette 
Pinnacle Communications 
Represented Argosy Gaming 
Citizens for Riverboat Gambling 
Clarke County Development Corporation 
Interview conducted: January 25, 1996 
Q1. What was the coalition's stated objective? 
AI.  In both cases, the objective was to bring a new economic opportunity to 
the area, bringing jobs and associated businesses to the area. To accomplish 
the objective, voters in each county would need to pass the county 
referendum vote required to enable casino riverboat gambling. 
4 2 .  Who were intended to be members of the coalition? 
A2. In Polk County, members were to be business and community leaders, 
The coalition wanted these leaders to say that from a business and a personal 
standpoint, CRG would be good for the area. The objective was to have 
these influencers buy in and then sell the concept to the voters. However, 
"It ended up  as a coalition of one." 
In ~1-arke County, the initial members were the Clarke County 
economic development committee. They called Argosy before the Polk 
County vote and invited Argosy to work with them to bring the project to 
C1:lrke County. The effort was a bi-partisan community initiative led by the 
CCDC. The project tvas funded by Argosy. The boards of supervisors of 
surrouncling counties were approached by CCDC to gain their support. All 
o f  t he111 dici P:LSS resolutions supporting the Clarke County project. They felt 
t h : ~  h;lcl ;IS strong a plitical base as possible. Vote passed by 70%. 
Q3. I - Iow were these individuals/organizations contacted and their support 
enlistecl? 
AS. In I'olk county, one-on-one meetings were held with City Council 
1nenll3ers. These were initiated by Argosy and Gillette. The City Council 
sugge.stecl C;r:1\7.: Lake ~LS the site, which Argosy pursued to the point of 
l ~ i ~ y i n g  llle property for development. Individual meetings were held with 
I~i~sincss  Ic:ldcrs, some of whom seemed favorably disposed toward the 
project until prolninent city leaders. J:lck Rehm (Meredith Corporation) and 
I>:~\ , icl  1 111 rcl ( I'~-incip:~l Fin:~ncial Group) said no. 
In <:l;~r.ke C,ountv, The lead on contacts wns tken  by CCDC. 
C O I I I I ~ L I ~ I I \  rclur:ltion meetings nrere held to educate the broader population. 
, ~ ] ~ c s ~  \ r ~ e f . l  initi:ltc.cl I J ~  CCDC with Argos). nttending to pro\.ide informtion. 
(XI )C ;11so con~:s~ccl  nlernlxrs of t tie County's lepislai~~e d legation 2nd 
I~o:II.c~.s of u lyr\,is(,~.: of s~lrrounding counties to enlist their sll PPrt .  
4 4 .  What was the baseline for number of members signed up before the 
coalition went public? 
A4. N o  specific number in Polk County. Meetings were held with 
government and business leaders. First with the city manager and council. 
In Clarke County, the base was the CCDC which included the mayor, 
a bank leader, and various business leaders. A bi-partisan group. The local 
group determined what was best in terms of additional contacts/meetings. 
Argosy was supportive. For instance they held job fairs and at one, they 
received 1,500 applications in a day's time. 
Q5. What was the intent for the coalition to communicate with coalition 
members on an ongoing basis? 
A5. In Polk, because the coalition never actually materialized, in fact, this did 
not come into play. 
In Clarke, a series of educational events were held with 
citizens/voters. These informed attendees about the proposed site, 
environmental impact and job potential. There was constant communication 
between members of the core coalition group and Argosy. Argosy did the 
work in terms of providing technical support, statistics, etc., as well as being 
a media spokesperson on technical subjects. 
Q6. How were members involved/activated~ 
Q6. Not applicable in Polk County. 
In Clarke County, elected officials, i.e. legislators and boards of 
supervisors were involved to give credibility to the project. Their support 
took many forms, i.e. resolutions, media interviews, letters to the editor. 
Q7. LVhat cvas the source of the coalition's funding? 
A7. 100% Argosy in both cases. In Polk County, the bulk of the money was 
spent on a television and radio advertising campaign. 
I t  cost less in Clarke County. Money wac used to produce tnro direct 
mail pieces to send to everyone in Clarke County., produce a couple of radio 
spots, ancl t>illboards. "It was obvious it was a community effort" The 
pieces c1~1ott.d people in the community; looked local; didn't come across as 
big nmonev. 
Q8,  Dict ;ill conlition members contribute financially? Why? Why not? 
A8.  Not  :~pplicable in Polk County. 
In Cl;lrke County. No. I t  was discussed at length and decided that 
people knew the county had gone after Argosy and that the county wanted 
t o  p:lrtner i~rith Argosy. The county had decided: "It's Argosy or nothing so 
t l m t ~  dicln't mind taking money from Argosy for the canmp:lign." 
Q9. I-Ionr clicl the coalition coln~nunic:lte about its nmeml~erslmip and its 
:~ctiirities t o  the put>lic. policy makers ;lnd the ~nedi:~? 
A9. In Polk County, the coalition was a communication strategy brought 
forward when the ads were being produced. When the media asked, the 
coalition was honest about who they were and who their backing was. 
Previously mentioned communication campaign to Clarke County 
residents; participated in all interviews. Osceola Sentinel wrote about it 
weekly; editor was on CCDC. Sought DM media coverage around events. 
CCDC members made contacts with policy makers. 
Q10. What media coverage was there of coalition membership? 
A10. Membership in the Citizens for kverboat Gambling was a major issue in 
Des Moines Register coverage because it was learned early that there were 
only two members in the coalition. 
With regard to the Clarke County project, there was no coverage of 
the membership, per se, although there were quotes from many people who 
were supprtive of the project. 
Q11. What media coverage was there of coalition activity and how did the 
coalition perceive that coverage? 
A1 1. Gillette was very careful not to speak for coalition. Mary Ellen Kimball, 
member of CCDC, was local contact 
Q12. Were guidelines used in establishing the coalition membership? 
A1 2. Only guideline was to involve business/comrnunity support which 
would help Argosy see the project as an economic development opportunity 
for Polk county. 
In Clarke County, after experiencing the problems in Polk Count)., the 
strategy was to let the local leaders take the lead in all cases with Argosy 
provicling information and financial support as necessary. 
Q1.3. Whrit considerations were given to naming the coalition? 
A1 3. In Polk Countv, they wanted to use '*citizensn because they were 
convincecl they n~obld have citizen involvement. Since they used the name 
\vithout acturllly having citizen membership, it "turned out to be a huge 
neg:~tive." 
I11 Cl:irke used 3 different approach. Wanted a down home name and 
Itx~k. \Sihile there nr:Ls a tag line, "Vote 4 The Boat.'' the effort was under the 
:~ilspirrs o f  :I s~rlnding group, the Clarke County Developnlent Corporation. 
A logo nJ;is cleveloped by high school student. 
Q14. Is the co;llition :in ongoing entity? 
A 1 4. N o .  Not in either case. 
C) 1 i. if [lit co:lIition is no longer ncti\re, hon. do  !Toil evaluate the 
cffc.c.ti~~ene,ss of the c-o:llition in :iccomplishing its obiecti~~e? 
A 1 5 In I 'o I I ;  Coilntv, the conlition nr:ls not effecthre 2nd rimy eLren ha\-e been 
:I clc>tl-i~llc'n~ sinc'c it \\':IS seen ;is :I sh:ml. 
In Clarke County, it was highly effective because it was a broad based, 
bi-partisan community effort. 
Q16. In retrospect, would you use a coalition again if you faced the same 
situation again? 
~ 1 6 .  A casino can't just come to a community and get this kind of project 
passed. It has to be driven by the community. The Polk and Clarke County 
projects are a good lesson for casino promoters. 
417. Were there ethical considerations/concerns that arose at any time 
during the existence of this coalition? 
A17. 1n Polk, Gillette felt Argosy did things right because they felt the 
walked away with not being bad guys, just had a bad idea. Very up front, 
never hid. 
There were great debates about funding in Clarke County. Great care 
was always taken to run dollars through the coalition. A committee was 
formed to file reports with county auditors. 
418. Do you think the coalition technique is being misused or abused by 
special interest groups? 
A18. "We clearly misused it in Polk County." They moved ahead with the 
coalition even though they didn't have members signed up because: "we felt 
we had to get a jump on the competition. We may have been successful if 
we'd had more time and had the coalition formed before it was announced. 
Maybe we could have been successful." 
This kind of misuse "causes people to be cynical of coalitions." 
Gillette keeps the Citizens for Riverboat Gambling logo on his shelf as a 
reminder of what not to do. He feels he learned more from the mistake than 
from the success. 
QI9. \Vh;it guidelines do you believe should be taken into consideration by 
puI>lic re1:ltions people, corporations and special interest groups in 
est;il~lishing coalitions? 
,419. Do homework to understand what you're trying to accomplish and n-ho 
:ire likel?. to be 3 bxse of coalition. Go to them, listen to them, learn from 
them :lnd I)uild the coalition quietly. Perhaps it does not need as broad but 
r:~ther :IS strong ;i bxse as possible. Doing this will create a well mapped 
out str;ttegic pl;~n. "\Ve never had a plan just that we were going to pass the 
referend~in~: Tn~st us." 
Keep ftxused on what you're tqying to do 
Spsc:~cling out funding prevents "thev're buying the Irate" concerns. 
L ~ I I I  i t  1\41] clepencl on the situation, so this ;anst be n no or !.es guideline. 
General comments 
The coalition worked in Clarke County because it was a truly community 
driven coalition. We got it backwards in Polk County. We tried to fake a 
coalition here. We really did believe we had the support. Lots of people 
said they supported us but couldn't do it in public. 
Historically riverboat gambling comes into a community with 
economic problems. They were not asked to come to Polk, Argosy picked 
the community. Polk County politicians were okay, but the problem was 
employer groups who thought the project would take from an already tight 
employee base. Clarke County contacted Argosy. 
Susan Neely, Senior Vice President, Director of Communications 
Health Insurance Association of America 
Coalition for Health Insurance Choices (CHIC) 
Interview Conducted - February 24, 1996 
Q1. What was the coalition's stated objective? 
Al.  To pass comprehensive health care reform at the federal level that 
achieves health care that serves everyone. We would have sought universal 
insurance coverage if we had an employer mandate. This was difficult 
because we needed business support and businesses didn't support 
employer mandate. This cut us off from many natural allies. Some 
businesses wouldn't get in at all. CHIC was not consistent with their 
missions. 
Neely felt the Arthritis Foundation which had originally signed up as a 
member of CHIC and later withdrew was leaned on by the Democratic 
National Committee to pull out. 
The "Harry & Louise" ads were tagged: "Sponsored by the Coalition 
for Health Insurance Choices. Primary funding by the Health Insurance 
Association of America." This helped organizational/coalition credibility 
when they came under media scrutiny since there was no deception about 
who was funding the effort. 
Q2. Who were intended to be members of the coalition? 
A2. HIAA staff were assigned to approach potential members who would 
represent a broad base of HIAA member companies, businesses and other 
organizations interested in health care reform. Many coalition partners were 
listed on CHIC letterhead and many were not. The ones who were not listed 
on the letterhead just exchanged Info every week. 
HIAA started with groups who would be publicly supportive -- "the 
Letrer head committee." HIAA said they didn't need money from these 
organizations, just needed their name and manpower. 
Then HIM added individuals, mostly through the ad campaign. 
430,000 individuals called the 8009 included in the television ads. Those 
w h o  c;dlecl were sent a packet of information about CHIC'S goals. 43,000 
people returned a card from the packet asking for membership. These 
individu:il's names went into a database and they were asked to do things 
supportive of the coalition. There were provided with letter writing points. 
bumper stickers, etc. HIAA experienced high response rates when HIAA 
asked them to clo something. 
Q3. Honr  were these individuals/organizntions contacted and their support 
enlist ecl? 
A3. 0rg:lniz:itions were gilVen n packet including the CHIC \,ision in total m d  
indii,idu:~l white papers on key issues H I M  objected to most. The\- nrere 
:~skecl ro sign :I card saying they agreed to be rnemLxrs. Each orpniz:aion 
pr(n~iclccl n:lrne, phone. FAY, sign:lturr. 1ndiviclu:ils nrerr nsked for this too. 
All were added into the database. H I M  was scrupulous about getting and 
recording this information in case anyone asked. 
Q4. What was the baseline for number of members signed up before the 
coalition went public. 
~ 4 .  For letterhead purposes HIM wanted to have 10-20 organizations who 
brought credibility. "To some degree it's the quality," Neely said, rather than 
a specific number of organizations If they had signed the National 
Chamber of Commerce, for instance, they could have gone faster. In 
California where HIAA had set up a coalition to address state issues, they had 
three big business groups and that was enough. "After we got to be heroes, 
others wanted to help. The National Organization of Manufacturers was an 
important one who joined us." 
Q 5 .  What was the intent for the coalition to communicate with coalition 
members on an ongoing basis? 
A5. "We built an arsenal of people. Then when we had an issue, we could 
activate them.' 
Q6. How were the members involved/activated. 
A6. There were many examples of how members were activated. For 
instance, when issues such as mandatory alliances, spending limits or the 
specific Clinton Health Reform Plan were being discussed, Call-to-Action 
Alerts were sent to CHIC members. Between February through June 1993, 
these Alerts generated 46,081 letters and mailgrams to Congress and to key 
memt->ers of congress in their home districts. Calls-to-Action were sent 
specific;llly for each relevant issue. Calls-to-Action were specific to CHIC 
member interests, i.e. rnailings to small business members encouraged them 
to contact their Senators and express opposition to flat community ratings. 
Q7. What was the source of the coalition's funding. 
A?. All funds were from HIAA. They could get in-kind contributions from 
members. I N  t pure dollars were HIAA. 
Q H .  I l ic l  :\I1 coalition members contribute financially? Why or why not? 
AH. We felt we couldn't get the dollars. The people with big dollars, i.e. 
I>usinrss groups, ciidn't want to give because they didn't agree with our 
ol,lect~ves. H I M  s:lici members could carry the message as the front groups 
:mcl 1-IIAh \\.o~~Ici put in dollars. Other groups disagreed with strategic 
:lplxo:~.h H I M  felt that if it nras the future of their members at stake. the!. 
s o i  I .  There were no obvious sources of cash. Also, nrith one funder. 
I I IAA c l i c l i . l  h;lve t o  dicker around nvith coalit~on members in the decision 
a l > o ~ ~ t  i l "  1 ~ 1 1 1  i t  n1:lkc.s it  h;~rder to rn:ike decisions. 
Q9.  How did the coalition communicate about its membership and its 
activities to the public, policy makers and the media? 
A9. HIAA was "Not an optimum coalition" -- in term of media and policy 
maker credibility. Didn't have the big names on letterhead. Inside the 
Beltway, it was seen as being totally an HIAA initiative, not a broad based 
coalition. Focus group testing showed the CHIC was much more credible 
outside the Beltway and in the ads. However, H I M  decided to continue to 
use the coalition inside the Beltway because with the citizens as members 
they felt they had enough to be credible. 
The Washington Post article created serious problem for HIAA and 
the coalition. "At that point, any hope of making it a more broad based 
coalition was lost." "Based on stumble with the (publicizing of the) 
campaign plan, we considered dropping the coalition." Because the focus 
group research showed the coalition continued to be credible outside 
Washington, CHIC was retained. 
In 1995, H I M  disbanded the legal entity CHIC, but HIAA continues 
to use the name with citizen volunteers. 
Q10. What media coverage was there of coalition membership? 
A10. Other than the Times and the Post, none. HlAA assumes some similar 
ones that trickled down from the Post coverage, but never any others. "\Ve 
passed through the ring of fire and were never any better or worse than we  
said we were. But we were never what we could have been," because of 
the Post article. However by then, Jan. 1994, 100 groups had surfaced who 
acted like a coalition for HIAA. 
In the end, what HIAA didn't get was the public power of coalition 
but did they get the support work of a coalition. 
H I M  was a hot information source on ads, policy, etc. They'd take 
H I M  counsel on timing and message and recycle it through their systems. 
Q11. \Vh:lt media coverage was there of coalition activity and how did the 
co:ilition percei~~e that coverage? 
A1 1 The Harry & Louise ads were used to focus attention on HIAA message 
points ;mcl were considered a public relations triumph by HIAA. A news 
conference nlas helci to introduce each new wave of advertising H I M  and 
the ads p i n e d  even more visibility and credibility when the Clinton's did a 
p:lr(~ly o f  H:lrry and Louise during the Washington Gridiron event. 
I - l I h A  considered the bulk of this coverage to be highly positive. The 
:~cls gener:~trd firr more news coverage of HIAA messages than they ever had 
inl:~ginecl [xfisjl,]e. The donrnside of the :ids was that entenainnlent nleili:~ 
such :n Ik~,pIe m:lp:izint' hegnn to focus on Harq and Louis as red people 
1 1 1  . 1 .  M:~naging this attention took time 3ncl dhrefled 
:~tlcmtion from other more important a~ti\~ities. 
~ l s ( , ,  tile ]'(fit :lnd Times coLrer:ige which focused on the H1.4-A 
slr:llegic pl:ln :111d members who had left the conlition effectively kept HIAA 
from rc*rru i, ing tile ki1,~\ :lnd number of co:~lition members they had x:mreci. 
Consequently, the media coverage kept them from being as effective as a 
coalition as they had planned. 
4 1 2 .  Were guidelines used in establishing the coalition membership? Whal 
were there. 
A12. No. 
Q13.  What considerations were given to naming the coalition? 
A12. The name stemmed from the HIAA Vision. HIAA was opposed to the 
Clinton plan for regional purchasing plans. Research showed that people 
were concerned about lack of choice. Opinion research was so critical. 
Tested words, and messages. "Choice" was a loaded word. 
Q14. Is the coalition an ongoing entity? 
A14. See answer 9. 
Q15. If the coalition is no longer active, how do you evaluate the 
effectiveness of the coalition in accomplishing its objective? 
A15. The coalition as it evolved was not the driver of the campaign. It was 
HIAA. It should have been CHIC. The reasons were our positions which 
potential partners did not agree with, the Post article which scared people 
away, and some of our strategies which others didn't support. 
In California, it worked as it should. As it turned out, CHIC became 
useful as a tagline on ads and to activate citizen volunteers. 100 
organizations came in afterwards, but to exchange information -- not to make 
decisions. 
As :I key part of the strategy, it was not what it could have been. From 
a DC standpoint, i t  nras not an "effective"/legitirnate coalition. 
Q16. In retrospect, would you use a coalition again if you faced the same 
situation again? 
A16. "I would always use a coalition. It takes the initiative away from being 
that of an individual group or organization. It increases clout and credibility 
I'd ;~lways opt for greater involvement." 
417. Were there ethical considerations/concerns that arose at any time 
during the existence of this coalition? 
A 17. 13asic et hied considerations n7ere: 
I'eople neecl to know what we stand for 
I'eoplc. need to know what they're signing up to 
I'cople need to know what strategies are being implen~ented 
U o t t o r n  line is neecl for full disclosure 
Qlri. I ) o  ~ ~ o i i  think the coalition technique is being misused or abused b ~ .  
,slx.ci;ll inrvrest groups? 
A18. There are many organizations who just come up with a name to tag 
their efforts. This particularly comes up in ads. There is a big opportunity 
for abuse there. Many media do Ad Watch columns but they don't do 
analysis of coalitions and those sponsoring them. 
"Which citizens and whose coalitions are problems media 
should/could do a lot more with." 
419. What guidelines do you believe should be taken into consideration by 
public relations people, corporations, and special interest groups in 
establishing coalitions? 
Al9 .  "The strategic imperative is clear. The stranger the bedfellows, the 
stronger the coalition. The broader based the interests represented, the 
stronger the position when the group goes forward." 
People have to understand what they're signing up for (what's the 
threat, what they stand for, what the cost) The hardest thing is forming a 
nucleus. Once they have that, it becomes easier having frank discussions. 
We have to understand that we can't call all the shots if we want their 
names, money, involvement. 
Everyone has to understand what we'll go along with/what not. Neely 
talks individually with the players to be sure everyone understands the 
other's agenda. 
Setting up governance is an issue. 
Executive committee -- most dollars and most decisions. Dollars, 
name and vote go together. If you want to make decisions, have to pay. 
Steering Committee -- representatives of all participants 
Legal council -- do we need it 
PR firm -- who they report to 
How often meet 
The major fights are over dollars, decisions. PR firm 
In adclition to answering the questions in this interview, Neely provided 
three dcxluments: "Vision and Advocacy Highlights: September 1994;" 
1'oljtic:rl Advertising and Health Care Reform," and "The Role of Advertising 
in the Me:~lth are Reform Debate." 
Frank Mankiewicz 
Vice Chairman 
Hill & Knowlton 
Represented the Government of Kuwait 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait 
Interview conducted: March 6, 1996 
Q1.  What was the group's stated objective? 
A l .  To make people aware of what Kuwait was and what was going on 
there. 
4 2 .  What was the hoped for outcome of gaining public support from the 
American public? 
A2. Kuwaitis living in the United States would feel better about themselves. 
Kuwaiti citizens (primarily students) who were living in the U.S. at the time 
felt they were suffering from the image of Kuwait that was being portrayed 
in the media. They would feel better about themselves if Americans 
understood their country better. 
Q3.  What was the baseline for number of members signed up before the 
group went public? 
A3. The group was set up before it came to H&K for help. The students had 
taken their concern to a couple of former Kuwaiti government ministers who 
came up with the idea to form a national organization. They had no name 
and no structure when they came to H&K with the idea. So there were no 
specific numbers for the group. 
Q4.  Mow were the members involved/activated~ 
A4. A council was formed made up of a few people who were ministers in 
the Kuwaiti government, the dean of a law school and former members of 
the Kuw:~iti parliament. They made the decisions and were the 
spokespople. \Ye were hired to set up rallies at campuses, get media 
coirer:lge of those events. That's what we did. 
Q5.  Ilicl ;ill group members contribute financially? Why? Why Not? 
AS. "I h:lve no idea." 
Q6.  Wh:~t consiclerations were given to nanung the coalition? 
AO. The group had ;ilready formed when it came to H&K. 
Q 7  I-I( , \ \ -  cio yo11 e\r:llu3te the effectiveness of the callition in accon~plishinp 
its ol,jec.ti\pe? 
A?. I)rt>tt?, gtxxl. There  is :I long ;irticle in Time tow:lrd the end of the 
\I~.:II. \\rrittcxn 1,). !vlich:tel Kr;umer t h ; ~  described Kuwait ;is :I pretty , L qooci 
c.c,Llntr-\r i l l  :I I,;ld neigh1,orhood. It's true th:lt n.omen cm't \-ote in Kun.:iir 
1,111 tIlc>\. ~ 3 1 1 ' 1  in otl~er countries in th:lt are:1 either. The rne~nhers of the 
coalition who were former members of parliament were going to try to get 
changes made if they got their country back. They wanted to give 
parliament more power. Some of these members of parliament had been 
exiled before the war broke out and some were exiled as a result of the war. 
48. Were there ethical considerations/concerns that arose at any time during 
the existence of the coalition? 
A$. They wanted to be sure they were not seen as a group trying to affect 
U.S. policy. They were against U.S. force. It was a matter of pride. They 
didn't want to have to ask another country for help. They thought the 
economic sanctions against Iraq should be allowed to work. 
Q7. Do you think the coalition technique is being misused or abused by 
special interest groups? 
A7. Good coalitions are not, but bad coalitions are clumsy, ineffective and 
are seen through. Having everyone in an industry involved makes sense but 
it has to be representative of the group's interest. If one person/group 
controls it, it can be clumsy. 
Q10. What guidelines do you believe should be taken into consideration by 
public relations people, corporations, and special interest groups in 
establishing coalitions? 
A10. They should be out in the open and tell the truth. Then you never 
have to remember what you said. 
Q11. How did the coalition perceive media coverage of the coalition? 
A1 1. Media coverage was pretty good. One article in Harper's magazine by 
MxArthur reported on a lot of activities which were later proven to be 
inaccurate. This article seemed to be the genesis of the adverse attention on 
the coalition. 
Q12.  \Vh:it wxs the story behind the Ambassador's daughter's testimony 
since this testimony also focused negative attention on the coalition? 
A1 2. A Human Rights conference was being held in the Senate. The Senate 
;~skecl the  Citizens for a Free Kuwait for names of people who could testify at 
this conference. The ambacsador's daughter was smuggled out of Kuwait 
ancl w;ts prepared to testify about atrocities she had seen. The Ambassador 
:~sked Congressm:ln L:lntos not to give the girl's last name because they n7ere 
;lfr:~icI o f  reprisals ap~~inst family members still in K u n a i t .  Lantos agreed. 
.'\X'c tllought this was 3 mistake but nre were not in control. Then the girl 
tc.slificcl rh ;~ t  she hnci seen several instances in which Iraqi soldiers had taken 
l,;~l,ies o i ~ r  of incub:~tors, left them on the floor, and taken the incubrltors. I t  
turnccl o~ l t  shc'cl onl~r seen one such instance." 
'I'llcl-c. nfere cert:~in n1ist;kes the Citizens for a Free Kuwait nude thnt 
1 -  1 .  -\S/c ivoi~ld hilve handled the hexing differentl).. but n-e didn't 
11:lvc. c-onlrol of th:l[." 
Jules Kroll, an investigator out of New York, was hired to track down 
Kuwaiti assets and to track down inaccuracies in what had been reported. 
This showed that a lot of what had been reported about Citizens for a Free 
Kuwait was inaccurate. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, R. J. & Jennings, K. M. (1993, Summer). Media advocacy: A case 
study of Philip Sokolof's cholesterol awareness campaign. The lournal 
of Consumer Affairs, 27: 145-65. 
Auerbach, S. (1991, June 5). Kuwaitis paid for Mosbacher trip. 
Washin~ton Post, A, 1311. 
Barney, R. D. & Black, J. (1994, Fall). Ethics and professional persuasive 
communications. Public Relations Review. 20: 233-48. 
Bergner, D. J. (1986, Fall). The maturing of public interest groups. Public 
Relations Quarterly, 14-16. 
Bok, S. (1989). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. New York: 
Vantage Books: 
Bovet, S. F. (1993, November). The burning question of ethics: The 
profession fights for better business practices. Public Relations Tournal, 
24-5+. 
Bowers, F. (1994, November 3). Argosy spends $200,000 to get boat afloat. 
The Des Moines Register, M, 6. 
13owers, F. (1794, August 26). Riverboat plan decried. The Des Moines 
Register, M, 1. 
Uo\vers, F. (1994, August 30). Riverboat interests scouting D.M. area. The 
Des Moines Register, A, 1. 
Uonrers, I-'. ( 1994, December 20). Charter campaign spending: 
Commonn~ealth backers raised more than $600,000. The Des Moines 
Register, M, 2. 
Cirlson. J .  (1994, October 8). TV screens to reflect Argosy push: The gaming 
fir111's :~d  :lpency hired four actors to play just plain folks who tout the 
:~cli~:~nt:iges of riverbost gambling. The Des Moines Register. M, 1. 
S O I I  I .  ( 1994, October 20). 'Citizms' group paid by Argosy: 'It's a 
clifkrent u7ny of going ahout things.' as opposed to n grassroots ballot 
isstlc.. The Des R;loines Reeister, A. 1. 
0 1  I . tl. Elclr~., C. D. (1971, November). The politics of npendn- 
j>uilcjinq: An :~[lernative persprcti\.e for modern den~rrrntic theonr. 
'1'11~) / O O ~ I I ; I I  of Ih)litics, 3 3 4 ) :  892-9lj. 
Cobb, R.;  Ross, J-K.; Ross, M. H. (1976, March). Agenda building as  a 
comparative political process. The American Political Science Review 
70: 126-138. 
-
Cook, F. L.; Tyler, T. R.; Goetz, E. G.; Gordon, M. T.; Protess, D.; Leff, D. R.; 
& Moltoch, H. L. (1983, Spring). Media and agenda setting: Effects on 
the public, interest group leaders, policy makers, and policy. Public 
Opinion Quarterly. 47: 16-35. 
Cutlip, S. M. & Center, A. H. (1978). Effective Public Relations. Englew& 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Dateline Iowa. (1995, January 17). Clarke county votes to support casino 
boat. The Des Moines Register, - M, 1. 
Emerson, T. 1. & Haber, D. (1952). Political and civil rights in the United 
States. Dennis & Co., Inc. Buffalo, NY. 
~nglehardt ,  E. E. & Evans, D. (1994, Fall). Lies, deception, and public 
relations. Public Relations Review. 20: 249-66. 
Fogarty, T. A..  (1994, October 24). Poll: Voters don't support casino boat. 
Most of those planning to cast ballots Nov. 8 oppose Argosy Garning's 
plan and support Prairie Meadows. The Des Moines Register, A, 1. 
Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia. (1979). Funk 8; Wagnalls, Inc., New 
York. v22: 15-16. 
Gans, H.  J .  (1979). Deciding what's news. New York: Random House. 
Georges, C. (1 995, July 20). House panel likely to clear GOP plan to curb 
lol~bving by nonprofit groups. \Val1 Street Tournal, B2. 
Gilhrrg, S,: Eyal, C.; McCombs, M.; & Nicholas, D. (1980). In D L. Protess 
& h4. McCombs (ed), A~enda setting: Readings on media, public 
or-inion. :~nd policv making (pp 223-228). New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erll~;ium Associates. 
(;n,~,cr, R. ( 1989, ~ l v  2 2 ) .  Fighting back: The resurgence of social activism. 
I311sines.s Week. 34-35. 
I I:lne),, C, ( 199 j, February). Coalitions and ally development: The new 
imlxr;lfi\re in public policy work. Presented to The Public Affairs 
fiIu nc i l  ~ ; ~ [ i ~ ~ : l ]  Grss r~~ots  Conference for Corponre md Association 
l 'r(~f~ssion;ll~. Key West. Fl. 
I ~ ~ : , l t  1, 1 nsilr;lncc i\sncri;lfion of America (1994. September). Vision :lnd 
; l c l ~ r (  ~ . : ic .y l~igl~ligllt~. 
Hilts, P. J . .  (1993, October 20). Coalition opposing health plan is called front 
group for insurers. The New York Times, A, 18:l. 
Hunt, F. D., Jr. (1993, June). How coalitions work. Association Management, 
45,93-4+. 
Hunt, T. & Tirpok, A. (1993, Spring). Universal ethics code: An idea whose 
time has come. Public Relations Review. 19: 1-11. 
IABC Code of Ethics. (1994). International Association of Business 
Communicators. San Francisco, CA. 
Insurers halting ads against health plan. (1994, May 25). The New York 
Times, A22. 
Judge, P. (1995, July 31). Gaming vote is a slap at rural citizens. [~etter  to the 
editor] The Des Moines Register, A,7. 
Kramer, M. (1790, December 24). Toward a new Kuwait. Time. 136(27): 
26-33. 
Lang, G. E. & Lang, K. (1983). The battle for public opinion: The president, 
the press, and the polls during Watergate. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Lee, G.  (1970, November 19). Kuwaitis pay lion to publicity firm. The 
Washington Po;st, A, 21:l. 
Lee, G .  (1990, November 29). Kuwait's campaign on the PR front. The 
Washington Post, A, 1 :6. 
Lee, G (1991, March 17). The selling of Kuwait moves into new phase. 
\V:~shington Post, A 2 5:l. 
Lester, 1'. (1995, October). Grassroots sign-ons. lesterp@RTK.NET, Oct 31, 
1795. 
Lipset. S. hl. (17X6, Fall). The sources of public interest .activism. Public 
liel;lt~c>n.s Ouarterly, 9-13. 
McKce .  13. K.; N:~ynun, 0. B. & Lattimore, D. L. (1975, November). How PR 
people see thenfielves. Public Relations loumal. 47-52. 
M:lnl~cim. 1 .  B. & Albritton, R B (1984. ~eptember). Changing national 
im:\~es:  international public relations and media agenda setting. 
Anlcric:~n P<,litic:~l Science Review. 78(1): 641-657. 
~ e l s ~ n .  13, ( 1 ) .  hj:&ing :m issue of child abuse. In D. L. Protess & M. 
blc(i,ml,s (eel), Acef-d:~ sertina: Rendinrs on medin. public opinion. 
:inc\ ix,lic\l tn;lliing (pp 16 1-170). Nenr Jersey: Lanrrence Erlbaum 
Newmn,  R.  (1790, May). The lobbying coalition that wasn't. Public 
Relations Journal, 40+. 
Newport, F. & Saad, L. (1994, April). Confidence in institutions. The Gallup 
Poll Monthly, 5-6. 
Newsom, D. & Scott, A. (1993). This is PR: the realities of ~ublic relations. 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 
Novotny, J. (1990, Fall). Working with advocate groups. The Bureaucrat, 55- 
59. 
O'Connor, B. (1994, May). Grassroots: Pointers on tapping third parties for a 
winning edge. Impact, I+. 
Petroski, W. (1794, November 1). Polk county pivotal to gambling's fortunes: 
Public sentiment is drifting in a new direction, say opponents of the 
measure on next week's ballot. The Des Moines Register, M, 1. 
Petroski, W. (1994, November 9). Polk county voters say no to wagering on 
riverboats. The Des Moines Register, A, 1. 
Petroski, W. (1994, November 11). Curb sought on gambling votes: Gaming 
foes want a legal limit on repeat referendums. The Des Moines 
Register, M, 6. 
Petroski, W. (1995, January 12). Spumed by D.M., Argosy plans casino in 
Osceola. The Des Moines Register, A,1. 
I'etroski, W. (1995, February 1). Osceola opens its arms to Argosy Gaming 
Co. The Des Moines Register, M, 6. 
I'etroski. W. (1995, February 10). Foes aim to sink casino boat. The Des 
Moines Register, A,1. 
I'etroski. \V. (199 5. Februmr 27). Casino future looks like a gamble. The Des 
Moines Recister, A, 1. 
I)etroski, \ , I .  (199 5. June 16). Casino in Osceola seen snagging D.M. dollars. 
The Iles Moines Register, M, 6. 
Ijetroski, \ST. (1995, July 19). Will casino sink before it starts? The Des 
hcloines Register, A, 1. 
I'etroski, \V. (1995. July 22.). Ionra taking tougher stand on gambling. The 
Dchs hloines Kerzister, A, 1. 
.I'hc* I1irrs Group, Inc. (1994) Fortune 100 coalition stud~l. The Pires Group. 
IIIC.. Arclsley. NJ'. 
l'il-c..;, b ~ .  A .  ( 1~)o- i .  Iune). Lohb!ring: The ethic:ll ch;dlenge. Im~:~ct.  1. 
Pratt, C. B., APR. (1994, Fall). Research progress in public relations ethics: 
An overview. Public Relations Review. 20(3): 217-224. 
Protess, D. L.; Leff, D. R.; Brooks, S. C.; & Gordon, M. T. (1985, Spring). 
Uncovering rape: The watchdog press and the limits of agenda setting. 
Public Opinion Ouarterly. 47: 19-37. 
Protess, D. L. 8r McCombs, M. (1991). Agenda setting: Readings on media. 
public o~inion, and policymaking. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Public Interest Profiles 1992-1993. (1992). Foundation For Public Affairs. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
PRSA Code of Professional Standards for the Practice of Public Relations. 
(1988). Public Relations Society of America. New York. 
Reese, S. D. & Danielian, L. H. (1989). Intermedia influence and the drug 
issue: Converging on cocaine. In D. L. Protess & M. McCombs (ed), 
Agenda set tin^: Readings on media. public opinion. and policv making 
(pp 237-249). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Rivers, W. L. (1982). The media as shadow government. In D. L. Protess & 
M. McCombs (ed), Agenda setting: Reading on media, public opinion, 
and mlicv making (pp 153-160). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Roschwalb, S. A. (1934, Fall). The Hill 8; Knowlton cases: A brief on the 
controversy. Public Relations Review. 20(3): 267-276. 
Rose, M. (1991. Fall). Activism in the 90s: Changing roles for public relations. 
Public Relations Quarterly, 28-32. 
liowse, A.  E. (1992, September/October). How to build support for war. 
Coli~n~bia lourndism Review, 28-29. 
Ruhinstein, G .  (1987, March). Coalitions at the crossroads. Association 
h4:ln:l~ement. 79: 32-5+. 
Ti~ckcr, K.  & McNerne\:, S. L. (1992, January). Building coalitions to initiate 
c.h:lnge. P~~l>lic Relations Tournal, 28-30. 
'I'ilrk, 1. \'.S. (1986). Pc~blic rel:ltions' influence on the news. In D. L. Protess 
k h1. McCornbs (ecl), Agend;~ setting: Readings on media. public 
or?inion, :~nd policv 11uking (pp 21 1-222). Nenr Jersey: Lan~rence 
I :~ . l l ) ;~ i~ r i i  Ass(xi:ltes. 
Weaver, D. & Elliott, S. N. (1985, Spring). Who sets the agenda for the 
media? A study of local agenda-building. Journalism Ouarterly, 62, 87- 
94. 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. (1989). Merriarn-Webster, Inc., 
253. 
VVestley, B. H. (1787, Spring). Setting the political agenda: What makes it 
change? Journal of Communication, 26(2): 43-47. 
Winkelman, M. (1989, January 2). How to win friends and influence the 
grass roots. Adweek's Marketing Week, 42. 
Wright, D. K. (1993, Spring). Enforcement dilemma: Voluntary nature of 
public relations codes. Public Relations Review, 19(1): 13-20. 
Weisskopf, M. (1773, October 20). Grass-roots health lobby financed by 
insurers. The Washington Post, A,1:2, A,8:1. 
West, D. M., Heith, D., 8; Goodwin, C. (1995). Political advertising and 
health care reform. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Assn. Chicago, IL. Apr 6-8, 1995. 
Cobb, R.;  ROSS, J-K.; Ross, M. H. (1976, March). Agenda building as a 
comparative political process. The American Political Science Review, 
70: 126-138. 
-
Cook, F. L.; Tyler, T. R.; Goetz, E. G.; Gordon, M. T.; Protess, D.; Leff, D. R. ;  
& Moltoch, H. L. (1983, Spring). Media and agenda setting: Effects on 
the public, interest group leaders, policy makers, and policy. Public 
Opinion Ouarterl~, 47: 16-35. 
Cutlip, S. M. & Center, A. H. (1978). Effective Public Relations. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Dateline Iowa. (1995, January 17). Clarke county votes to support casino 
boat. The Des Moines Register, M, 1. 
Emerson, T. I.  & Haber, D. (1952). Political and civil rights in the United 
States. Dennis & Co., Inc. Buffalo, NY. 
Englehardt, E. E. & Evans, D. (1994, Fall). Lies, deception, and public 
relations. Public Relations Review. 20: 249-66. 
Fogarty, T.  A..  (1994, October 24). Poll: Voters don't support casino boat. 
Most of those planning to cast ballots Nov. 8 oppose Argosy Gaming's 
plan and support Prairie Meadows. The Des Moines Register, A, 1. 
Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia. (1979). Funk & Wagnalls, Inc., New 
York. ~ 2 2 :  15-16. 
G:ins. H .  J .  (1979). Deciding what's news. New York: Random House. 
Georges. C. ( 199 5, July 20). House panel likely to clear GOP plan to curb 
lol,l,ying by nonprofit groups. Wall Street Tournal, B2. 
Gillxrg, S.; Eyal, C.; McCombs, M.;  & Nicholas, D. (1980). In D. L. Protess 
& 91. McComl,s (ed). Agenda setting: Readings on media, public 
or-inion, ;~nd rx,licv making (pp 223-228). New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erl\,;~urn t2sst~iates. 
Gnnrer, R ( 1989, hl:lv 22). Fighting back: The resurgence of social activism. 
I3rls1ness Week, 34-35. 
tI:lnc!.. (1. ( 1395. Fchniary) Coalitions and ally development: The new 
i ~ n l x r : ~ i \ ~ c  in pul~lic plicv work Presented to The Public Affairs 
Council N:~tion:il Gr:~ssroots Conference for Corporate ~ n d  Associ:ltion 
1'1-ofcssion:~ls. Key West, F1. 
I lc:11111 I nsu~-;lnce Ass(ri:lrion of Amn-icn (1994, September). \:ision and 
Hilts, P. 1.. (1993, October 20). Coalition opposing health plan is called front 
group for insurers. The New York Times, A, 18:1. 
Hunt, F. D., Jr. (1993, June). HOW coalitions work. Association Management - 
6 93-4+. 
Hunt, T.  & Tirpok, A. (1993, Spring). Universal ethics code: An idea whose 
time has come. Public Relations Review. 19: 1-11. 
IABC Code of Ethics. (1994). International Association of Business 
Communicators. San Francisco, CA. 
Insurers halting ads against health plan. (1994, May 25). The New York 
Times, A22. 
Judge, P. (1995, July 31). Gaming vote is a slap at rural citizens. [Letter to the 
editor1 The Des Moines Register, A,7. 
Kramer, M. (1990, December 24). Toward a new Kuwait. Time. 136(27): 
26-33. 
Lang, G .  E. & Lang, K. (1983). The battle for public opinion: The president, 
the press, and the polls during Watergate. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Lee, G. (1990, November 19). Kuwaitis pay lion to publicity firm. The 
Washington m, A, 21:l. 
Lec, G .  (1 990, November 29). Kuwait's campaign on the PR front. The 
\Xr;lshingron Post, A, 1 :6. 
Lee. G .  ( .1091, March 17). The selling of Kuwait moves into new phase. The 
\Yr;lshinaton Post, A 25: 1. 
1-ester, 1) .  (1995, October). Grassroots sign-ons. lesterp@RTK.NET, Oct 31, 
1995. 
Lil3.s~. S hl. ( 1986, Fall). The sources of public interest activism. public 
I<t.l;ltions Ou:lnerly, 9-13. 
hlcI<ce. H. I<.: N:~yman, 0. D, & Lattimore, D. L. (1975. ~ovember). How PR 
jx.()ple see themselves. Public Relations lournal, 47-52. 
R1:lnhcim, 1 .  13. S. All,ritton. R D. (1984, Septenlher). Changing national 
inl:l,~cs: 1~1~~~: l t ion : l I  public relations and medi:~ agenda setting. The 
Anlclric.:ln ~'()litic;ll Science Rei!ienr. 71;(3): 641-657. 
Nclsclnq 1 3 .  ( l ( ) ~ . / i ) ,  M:&ing :in issue of child abuse. In D. L. Protess & hl. 
hdc(;clml,s (eel), A~encla sertinr: Re:\clings on medi:~. !,ul3lic opinion. 
:Inil ,u,lic.v milking (pp 161-170). Nenr Jersey: L:i\vrence Erlbnum 
ASS( K ' ~ ; I I  C'S. 
